1
+
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CONCLUSIONS
3. My conclusions are these.
(a) While from the point of view of the Grey case it would
suit us best if the September timing envisaged earlier
could be maintained in the Brooke case, the timing of
the latter need not be a decisive factor in the timing
of the former. Thus the Grey case of itself does not
(b)
seem to me to require us to press for delay in the
Brooke case.
Even if a bargain about Mr. Brooke is to become publicly
known by 1 July, this does not require us to try to
settle the Grey case before that date by the release of
the convicted newsworkers in Hong Kong.
Indeed it
would be both impracticable and undesirable for us to
attempt to do so.
(c) Accordingly a decision on the future handling of the
Grey case can await Lord Shepherd's return.
(a)
If thereafter the decision on the merits of the Grey case
is to let things take their course in Hong Kong until
October, developments in the Brooke case should not
prevent us from going through with this.
ARGUMENT
4.
There is much force in the case the Governor has put to
There are, however, two points with which I
Lord Shepherd.
would take issue.
(a) I do not agree that it is "by no means certain that the
earlier release of the newsworkers would expedite
Mr. Grey's release". If, on the basis of the recent
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2
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assurances by the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires we accept
that the release of all the newsworkers by October will
secure the release of Mr. Grey, then it seems to me as
certain as anything can be in dealings with the Chinese
that the earlier release of the newsworkers would result
in the earlier release of Mr. Grey.
(b) I am firmly opposed to "cover stories" as a means of
justifying the release of the newsworkers. It was right
that an arrangement was contrived to bring Wong Chak on
to the same basis as the other ten newsworkers, and we
were able to achieve this without excessive public
embarrassment.
But if we were now to try to contrive cover
stories for the premature release of the others (and of
Wong himself), credibility would be strained and I should
have thought the Hong Kong authorities would be made to
look foolish. If therefore the eleven are to be released
prematurely it would in my view have to be on the basis of
a "flat political deal" which we would have to do our best
to present, not as giving way under pressure but as a
gesture of conciliation stemming from strength.
However, my view is that the Governor has in effect made a
powerful case for letting matters take their course in Hong Kong
until October.
5. The complicating factor is the present state of the Brooke
case. On the two arguments which Lord Shepherd advances for
deferring public knowledge of any deal over Mr. Brooke until
the Grey case has been settled, I have the following comments.
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(a) Knowledge of a bargain with the Russians over Mr. Brooke
would clearly lead to pressure from those directly
involved in the Grey case (i.e. Reuters, certain sections
of the press, and the Grey family) for a bargain with
the Chinese over Mr. Grey. But I am by no means certain
that public opinion generally would come to the conclusion
that because we had in very special circumstances made
concessions to the Russians about the Krogers we should
necessarily follow this up by caving in to the Chinese
over the convicted newaworkers. Moreover there are
important and relevant differences between the Brooke case
and the Grey case, which it should not be too difficult
to put across to the public. Mr. Brooke faces the
prospect of a new and long prison sentence;
should, on the terms the Chinese have declared to us,
be out of detention in October.
Krogers, but eleven neweworkers.
Mr. Grey
There are only two
The Krogers are in a
very special and restricted category of prisoners,
whereas the newaworkers are eleven among over 200
communists who are serving sentences in Hong Kong for
offenses arising out of the 1967 troubles.
The bending
of the law in favour of the Krogers does not involve the
same considerations of security and public confidence for
the future as would similar action in Hong Kong.
(b) The Chinese are bound to draw their own conclusions from
our willingness to bend the law in respect of the Krogers
particularly in the present sour climate of Sino-Soviet relation
and/contrast it with what has been said to them about the
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6.
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impossibility of prematurely releasing convicted
prisoners in Hong Kong.
This may well lead to further
pressure by them on us in the matter of the whole problem
of convicted prisoners in Hong Kong. We must accept
that there is some risk that they might put up their
price for Mr. Grey to include convicted prisoners other
than the newsworkers. But I personally doubt if they
will do so, in view of the firmness with which they have
established the link between Mr. Grey and the newsworkers.
On 5 May the Prime Minister commented that the prospect
of an early deal over Mr. Brooke made it desirable that we should
get the Grey case out of the way first. If knowledge of a deal
over Mr. Brooke is now to become public by 1 July I doubt if it
is practicable to try to get the Grey case out of the way
beforehand. We could of course try to persuade the Governor
that a "flat political deal" in advance with the Chinese about
Mr. Grey would be the best way of avoiding the dangers to which
Lord Shepherd has drawn attention. But I am reasonably sure
that the Governor would argue that because it had been
considered necessary to accept the Russian terms over Mr. Brooke,
this was no justification for taking what he continued to regard
as unjustifiable risks for the future of Hong Kong. Moreover
with so short a time remaining before 1 July a deal now with
the Chinese over Mr. Grey would no longer meet what may have
been some of the Prime Minister's preoccupations at the
beginning of May. Knowledge of concessions to the Chinese
over the newsworkers followed almost immediately afterwards by
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public knowledge of concessions to the Russians over the
Krogers is likely to increase rather than diminish our
problems with opinion in this country. Hence my conclusion
that it is both impracticable and undesirable to try to settle
the Grey case before 1 July.
Copies to:
Jaun
Private Secretary
Mr. Baker
Miss Deas
Sir T. Brimelow
Sir A. Galsworthy
Mr. Giffard
Mr. Carter
Wwway.
(James Murray)
11 June, 1969.
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CYPHER/CAT A
SECRET
Head of Far Eastern
COPY NO.3
enter
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
IMMEDIATE HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NUMBER 466
7 JUNE 1969
SECRET
FOR SECRETARY OF STATE FROM LORD SHEPHERD.
GREY.
RECEIVED
RIC
13 JUN 1969
Ju
བཉྩེ ༽༦༠༦
Ker 1010 $ f. 19.6.
KEL 134/1
Paylo
bas
I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH GOVERNOR ON BASIS OF YOUR INSTRUCTIONS. HIS
INITIAL REACTIONS WERE AS FOLLOWS.
2. HE HAD BEEN TRYING FOR LAST 18 MONTHS TO FIND A MEANS OF RELEASING
THE ELEVEN NEWSWORKERS PROVIDED A GOOD COVER STORY COULD BE FOUND.
WITH THIS IN MIND HE HAD EXAMINED THEIR FAMILY BACKGROUND, HEALTH
AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF EACH OFFENCE AND SENTENCE AND HAD EVEN
CONSIDERED THE MOST EXTREME POSSIBILITIES. AS A RESULT HE HAD BEEN
ABLE TO HIT ON THE DEVICE OF REDUCING WONG CHAK'S SENTENCE SO THAT
ALL WOULD BE OUT BY EARLY OCTOBER, BUT THE LATTER EXERCISE HAD
STRETCHED CREDIBILITY TO THE LIMIT. ALREADY THE CHINA MAIL ON 3
JUNE HAD GIVEN FRONT PAGE HEADLINES TO A LETTER FROM 80 PRISONERS
ACCUSING THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF BEING PARTICULARLY PARTIAL TOWARDS
LEFT WING PRISONERS. THE FULL REPERCUSSIONS WERE NOT YET OVER SEMI-
COLON AND IF THE LAW WERE SEEN TO BE BENT FURTHER IN FAVOUR OF THE
NEWSWORKERS HE GENUINELY FEARED THE POSSIBILITY OF SERIOUS RIOTS
AND TROUBLES IN THE PRISONS, MANY OF WHICH WERE 'OPEN
3. THE GOVERNOR CONSIDERED IT WAS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT THE EARLIER
RELEASE OF THE NEWSWORKERS WOULD EXPEDITE GREY'S RELEASE.
HE BELIEVED THERE WAS AT PRESENT THE NEAREST APPROACH TO A DEAL THAT
GREY WOULD BE OUT IN OCTOBER. EXPERIENCE HAD SHOWN THAT A FURTHER MOVE
BY US NOW MIGHT ONLY CONFUSE AND PUZZLE THE CHINESE, OCTOBER WAS NOT FAR
OFF AND IN THE MEANTIME HE WOULD DO HIS BEST
/TO ENSURE
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H
ו
י
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TO ENSURE THAT NO ACTION WAS TAKEN BY THE HONG KONG AUTHORITIES
WHICH THE CHINESE MIGHT REGARD AS PROVOCATIVE OR USE AS A PRETEX?
FOR UPSETTING THE DEAL.
4. THE GOVERNOR SAID THAT HE WOULD CERTAINLY CONTINUE TO SEARCH
FOR A DEFENSIBLE MEANS OF EARLIER RELEASE BUT IN THE ABOVE
CIRCUMSTANCES HE WOULD BE LESS THAN HONEST IF HE DID NOT SAY
THAT THE PROSPECTS WERE NOT GOOD. HE COULD NOT AGREE TO A FLAT
POLITICAL DEAL WITHOUT AN ADEQUATE COVER STORY SINCE THIS WOULD
REPRESENT A FUNDAMENTAL REVERSAL OF OUR POLICY TOWARDS CHINA OVER
HONG KONG, NAMELY THAT OF NOT GIVING WAY UNDER PRESSURE SEMICOLON
THIS WOULD HAVE INCALCULABLE CONSEQUENCES. BUT HE WOULD EXAMINE ALL
MEANS SHORT OF THIS.
5. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE GOVERNOR WOULD REEXAMINE EVERY ASPECT AND
SEND A FULL APPRAISAL BY MY RETURN ON 19 JUNE.
5. I DOUBT IF THE GOVERNOR'S FINAL ASSESSMENT WILL DIFFER GREATLY
FROM ABOVE. HOWEVER I WILL DEFER MY RECOMMENDATION UNTIL I HAVE
SEEN IT.
7. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BROOKE CASE FOR GREY ARE HARDER TO
ASSESS FROM HERE, BUT IT WOULD CLEARLY BE VERY DESIRABLE TO DEFER
PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF ANY DEAL OVER BROOKE UNTIL AFTER OCTOBER SINCE
(A) IT WOULD STIMULATE EXTREME PUBLIC PRESSURE FOR ACTION OVER
GREY AND
(B) IT MIGHT CAUSE AN ADVERSE REACTION IN PEKING SINCE WE HAVE
REPEATEDLY TOLD THE CHINESE THAT WE COULD NOT AS A DIRECT BARGAIN
RELEASE CONVICTED PRISONERS IN HONG KONG IN EXCHANGE FOR GREY.
BOTH OF THESE WOULD, IN MY VIEW, AFFECT ADVERSELY GREY'S CHANCES OF
EARLY RELEASE.
SIR D. TRENCH
PRISEC
XXXXX
H
SECRET AND PERSONAL
子
Fre
isalı
20 May, 1969
pekooló
In your letter of 5 Hay you reported that the Prime Minister thought
that an early initiative should be taken on Grey, particularly in view
of the way the Brooke case was develo, ing.
As you will have seen from the press there have been recent developments
in Hong Kong relevant to the Grey case. On 9 May the Hong Kong
Government announced the first results of a review of the sentences on
long-term prisoners convicted for offences arising out of the troubles
in 1967. Those who had their sentences reduced included Wong Chak, one
of the eleven imprisoned newsworkers whom the Chinese have linked with
Grey. Wong Chak had his sentence reduced from five to three years, which
means that he should be released with full remission on 4 October. The
other ten newsworkers are already due out at various dates in September.
By the first week in October therefore all eleven will be out of prison.
In their statement last December, the Chinese said that "since the Hong
Kong British authorities continue to keep 13 now 117 patr.otic Chinese
journalists in jail, the Chinese Government is fully justified in
continuing to restrict Grey's freedom of movement". Thus the release of
the eleven will deprive the Chinese of the only justification they
themselves have advanced for detaining Grey. We cannot of course be
certain that they
/in turn
E. Youde, Esq., C.M.G., M.B.C.,
10 Downing Street.
SECRET AND PERSONAL
SECRET AND PERSONAL
in turn vill release Grey. But there are good grounds for expecting that
they will. (Bank of China officials in London have let it be known
privately that they expect to see Grey released when the newsworkers are
freed.) The Chinese authorities have never attempted to relate the case
of Grey to developments in Hong Kong other than those affecting the
local communist press. They have made considerable use of their December
statement throughout the world in justifying their position. We have had
various indications that Grey's continuing detention has been an
embarrassment to them, particularly in those countries whose esteem they
want. They would not find it easy now to change their ground and advance
a new justification for detaining him.
I turn now to the possible implications of the Brooke case for the Grey
case. As soon as it becomes known that we are prepared to make a bargain
with the Russians over Brooke we shall certainly be under increasing
pressure from sectors of opinion in this country to try to make a
bargain with the Chinese over Grey. But if arrangements to obtain the
release of Brooke in return for a concession on the Krogers do not
become known until September or later (as is envisaged at present) these
arrangements need not have any direct Implications for the Grey case."
In September we shall be able to say (with precise dates) that all the
eleven newsworkers whom the Chinese have linked with Grey, will be out
of prison within a matter of days; and we should at that time have
little difficulty in convincing the public here that we had done or were
just on the point of doing all that we properly could to facilitate
Grey's release. Thus if we can hold to the September timing in the
Brooke case, we can in the meantime continue to handle the Grey case on
its merits.
Even so, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary by no means rules out
the possibility of some initiative over Grey. Broadly speaking three
courses have been under consideration here:-
/(a)
[
SECRET AND PERSONAL
(a) to let matters take their course in Hong Kong;
(b) to propose to the Governor that he should remit
the sentence of at any rate ten of the newsworkers a matter of weeks
before their due release dates; and
(c) to ask the Governor to try to devise some
procedure which would ensure the release of all the eleven newsworkers
in the immediate future.
Each of these courses has its merits and disadvantages. The Governor of
Hong Kong has hitherto considered that the premature release of the
newsworkers in Hong Kong carried unacceptable risks for the wellbeing of
Hong Kong, both now and in the future; and we have supported him in
this. His reluctance to do so has, understandably, been reinforced by
the fact that the Chinese have already rejected an exchange of Grey for
the eleven newsworkers. They want the latter released unconditionally in
Hong Kong itself for maximum political effect. However, the Foreign and
Consonwealth Secretary has directed that Lord Shepherd, who is visiting
Hong Kong between 1 and 7 June, and the Governor should carefully weigh
all the issues involved with a view to assessing whether the time has
not come when the risks of premature release are acceptable. It may be
that the Governor will strongly maintain his objections; in which case
the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary vill wish to reconsider the
matter in the light of these objections. You will readily understand the
unfortunate effects it could have in Hong Kong if the impression were to
be created of a serious divergence of view between the Hong Kong
authorities and ourselves on a watter pertaining to the security of Hong
Kong.
+
SECRET AND PERSONAL
(118281) D4. 391399 1,500μ 2μ9 Hw.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry No.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret
Secret,
Confidential,
Restricted Unclassified.
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
SECRET & PERSONAL
DRAFT
Letter
Type 1 +
To:-
E. Youde, Esq., C.M.G., M.B.E. No. 10 Downing Street, S.W.1.
From
Private Secretary
Telephone No. & Ext.
Copy to: D. G. Jonés, Esq..
Cabinet office.
Department
Lotar despitenes by Private Sacratary's Ded
20 MAY 1969
In your letter of 5 May you reported that the
Prime Minister thought that an early initiative should
be taken on Grey, particularly in view of the way the
Brooke case was developing.
2. As you will have seen from the press there have
been recent developments in Hong Kong relevant to the
Grey case. On 9 May the Hong Kong Government
announced the first results of a review of the sentences
on long-term prisoners convicted for offences arising
out of the troubles in 1967. Those who had their
sentences reduced included Wong Chak, one of the
eleven imprisoned newsworkers whom the Chinese have
linked with Grey. Wong Chak had his sentence reduced
from five to three years, which means that he should be
released with full remission on 4 October. The other
ten newsworkers are already due out at various dates in
September. By the first week in October therefore all
eleven will be out of prison. In their statement last
December, the Chinese said that "since the Hong Kong
British authorities continue to keep 13 now 117
patriotic Chinese journalists in jail, the Chinese
Government is fully justified in continuing to restrict
Grey's freedom of movment". Thus the release of the eleven will deprive
the Chinese of the only justification
SECRET & PERSONAL
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
SECRET & PERSONAL
they themselves have advanced for detaining Grey
We cannot of course be certain that they in turn
will release Grey. But there are good grounds
for expecting that they will. (Bank of China
officials in London have let it be known
privately that they expect to see Grey released
when the newsworkers are freed.) The Chinese
authorities have never attempted to relate the
case of Grey to developments in Hong Kong other than
local communist
those affecting the/press, They have made
considerable use of their December statement
throughout the world in justifying their
position. We have had various indications that
Grey's continuing detention has been an
embarrassment to them, particularly in those
countries whose esteem they want. They would
not find it easy now to change their ground and
advance a new justification for detaining him.
3. I turn now to the possible implications of
the Brooke case for the Grey case. As soon as
it becomes known that we are prepared to make a
bargain with the Russians over Brooke we shall
certainly be under increasing pressure from
sectors of opinion in this country to try to
make a bargain with the Chinese over Grey.
But
if arrangements to obtain the release of Brooke
in return for a concession on the Krogers do
or later not become known until September (as is envisaged
at present) these arrangements need not have any
direct implications for the Grey case. In
September we shall be able to say (with precise
dates) that all the eleven newsworkers whom the
Chinese have linked with Grey, will be out of
prison within a matter of days; and we should at
that time have little difficulty in convincing
2
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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
WIBIL 51-7406
SECRET & PERSONAL
the public here that we had done or were just
on the point of doing all that we properly
could to facilitate Grey's release. Thus if
we can hold to the September timing in the
Brooke case, we can in the meantime continue
to handle the Grey case on its merits.
4. Even so, the Foreign and Commonwealth
Secretary by no means rules out the possibility
of some initiative over Grey.
Broadly
speaking three courses have been under
consideration here:
a)
b)
c)
to let matters take their course in Hong
Kong;
to propose to the Governor that he should
remit the sentence of at any rate ten of
the newsworkers a matter of weeks before
their due release dates; and
to ask the Governor to try to devise some
procedure which would ensure the release
of all the eleven newsworkers in the
immediate future.
Each of these courses has its merits and
disadvantages. The Governor of Hong Kong has
hitherto considered that the premature release
of the newsworkers in Hong Kong carried
unacceptable risks for the wellbeing of Hong
Kong, both now and in the future; and we have
supported him in this. His reluctance to do
so has, understandably, been reinforced by the
fact that the Chinese have already rejected
an exchange of Grey for the eleven newsworkers,
They want the latter released unconditionally
in Hong Kong itself for maximum political
effect.
However, the Foreign and Commonwealth
SECRET & PERSONAL
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WEBL 51-7406
SECRET & PERSONAL
Secretary has directed that Lord Shepherd,
who is visiting Hong Kong between 1 and 7
June, and the Governor should carefully weigh
all the issues involved with a view to
assessing whether the time has not come when
the risks of premature release are acceptable.
It may be that the Governor will strongly
maintain his objections; in which case the
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will wish
to reconsider the matter in the light of
these objections. You will readily
understand the unfortunate effects it could
have in Hong Kong if the impression were to
be created of a serious divergence of view
between the Hong Kong authorities and
ourselves on a matter pertaining to the
security of Hong Kong.
١٩
SECRET & PERSONAL
SECRET
Flag A
Ит. Моторбо Mr. Họ
PROBLEM
Puvalé Sey
Secretary of State.
I gue
MUS
MR ANTHONY GREY OF REUTERS
8:1A
On 5 May Mr. Youde wrote to the Private Secretary
reporting that the Prime Minister thought that "it would
be better to get the Grey case out of the way before the
arrangements to obtain the release of Brooke in return for
a concession on the Krogers come to a head and become known".
I have delayed submitting a reply against the possibility
of a more precise indication of timings in the Brooke case. But further
delay would seem undesirable. RECOMMENDATION
2. I recommend that a reply be sent in the terms of the
attached draft. Hong Kong Department and, in respect of
the Brooke case, Sir T. Brimelow concur.
BACKGROUND
3. The background is to be found in the papers beginning Flag Bh with my
submission of 6 May and ending with the Secretary
1 of State's minute of 9 May.
Jane Wing гру
(James Murray)
16 May, 1969.
ipa hoole
Copies to:
Mr. Baker
Sir J. Johnston
Mr. Carter
1975
SECRET
Dift to isme
19
ге
PRIME
MINISTER
SECRET AND PERSONAL
Dear Jahny.
F.E. DefF Ce: Sofs
PUS.
Aufl. babae.
A16 R
10 Downing Street Whitehall
5
Sist. Bi hay 5, 1969 Suis J. Johnsten
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