THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE WERE AT PAINS YESTERDAY TO DENY
THAT THE REDUCTION IN SENTENCES WAS INSPIRED BY A DESIRE TO SEE MR. GREY
FREED. IT IS HARD, THOUGH, TO ESCAPE THIS INTERPRETATION UNQUOTE.
3. ALTHOUGH THE FACTS ARE REPORTED MORE OR LESS ACCURATELY BY ALL,
PRESENTATION IN THE QUOTE GUARDIAN UNQUOTE (PRITTIE) IS SOMEWHAT
MISLEADING. ITS HEADLINE - QUOTE BRITAIN TO FREE CHINESE UNQUOTE IS
FIRST GLOSSED BY : QUOTE BRITAIN HAS ANNOUNCED THE IMPENDING
RELEASE OF ALL CHINESE JOURNALISTS IMPRISONED IN HONG KONG UNQUOTE.
HOWEVER, REPORT PROCEEDS TO SAY THAT THERE IS QUOTE NOTHING DRAMATIC
UNQUOTE ABOUT THE ANNOUNCEMENT AS TEN OF THE NEWSWORKERS
WERE IN ANY CASE DUE FOR RELEASE IN THE AUTUMN.
RESTRICTED
/4. THE
RESTRICTED
- 2 -
4. THE QUOTE TIMES UNQUOTE INCLUDES FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH 1
THE ANNOUNCEMENT CAME AS A SURPRISE. OFFICIALS HAVE CONSISTENTLY RULED
OUT ANY MOVE OF THIS SORT BEFORE PEKING HAD GIVEN SOME CLEAR INDICATION
THAT IT WOULD RECIPROCATE. THE DECISION HAS STARTED FRESH SPECULATION
THAT THE AUTHORITIES MAY HAVE BEEN HOLDING PRIVATE TALKS WITH COMMUNIST
REPRESENTATIVES OR THAT THE BRITISH MISSION IN PEKING HAS AT LAST HAD
SOME RESPONSE TO ITS REPEATED REPRESENTATIONS
ON MR. GREY'S BEHALF.
5. REACTIONS OF MRS. GREY, WHO WILL BE WITH A DELEGATION DUE TO I SEE
MR. FOLEY ON MONDAY 12 MAY (IN ORDER TO PRESENT A PETITION,
SIGNED BY 53 OF MR. GREY'S RELATIVES, ASKING FOR THE RELEASE OF THE
NEWSWORKERS) ARE VARIOUSLY REPORTED OF THE NEWS THAT HER SON MIGHT
BE FREED SOON :
QUOTE I SHALL BELIEVE IT WHEN I SEE HIM, MY HOPES HAVE BEEN RAISED
SO MANY TIMES IN THE PAST. THEY SAID HE WOULD BE RELEASED AT CHRISTMAS
AND HE WAS NOT UNQUOTE (QUOTE THE TIMES UNQUOTE).
QUOTE IT SOUNDS HOPEFUL, BUT THERE IS ALWAYS THE NAGGING WORRY THAT THEY
MIGHT NOT RELEASE HIM AND WANT SOMETHING MORE UNQUOTE (QUOTE DAILY
EXPRESS UNQUOTE).
STEWART
FILES
FAR EASTERN DEPT.
HONG KONG DEPT..
NEWS DEPT.
FFFFF
RESTRICTED
Registry No.
DEPARTMENT
FED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top-Saccat
Secret
Confidenzial
Restricted
Unclassifed
PRIORITY MARKINGS (Date)
L
Flash Immediate
}
Despatched
Rootin
Date and time (G.M.T.)elegram
reach addresses(s)
9
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1340
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Ind
PETARIE AND M
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
En Clair. Code Cypher
Draft Telegram to:-
PEKING
No.
(Date)
And to:-
[Secu
Security classification
-if any
[ Privacy marking
1
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...
if any
[Codeword-if any]
Addressed to
Keling
III...
telegram No.
167. And to
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repeated for information to
Saving to....
LOLL.
PL-10 ~~~ ------------'ILLONILI ■ Than 'I pl. ------------ PIRLOTTELIJ
Repeat [to:
HOPE KONG
Saving to:-
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Distribution:-
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Fe) H.K. Dept. News Dept.
Copies to:-
FAT TULIJ
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➖➖ -- · ➖➖➖LL-TR............‒‒‒‒‒‒E.. - P
MIZ.
British Press Coverage of news of sentence reductions in Hay Kay
WONG CHAK
SIITTIME
ılır (JAL
ท
Coverage in tring's press is as restrains? as could be resourally
expected, although testleres emphasise: "Grey; new hope of release" ("F
mancial Times"). All reports carry official serid of any connection
between the Review Fos doard's recommendations and the Grey case. All
છે pick out Wong Chake; and most drow their own conclusims that The news
"could make it easier for Peking to rebent grey in the free' antare
("Guardian") as "All nine (sic) will be free by the autumn and China
will find it difficult to justity Mc Gray's untinue? detection after
that time." ("The Times").
set ME
2. Only the "Sun" (Leapman) is particularly painted: "The British F
reign office were at paired yesterday to deny that the reduction in
sentences was inspired by a desire to see M= grey freed. It is hard,
though, to excope this interpretation."
3.
reported Although the facts are wart i lass accurately by all,
presentation in the " guardian" (Prittie) is somewhat misleading. it's
theadline - "Britain to free Chinese " - is first glossed by: "Britain
was announced the imperting release of all chinese
LOVER
1
journalists in prismat in Hong Kong." However, report proceeds to say
that there is "nothing dramatic" about the announcement as ten of the
news workers were in my case due for release in The autumn.
4. The Time
+
holes following paragraph!
The announcement came M surprise. Cher's have conse
roled mut sm
sort before Peking had given some clear indication that it would
reciprocate. The decision has started fresh speculation that the
authonties may have been hold- ing private talks with communist
representatives or that the British mission in Peking has at last had
Mr.
5. Reactions of Mt Gray, who with be with the delegation Ove
to see Mo Foley on Monday 12 Mays, are varinoly reported:
Λ
of the news that her son might be freat som: "I still be there it when I
see # heim. My hopes have been raised to many waing times in the past.
They said he would be relaxed at Christmas and the was not." ("The
Times")
It sounds hopeful, but there is always the nagging
that they might not relase him and want Something more." ("Daily
Expres")
wany
* (in orter to present a petition, signal by 53 of Mr Gray's
relatives, asking to the lease of the news wate4,5)
Files Distr
Ros
R.c. 175-
(USIM) D4.392077 300m 10/49
WI Lad Cp. 361
منا
10/5
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Flag A
CONFIDENTIAL
Lood Shephard (away)
Si 7. John's
Mr. Noreton
Mr. Anthony Grey of Reutera
PROELEM
C
FEC
My submission of 28 March drew attention to two recent
developments: the failure of our offer to the Chinese to
release to China for the remainder of their sentences the
eleven convicted newsworkers in return for the release of
Mr. Grey; and the review procedure whereby the sentence of
the eleventh newsworker, Wong Chak, is likely to be shortened,
with the result that it should become public knowledge in the
course of May that all eleven newsworkers should be out of
prison in September.
confronting us was:
I concluded that the choice in practice
(a) to bring the Governor of Hong Kong to agree now
to the immediate release of all eleven newaworkers
in return for appropriate assurances that this would
result in the release of Mr. Grey; Or
(b) to let matters take their course in Hong Kong with
the reasonable expectation that Mr. Grey would be
out in September, but almost certainly not before.
And I argued in favour of the latter.
2. In a conversation with the Secretary of State on 1 April,
Mr. Long, the General Manager of Reuters, while grateful for
the prospect that the affuir would be settled in September,
asked whether the date of release of the eleven might not be
advanced somewhat in order to shorten Mr. Grey's ordeal.
Secretary of State undertook to consider this.
The
рив
pus 1215
CONFIDENTIAL
به
CONFIDENTIAL
RECOMMENDATION
3. I recommend that I be authorised to inform Mr. Long
that for the present we think that we must continue to stand
firm in Hong Kong; but we fully sympathise with his desire
to shorten Mr. Grey's ordeal, and if nearer September it seems
that the prisoners could be prematurely released in Hong Kong,
without serious consequences for Hong Kong in the short or
long term, we shall certainly consider this.
ARGUMENT
4. We have hitherto seen three dangers in the premature
release of convicted prisoners in Hong Kong:-
(a) We believe that it would damage public confidence
in the Colony. It might also be interpreted by
the Communists as the'kow tow'which the Chinese
have been seeking. We should thus be tacitly
acknowledging their ability to influence events in
the Colony at their whim. Mr. Long has argued
that the release of the newsworkers could equally be
presented as an act of strength demonstrating that
the Governor, successful in his "confrontation"
policy, had sufficient confidence in the security
situation to regard the risks of release as negligible.
But it is not so much the immediate security situation
that concerns the Governor as long-term confidence.
Any action which might lead the inhabitants of Hong
Kong to conclude that we have lost our nerve could
quickly be disastrous, We cannot afford to
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
miscalculate, and must give due weight to the arguments
of the Governor who is better placed that we are to
make a judgment.
(b) By providing a precedent of willingness to disregard
the courts in a flagrant manner and for a political
purpose, it would impair the future credibility of
the sanction of imprisonment.
Admittedly there is
a time element in this since a brief curtailment of
imprisonment might not be very damaging in this respect.
(c) It could encourage the Chinese to adopt similar ransom
tactics in future to the detriment of other British
subjects in China. Mr. Long has argued that if the
Chinese decide in future to take hostages they will
whatever we do in this particular case. There
But the Grey case
do so,
is some force in this argument.
is specially important in that it is the first, as
far as I am aware, in which the Chinese have acknow-
ledged the taking of a hostage;
in other cases
where they have imprisoned foreigners, effectively
us hostages, it has always allegedly been for some
personal misdemeanour.
I remain therefore of the view that the immediate release in
Hong Kong of all eleven newsworkers
particularly when we have
not only been pressed openly by the Chinese to do this, but
have recently made clear to them that this course would be quite
unacceptable to us would be highly damaging.
5.
-
I do not underestimate the difficulties of letting matters
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
take their course in Hong Kong until September:
(a) The effects on Mr. Grey's health of this prolongation
of his ordeal.
Present indications are that he
should be able to bear the strains until September.
But this is a matter which we must keep under constant
review, on the meagre evidence available to us.
(b) Possible difficulties with parlamentary and public
opinion in this country. I think, however, that we
should find that public opinion here is by no means
unanimously in favour of concessions to the Chinese.
We have so far refrained from using to the full the
strong arguments for refusing to pay ransom in Hong
Kong, lest this would stimulate indignation against
the Chinese and lead to increased pressure for
unhelpful measures against them in this country
pressures which Mr. Long explained to the Secretary
of State he had had to cope with in Fleet Street,
It is difficult to predict how public opinion might
move in coming weeks. Once it becomes public know-
ledge in May that all eleven newsworkers are due to
be released in mid-September, it may become progressively
easier to hold the situation as we approach that date.
(c) The possible effects on Chinese policy if we fail
to make what they would regard as any significant
gesture towards them over the Grey case. Mr. Cradock
has in the past argued from Peking that if we simply
let the eleven newsworkers out in September the Chinese
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6.
will not regard this as any concession on our part,
and that we should have thus lost the opportunity
of giving the Chinese the relatively harmless
"victory" which they may regard as a pre-requisite
for their acceptance of a modus vivendi in Hong
Kong. However, our experience of the Chinese
suggests that they will not be at a loss to present
the release of the eleven, whenever it comes, 36 a
victory. They will have prevailed to the extent of
having held on to Mr. Grey until we have stopped
"the persecution of patriotic newsworkers in Hong
Kong".
We have re-examined the possibility of an intermediate
position, i.e. commuting the sentences of the newsworkers
only a short time before their normal release date, say in
mid-July. Such a course would have this in its favour:
(a) It should shorten Mr. Grey's ordeal by about two
months.
(b) It would be a very mild"kow tow" towards the Chinese
of the kind for which Mr. Cradock argued (paragraph
5(c) above) and would be a further demonstration
of our flexibility in trying to reach an accommo-
dation with them;
(c) It would help to meet public criticism of inhumanity
on our part towards Mr. Grey at a time when, on
the eve of the recess, Parliament will be taking
particular interest.
CONFIDENTIAL
5
CONFIDENTIAL
7.
(a) In that we should be insisting on the prisoners
serving all but two months of their normal
sentences with remission, we could fairly easily
rebut charges of flabbiness in the face of Chinese
pressure.
There are, however, strong arguments against it:- (a) Since we have
taken a firm stand in Hong Kong on
(b)
the principle of non-interference with the judicial processes, it might
be undesirable to compromise that principle simply to settle the Grey
affair
two months earlier.
So far from seeing our act as a gesture of compromise the Chinese might
take it simply as proof that we were in the final instance susceptible
to pressure and
that by hanging on to Mr. Grey beyond September, they might bring us to
further concessions in the
I do not matter of other convicted prisoners.
think this risk is great, but regard it as by no
means negligible.
(c) We should face the old difficulty of being asked
by critics here and in Hong Kong about any measures
we had taken to ensure that our gesture would in
fact result in the release of Mr. Grey.
(a)
We should have to contend with tiresome criticism
as indeed we could along the lines that if a
-
gesture of clemency were possible in July, why
could we not have spared Mr. Grey suffering by
making the gesture in January.
CONFIDENTIAL
6
CONFIDENTIAL
8.
I do not
These disadvantages of the intermediate course seem to
me to outweigh the advantages. As things stand now, I continue to hold
the view (reluctantly from the humane aspect) that to
let matters take their course in Hong Kong until September
would now be the wisest way of coping with the Grey affair,
taking broad account of both our short and long-term interests. I think,
however, that were circumstances to change (e.g. a
marked deterioration in Mr. Grey's health and increasing anxiety by the
public here) we should be ready to consider the
however, intermediate position discussed above.
consider that we should consult the Governor at this stage:
we could hardly expect him to give us a firm commitment for July, and we
would be handicapped if he took up a position of
rigid opposition at the outset. (Moreover, our pincipal
concern with him at present is that he should as quickly as possible
complete the review procedure covering Wong Chak.) It is, however,
important that we should continue to convince
Mr. Long that we share his anxiety to terminate Mr. Grey's
ordeal at the earliest feasible date. I suggest therefore
that our views be put to him in the terms of the Recommendation
at paragraph 3 above. From such conversation as I had with him
after his meeting with the Secretary of State, I think that he
would probably accept this.
Janu
Zennay.
(James Murray) 3 April, 1969
Copies to:- Kr. Godden
Mr. Baker
Sir A.Galaworthy Sir J.Johnston Mr. Carter
CONFIDENTIAL
- 7 -
19.
д вил вели
feel
shingly that
thats
te
More fo
at present.
Ehwal
3/4.
Baton
3/4
SEORET
Private Secretary to Secretary of State
On the understanding that the review referred
to in paragraph 6 of the submission is now under way
and that prisoners to be released under the review
will be informed of the decision before the end of
May (Mr. D. Murray has confirmed that this understanding
is correct), Lord Shepherd agrees with the recommendation.
(C. H. Godden) 1 April. 1969.
DECRET
ısılı
Fac isill
pu
Leaks
223
SECRET
COVERING TOP SECRET
Minister of State
In view of the time factor Sir John Johnston has asked
me to send this direct to you. Both he and I agree with the
In support of it there are the additional
recommendation.
argumenta:
(1) We have only recently re-affirmed, in the current
probe, that we could not agree to the release of the
news workers in Hong Kong; if we were now to do so it would thus be even
more damaging.
(ii) The eleven news workers probably represent the last
stage in the battle of wills following confrontation. It seems most
unlikely that once they have been cleared out of the way (by September)
the Chinese would then campaign for the release of the remaining
confrontation prisoners in whom they have so far shown
almost no interest.
SECRET
COVERING TOP SECRET
(J. 0. Koreton) 31 Harch 1969.
[add]
palasings
On the
SECRET
w.Golden.
minute
Nr. Moreton
UR. ANTHONY GREY OF REUTERS
1224
Flag A
1
+
PROBLEM
FEL well
My submission of 28 February envisaged a review of
the problen of Mr. Grey in the latter part of this month. Ir the
meantime we have made no progress towards his
release.
An offer to the Chinese through covert channels
in Hong Kong to release to China for the remainder of their
sentences the eleven convicted news workers whom the Chinese
have linked with Mr. Grey, has not been taken up. We must
assume therefore that the Chinese intend to keep Mr. Grey until the news
workers have been released in Hong Kong. Barring unforseen
circumstances, all eleven should now be
out of prison by mid-September. The alternatives at
present before us are:
(a)
to ask the Governor of Hong Kong to arrange the
immediate release in Hong Kong of the eleven news
workers; or
(b)
to let matters take their course in Hong Kong with
the reasonably confident expectation that Mr. Grey
will be let out shortly after the release of the
news workers in September, but almost certainly
not before.
RECOMMENDATION
2.
I recommend alternative (b). Hong Kong Department
concur.
/ BACKGROUND
SECRET
3
SECRET
BACKGROUND
3. On 28 December the New China News Agency in Peking
published a report openly linking Mr. Grey with the
communist news workers (then thirteen, now eleven) serving
prison sentences in Hong Kong. The report said that
'since the Hong Kong British authorities continue to keep
the thirteen patriotic Chinese journalists in jail, the
Chinese Government is fully justified in continuing to
restrict Mr. Grey's freedom of movement", Shortly there-
after the Chinese resumed their covert contacts with the
Hong Kong Government about Mr. Grey, describing the N.C.N.A.
statement as "the proposed swap for Grey" and indicating
that they expected a reply to their "proposal".
here concluded that the release of the news workers in Hong
Kong itself raised such difficulties as to be highly
undesirable.
Ministers
However it was decided that we should,
through the covert channel, repeat an earlier offer to the
effect that we would be ready to release the news workers
to China for the remainder of their sentences in return
for Hr. Grey.
4. Our offer has been discussed by Mr. Cater, the Hong
Kong representative, with his Chinese contact in a series
of meetings beginning on 27 January. In messages which
the contact has said he was relaying from Peking, the
Chinese have insisted on release in Hong Kong. We have
had a virtual admission that they would be unable to
persuade the news workers to return voluntarily to the
/mainland.
- 2 -
SECRET
SECRET
mainland. We have modified our original proposal to the
extent of offering release in Macao, Mr. Cater, however,
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.