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Supplementary Walking Points
Might the Chinese change their ground, as they
have done before?
6. The original Chinese announcement about
Mr. Grey's detention referred to eight Hong
Kong news workers. When the last of these was
released in November last year we had some
hopes that Mr. Grey might be set free. However,
they proceeded to link his continuied detention
to further news workers arrested in Hong Kong
after the start of Mr. Grey's detention.
would still be possible for them to find a
similar excuse for prolonging his ordeal after
the last of these men is released in early
October, but we think this unlikely.
It
Would not the release of the newsworkers only
a short time before the end of their sentences
be a harmless concession?
7.
The Hong Kong authorities must think of
the future. They would still be interfering
with the judicial processes for political
reasons. Confidence in their ability to with-
atand communist pressure would be undermined.
If the Hong Kong authorities were seen to be
ready to yield to Chinese pressure, this might
encourage the Chinese to put up their price
for Mr. Grey.
Retaliation against N.C.N.A.
8.
We have considered the possibility of
retaliation against the New Chine News Agency
in the United Kingdom. The possibility
remains open However, it is our judgement at
present that this will do nothing to secure the
/release
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release of Mr. Grey. It would only make his
chances of early release worse as well as
damaging the chances of other British subjects
detained in China,
Mr. Grey's Health.
9.
Naturally, we remain deeply concerned
about Mr. Grey. However, although he must
obviously be bitter about his long detention
by the Chinese, it is not our impression that
his health or mental equilibrium have
Buffered. We know that he had proper medical
attention for his throat condition during
the winter
Access to his books upstairs
should make life somewhat more bearable.
Nevertheless, we shall continue to watch this
aspect carefully.
Further Visit to Mr. Grey
10.
We do not rule out the possibility that
the Chinese will allow a further visit to
Mr. Grey in the fairly near future.
CONFIDENTIAL
•
229
SECRET.
SECRET
SECRETARY OF STATE.
hr. Anthony Grey of Reuters.
You will know that I and the department
have been giving deep and anxious thought to
the problem of Mr. Anthony Grey and how best
we could obtain his release without risking
or prejudicing the security and stability
of Hong Kong. I have also had an
opportunity of discussing this with Mr.
Cater and Mr. Cradock.
2.
Both Mr. Cater and Mr. Cradock
believe that the Chinese are determined
that Mr. Grey will not be released until
the eleven journalists are released from
prison.
3.
As you will see from the submission,
the departmental advice is that in the
interests of Hong Kong we should in general stand on our present
position whereby the ten
journalists would be released in September
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on/
I
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on the completion of their sentences and
Wong Chak, the remaining journalist, whose
sentence the Review Board has recently
shortened, would be released early in
October. The official view is that this
should meet the Chinese demands and should
obtain the release of Mr. Grey shortly after
Wong Chak's release.
Li
In addition to this course, (a),
there are two other possible courses, (b) and
(c), which I have considered and discussed
with the department
5.
Course (b) is that the Governor
should at his discretion and exercising his
prerogative release the ten journalists in
July leaving Wong Chak only in prison until
October. The official advice in the
submission is that I should discuss this
with the Governor when I am in Hong Kong
when we could take into account the reactions
of the Chinese following the announcement
SECHET.
of/
J
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of the reduction in Wong Chak's sentence (on May 9)
and other local factors.
On this possible course
I would make the comment that I think that
the Governor will be loth to agree.
Personally
I think it might make it more certain that the
Chinese would release Mr. Grey, although I do
not believe they would release him until Wong
Chak was released in October. Whilst all
the latest information is that the health of
Mr. Grey is good and we have no reason to
believe that he could not withstand confinement
until then, particularly if news of steps taken
in Hong Kong became known to him, I feel I
should mention my misgivings about a course of
action which would leave him in detention until
October. But I do accept that from the
presentational point of view in Hong Kong there
is much to course (b), It seems to me,
however, that when it becomes known that while
we were ready to release ten of the journalists
but were insisting that Wong Chak remained a
prisoner/
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prisoner until October which means the
-
continued confinement of Mr. Grey we might
be confronted with press and parliamentary
clamour.
So far we have been able to hold
this within limits. It may however become so
great that the Chinese might either feel that
they could not be seen to be releasing Mr.
Grey as a consequence of public criticism, as
I suspect might have been the case in 1968,
or they may feel that the pressure on us is
such that the original price for Mr. Grey is
too low and make more difficult demands as the
price for his release. One does not wish to
exaggerate this risk. I am however especially.
conscious of the proposed petition to be
delivered by Mr. Grey's family. If, as is
likely. this is delivered in the glare of T.V.
and the press, it could well spark off the
pressures which we know to be there but which
have been deliberately restrained in the
interests of Mr. Grey.
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6./
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6.
Course (c) is the earlier release of
Wong Chak to coincide with that of the other journalists at the earliest
date possible. If this were to be the decision, clearly it would place
the Governor in a very difficult position in that he has just accepted
the Review Board's recommendation to reduce the sentence to three years
instead of five and will be justifying this as a normal review procedure
quite unconnected with the Grey case. It would be hard to explain,
although not impossible, if the Governor by exercise of his prerogative
went beyond the
recommendation of the Review Board so soon
after he had accepted it and released Wong Chak with the other prisoners
at an earlier date. I do not think however there is any doubt that this
course provides the best opportunity of getting the release of Mr.Grey
and will avoid the risks which I have mentioned above of a release by
stages as envisaged in course (b).
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7./
1
E
SECRET.
7.
Course (c), if you agree, could also be
discussed by me with the Governor.
I am not
however due in Hong Kong until about 1 June. And in the meantime
circumstances may arise which you may think require a decision
before then.
8.
To come to a decision on this finely balanced problem in which
conjecture must carry as much weight as logic, since there is no firm
evidence on how the Chinese may react, is very difficult. This is more
so in view
of the consistent and well-argued advice of the Governor and officials.
My own feeling, which is the one I expressed to you on 3 April when I
talked over the submission by the department of that date, is that while
we must take no steps which would place at risk Hong Kong, we should ask
the Governor to try to devise some procedure to mitigate any risk but
ensure the release of the eleven
journalists during June or at the latest July.
9.
Like Mr. Long, I do not believe this step would place at risk the
security or
stability/
11
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stability of Hong Kong though I do see that it
would involve difficult and embarrassing
administrative problems. I accept however
that it would probably be right for us to
defer a final decision if possible - until
I have had an opportunity of weighing the issues
fully with the Governor and in any case until
after we have had the reactions to the
reduction of Wong Chak's sentence.
The period
of delay worries me and if we adopt this course,
I think it necessary that I have a directive from
you to make a decision so as to avoid further
delay which may prejudice Mr. Grey's release.
10. In view of the fact that I am leaving
for an overseas visit tomorrow I felt it right
to record my views, although we may have an
opportunity of discussing this matter today.
CC:
Mal?
(//EPHERD)
8 may, 1969.
Sir John Johnston Sir A. Galsworthy
Mr. J.0. Moreton
Mr. R. Baker
Mr. J. Murray Mr. W.S. Carter.
SECRET.
SECRET
Far Eastern Department
Mary.
The Secretary of State saw the submission of 6 May on the case of Mr.
Anthony Grey together with Lord Shepherd's minute of 8 May on the same
subject. He has minuted on this as follows:
"Lord Shepherd and I spoke about this. I have great sympathy with Mr.
Grey, and even more with the Governor, whose handling of a difficult
situation I greatly admore. Weighing it all up. I conclude that Lord
Shepherd, when he is in Hong Kong should urge the Governor most strongly
to follow course (c) in Lord Shepherd's minute; and that unless the
Governor is able to convince Lord Shepherd, personally, that this would
be wrong, Lord Shepherd should say that course (c) is my decision".
urin
C.C.
Sir A. Galsworthy Sir J. Johnston Mr. Moreton
Hong Kong Department P.S. to Lord Shepherd
SECRET
(A. D. Brighty) 9 May, 1969
RE
Y
4 JUN 1969
后
FEL 1321
Beli
1228
S&S.
Farkusten Defartment
would rather let to manais ansencement stand. They
acceft that
you may well
•for the release Wing Chake in July, with
the rest, and that in that they and the Gremer
Cash
such
will have to embarrassment
manage
may arise
as
from the terms of the amoen emat -morrow. In firm it merely nounces the
Review Brands decision and has no bearing Os exarise botte Cravemois)
Geverner's prerogative.
Долоо
int Shoffend
spice but the SECRET
I have great symfeitly with th, Gay, and ever more with the jeveros,
whose handling of a difficult situation I greatly admiri. Sin Toby
Jolestar Weighing it all up. I conclude that had Shopiand,
The is in Hery Kory should urge the Governor
Mr. Moreton
•when he is in
must
strongly to folour come (<) in had Shepland) rinkt; and thr
Governor is able to convins hood Shapland, parantly, th inless Mr.
Anthony Grey of Reuters
hand Sheffend started
started Snap
Smy that cause (c) is
decision
is my
MS,
(9 Mary)
PROBLEM the world be wray,
For some time we have been proceeding on the
assumption that we could not now expect the release of Mr. Grey until
all eleven Communist newsworkers in prison in Hong Kong had been
released, but that thereafter the
Chinese would release Mr. Grey. Ten of the newsworkers
are due out with remission in September. The Governor of Hong Kong on
about 9 May will be announcing his acceptance
of a recommendation of the Review Board that the sentence of
the eleventh, Wong Chak, should be reduced from five years to three
years, with the result that the latter will be out with remission on ↳
October. Thus there is a reasonable expec- tation that Mr. Grey will be
out in October. Is it right
to let matters take their course until then?
RECOMMENDATION
2. I recommend that Lord Shepherd during his forthcoming visit to Hong
Kong should discuss with the Governor the feasibility of the release of
at any rate ten of the prisoners about the end of July. We might give
the Governor advance
notice. But it might be best to wait about a week after the
announcement covering Wong Chak on 9 May, so that we can take
account of any reactions to it. Hong Kong Department concur.
ARGUMENT
3. We have hitherto seen four dangers in the premature
release of convicted prisoners in Hong Kong.
a)
We believed that it would damage public confidence in the Colony. It
would be interpreted by the local communists as the "kowtow" the Chinese
had been seeking. We should thus be tacitly acknowledging their ability
to influence events in the Colony at their whim. Mr. Long, General
Manager of Reuters, on the other hand has argued that release of the
newsworkers could equally be presented as an act of strength
demonstrating that the Governor, successful in his "confrontation"
policy, had sufficient
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b)
c)
confidence in the security situation to regard the
risks of release negligible. But it is not so much the immediate
security situation that concerns the Governor as long-term confidence.
Any action which might lead the inhabitants of Hong Kong to conclude
that we have lost our nerve could quickly be disastrous. We cannot
afford to mis-calculate and must give due weight to the arguments of the
Governor who is better placed than we are to make judgement. Admittedly
the closer we get to the due release dates of the prisoners, the less
their premature release will be a concession to the Chinese and the less
the danger.
By providing a precedent of willingness to disregard the courts in a
flagrant manner and for a political purpose, premature release would
impair the future credibility of the sanction of imprisonment.
Admittedly there is a time element in this also, since a brief
curtailment of imprisonment might not be very damaging in this respect.
On the other hand since we have taken a firm stand in Hong Kong on the
principle of non- interference with the judicial process it might be
undesirable to compromise that principle simply in the hope of settling
the Grey affair a matter of months
earlier.
Success in their ransom tactics could encourage the Chinese to adopt
similar tactics in future to the detriment of other British subjects.
There have been those who have argued that if the Chinese decided in
future to take hostages they would do so whatever our
action in this particular case. There is воде force in this argument.
But the Grey case is especially important in that it is the first, as
far as I am aware in which the Chinese have acknowledged the taking of a
political hostage.
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2
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d)
4.
We were concerned lest the Chinese, so far from seeing premature release
as a gesture of compromise on our part, might take it simply as proof
that we were susceptible to pressure and conclude that by hanging on to
Mr. Grey indefinitely (and possibly even beyond October) they might
bring us to further concessions in the matter of other convicted
prisoners.
Reviewing these objections I continue to conclude that the premature
release of the newsworkers will continue to be to some degree damaging
in Hong Kong, but that the degree of damage will be the less the closer
we approach the due release dates in September and October.
5. We have fully recognised, however, that there were risks in accepting
the Governor's view that we must let matters take
their course until the due release dates.
a) The prolongation of his ordeal may seriously affect
b)
Mr. Grey's health. Present indications (including his latest letters to
his girl friend) are, however, that
he should be able to bear the strain until October.
We may face difficulties with Parliament and public opinion in this
country. The editor of "The People" has come out strongly in favour of
the release of the news- workers in exchange for Mr. Grey. We are
apparently to receive from the relatives of Mr. Grey a petition on the
same lines. Mr. Long has pressed the Secretary of State privately for
such an arrangement. But I think that we should find that public opinion
here, if they had the issues aquarely put before them, would by no means
unanimously favour concessions to the Chinese. We have so far refrained
from using to the full the strong arguments for refusing to pay ranson
in Hong Kong, lest this would only exacerbate controversy with the
Chinese to the detriment of Mr. Grey. It is difficult to predict how
public opinion might move in the coming weeks. Once it is public
knowledge (about 9 May) that all eleven
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c)
newsworkers will be out by early October, it should become progressively
easier to hold the situation as the end of the tunnel approaches.
We have taken account of the possibility that if we
simply let the eleven newsworkers out in September and October the
Chinese will not regard this as any concession on our part, and that we
should have thus lost the opportunity of giving the Chinese the
relatively harmless "victory" which they may regard as a pre-requisite
for their acceptance of a modus
vivendi in Hong Kong. However, our experience of the Chinese suggests
that they will not be at a loss to present the release of the eleven,
whenever it comes,
as a victory. They will have prevailed to the extent of having held on
to Mr. Grey until we have stopped "the persecution of patriotic
newsworkers in Hong Kong". 6. In short none of the foregoing
considerations seem to me to constitute an overriding objection to
letting matters take
their course until October unless we were to be faced with
Grey's health and consequently
-
a marked deterioration in Mr. increasing public anxiety here. However,
since the risks involved in the premature release of the newsworkers
become less the nearer we approach their due release dates it is for
consideration whether we might ask the Governor to use his discretionary
powers of remission say at the end of July. If he were to remit the
remaining sentences of all eleven, this would almost certainly shorten
Mr. Grey's ordeal by
about two months. It would be a mild "kowtow" towards the Chinese (see
paragraph 5 c) above), which might in turn be a useful insurance against
the possibility of their attempting to force further concessions before
releasing Mr. Grey. But there is a snag. We might reasonably ask the
Governor to remit the sentences of the ten. But to suggest to him that
he might remit Wong Chak's sentence also would be in
effect to ask him to make a nonsense of the careful
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explanation he will have given to the Hong Kong public that the
reduction of Wong Chak's sentence from five years to three years
resulted from normal review processes and was in no way connected with
the Grey case. He might well consider that this would not merely have a
damaging effect on the credibility and prestige of the Hong Kong
authorities but would seriously impair confidence within Hong Kong. If
however ten only were to be released, and this was not judged sufficient
by the Chinese, we should face a very trying time until the release of
Wong Chak in October. These seem to me very real difficulties. It might
be best if a decision on them were postponed until Lord Shepherd has had
an opportunity to weigh the issues fully with the Governor during his
visit beginning 31 May. By then the Governor will have had an
opportunity to assess the reactions of the public in Hong Kong and of
the Chinese authorities (through the covert channels) to the reduction
of Wong Chak's sentence.
James Munay
(James Murray)
6 May, 1969.
Copies to: Mr. Godden
Mr. Baker
Sir J. Johnston
Sir A. Galsworthy
Mr. Carter
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in my
view
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(226
In my view the arguments against releasing the
newaworkers (whether ten or eleven) in July are overriding.
We should be sacrificing a principle and placing the future
in Hong Kong at risk to an extent out of all proportion to
the advantage of possibly securing Ir. Grey's release a couple
of months earlier. Clearly however Lord Shepherd will wish
to satisfy himself when in Hong Kong that there are no other
defensible courses open to us to advance Mr. Grey's release.
The Governor has done his best to be flexible it was he
personally who devised the means of securing the reduction
of Wong Chak's sentence. I hope that in the last analysis
his judgement on what is tolerable in regard to public
confidence will be accepted.
P
(J. 0. Koreton)
7 Lay 1969.
Grey has in a sense been
Though it has been involuntary, Mr.
bearing, single-handed, a large part of the burden of safeguarding
the liberty and freedom of the millions in Hong Kong for whom
we are responsible.
tribute to this in due course. We have been in the agonising
situation of having to ask him to make this sacrifice of his
own liberty for a sustained period without being able to consult
him or explain to him the significance of his privations. I
hope these can be made clear to him the moment he is a free man
again. But they will all have been wasted and to no purpose if
his release is secured by a suspension of the rule of law in
/Hong Kong
I hope we shall be able to pay public
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Hong Kong in circumstances in which the Chinese can claim
effectively, to the people of Hong Kong, that they have forced
the Hong Kong Government to do their bidding
the more so
It
if they can achieve this result after a prolonged struggle
in which we have repeatedly said to them that we will not
suspend the rule of law in respect of the "newsworkers",
is this situation which it will be most valuable for
Lord Shepherd to discuss personally with the Governor; and
which on present evidence seems to me to make the release
of the "newsworkers" in July premature in terms of the trial
of will between ourselves and the Chinese.
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Bodrumaton
(J.B. JOHNSTON)
8.5.69.
You will know
CYPHER/CAT A
RESTRICTED
ROUTINE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 167
RESTRICTED
TO
TOP Cor:
PEKING
10 MAY 1969
205
(FED) Do
134/1 12/5
ADDRESSED TO PEKING TELEGRAM NUMDER 167 OF 10 MAY REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO HONG KONG.
BRITISH PRESS COVERAGE OF NEWS OF SENTENCE REDUCTIONS IN HONG KONG.
COVERAGE IN TODAY'S PRESS IS AS RESTRAINED AS COULD BE REASONABLY
EXPECTED, ALTHOUGH HEADLINES EMPHASISE QUOTE GREY : NEW HOPE OF RELEASE
UNQUOTE (QUOTE FINANCIAL TIMES UNQUOTE). ALL REPORTS CARRY OFFICIAL
DENIAL OF ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE REVIEW BOARD'S
RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE GREY CASE. ALL PICK OUT WONG CHAK: AND MOST
DRAW THEIR OWN CONCLUSIONS THAT THE NEWS QUOTE COULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR
PEKING TO SET MR. GREY FREE UNQUOTE (QUOTE GUARDIAN UNQUOTE) AS QUOTE
ALL NINE (SIC) WILL BE FREE BY THE AUTUMN AND CHINA WILL FIND IT
DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY MR. GREY'S CONTINUED DETENTION AFTER THAT TIME
UNQUOTE. (QUOTE THE TIMES UNQUOTE).
2. ONLY THE QUOTE SUN UNQUOTE (LEAPMAN) IS PARTICULARLY POINTED : QUOTE
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