and puzzled
are Surfine of
an of
not Peking.
detention
The relaxation of Grey's conditions of
out-
that Pekmą got the menage
the end of Ray indicate
the manage clearly
enough
and appreciated firewicly why
!
Live
bo ove d
and in
L... Ch 25/6/65
See also 857
I
адне
that the inforore mont
dim 17o Svey's
constitions is endince that the Chamese sd.
Светиль
Ral
•
the wage. But. Many wrong
Bur. May may nevertheles have
была разваль бу
facture of making
"concussion"
whats this claiming it was any
teal thing crad
replaining for attempting to obtain any immediate
ت
counter-concussion from the Churnet
¦
|
AIR. Mughay Ref para 4. If we have inclsess
puzzled the Chinne by the resturation of
Wong Chad's sonhance, they
have more succscaled in
116
sugghing me!
My 18 Joe
REF. With the Compliments of the the Sither
N 1969 Political Adviser
7 Boga itos
FEC Well
TSX.4/68
Hong Kong
Sur J. Johvatim
To Morton 0.r.
Political Adviser
SECRET
On Tuesday, 3rd June, Mr. I.C. Jay telephoned to say that he was anxious
to see me "within the next day or two", Accordingly I made arrangements
to see him at 12.15 p.m. on Vednesday, 4 June.
Jay started by saying that although he intended speaking ti me only
briefly on this occasion, nevertheless he would appreciate an
opportunity of a "very long discussion" in the near future.
3.
Jay said that although he had no specific message to pass to me from
"the other side" he had been mulling over in his mind the desirability
or otherwise of informing me of a meeting he had had recently with LI
Cho-chih and POON Ching-on (Jay's comment on the latter i "a vorse
communist thần even l ́as -- he is a real capitalist"); after some days'
reflection Jay thought it advisable to inform me of the discussion and
to seek advice.
J
a
Apparently Jay was invited to the Bank of China to see a fils on the 9th
Party Congress: he had serious doubts as to whether he should attend as
he was not aware whether this was to be a showing for several people or
simply a private one for himself: in the event, it was a private showing
but Jay was "very courageous" and decided to stay on without making
excuses to leave early. Before the film show Jay had the opportunity for
a short discussion with LI: LI apparently was most agitated - he had
received a communication from Peking which had indicated that they vere
most puzzled by the H.I.G.'s action in reducing the prison terms of 11
confrontation prisoners including that of VỌNG Chak: it seemed to LI and
to POON that the H.K.G. vas acting in a strange manner; perfectly
reasonable request had been made by Peking for negotiations over Anthony
Grey and the imprisoned nevsvorkers and the H.K.G. had responded with a
firm negative: yet later they had taken action in regard to the
confrontation prisoners which seened to indicate that in spite of
earlier denials, it was possible to take action along the fines
previously suggested by Peking. LI wondered whether this was meant to be
an indication that the H.K.G. was in fact nov prepared to negotiate. Jay
claimed that he repeated to LI the precise message which I had given him
recently on the decision to reduce the prison terms of the 11
confrontation prisoners, but then apparently their discussion was
interrupted by the arrival of POON. The conversation thereafter,
although still on the same subject, vas left mainly in the hands of
POOŇ. The question was raised whether the H.I.G. realised the serious
embarrassment which their recent action had caused Prime Minister CHOU
En Lai, particularly as it came as a fait accompli without any previous
warning whatsoever, that consideration was being given to the
possibility of reducing prison terms. CHOU was in a very difficult
position in Peking and it was important for his future that he should be
able to show that his more moderate policies were successful, or at
least stood more chance of success than those being put forward by the
more militant members of the Central Comittee who vere in the majority.
The question was also raised as to whether the H.K.G. was still keen to
use the Jay/Cater channel - perhaps the recent action was meant to
indicate to Peking that the H.K.G. was prepared to negotiate but not
through the present channel. I broke in at that point to assure jay in
the strongest possible teras that his
SECRET
/contd.
SECRET
was the one and only channel through which the H.K.G. vas prepared to
work and asked that he should make this absolutely clear to LI and, if
he thought it appropriate, to Paking. I also reassured Jay at great
length that the H.K.G. was in no way trying to be "tricky" or devious
but that the position was precisely as I had
id it was in previous meetings.
5.
Jay claims that, during the discussion with LI and POON, he referred to
the question of Anthony Grey and said that he assumed that Grey would be
released at least at the time when the last of the newsworkers had been
released from prison: he vent further and said that in a recent
communication with Peking he had strongly advised that now it was known
that the newsworkers would be released definitely and legally in
September/October, it would be politic if Peking vere to consider
releasing Grey earlier, possibly in July or August. LI enquired whether
he might pass this view back to Peking also along his channel and Jay
said he saw no objection to this being done. There seemed to be some
misunderstanding as to when the newsworkers would be released from
prison - POON had mentioned November as being the month when VÒNG Chak
would be released: I informed Jay that I would obtain for him the exact
dates when all 11 newsworkers were due for release.
6.
Jay said that LI and FOON had than shoved considerable interest
concerning senior Government officers: he specifically Fentioned H.E.,
the C.S. and myself. Jay said that the questions mainly concerned his
personal view of hose mentioned and the views of their friends,
colleagues and acquaintances. Jay claims that be was unable to speak at
any length on his personal knowledge of H.5. and the Colonial Secretary
but passed on general comment which had been made by his personal
friends in UMELCÓ. As for myself, he said that he was questioned in
great detail as to who my friends vere, my career to date, etc. etc.,
and particularly what I would be doing in the future. In a rather
diffuse discussion Jay said that LI and P001 vere particularly
interested in a "course" which I had recently taken: he came back to
this on two further occasions in which he referred to this as being "a
conference" and then "a briefing". Meanwhile I said nothing about this
particular point but right at the end I asked whether he had any idea to
what course/conference/briefing LI and POON were referring: Jay was
unable to be specific at all on this but it was clear that he him- self
was fishing for something. I left this topic of conversation with Jay
still holding rod and line. Jay also said that the Financial Secretary
had been mentioned briefly and LI and POON had asked whether it was true
that Sir John Cowperthwaite would be staying with the H.K.G. for a
further period after next April.
7.
Just before the interview broke up Jay mentioned the problem of the Bank
of China in Singapore. He thought that matters vere now proceeding
fairly well and that he did not expect any serious problems to arise. He
said that he had held discussions on this with Mr. Martin Scott of the
Hongkong & Shanghai Bank and that he was confident that the H.X. à š.
Bank would do what it could to assist in this matter.
/contd..
SECRET
SECRET
3
a.
As I was leaving the office Jay said that he was very concerned now at
the moves being made by local communists to infiltrate their views into
the local population:
until very recently the communists had been unsuccessful but Jay now
felt hat they were beginning to make gains and that the situation
required careful watching.
6th June, 1969.
C.C.
Mr. J. Murray, CMG (F.C.o.) Mr. J.B. Denson, OBE (Peking) D.S.3.
M./A.R.G.
E.8.8.
el.
(J. Cater)
SECRET
1
MR. MURRAY
Маш
Wife
в
175 Baya M
5° With the Compliments of the
Ir Canter.
Political Adviser
R
767
FEC 130!!
TSX.4/68.
Enci
Hong Kong
45
مسال
SECRET
Political Adviser
As a result of a meeting with H.B. on the morning of Monday, 26th May, I
arranged to see Mr. K.C. Jay later the same day.
2.
(1)
(2)
I had two main points to put to Jay:-
South China Iron Works land. I spoke to Jay along the lines of the
attached notes. I emphasised that normally a purchase of this type would
assume vacant possession but told Jay that in the circumstances
Government would be prepared to accept transfer of the land as it now
stands. Also, as agreed with H.E.. I said that the very top rate,
bearing in mind the doubts of the status of some of the land, would be
between $ 51 M. and $6 M.
Jay noted this down but expressed great surprise at the figures given
for building land. Be vas quite convinced that conversion of the
agricultural land had already taken place and claimed that he had seen a
receipt for money paid to this end. Jay had no doubt whatsoever that the
industrial land held by the S.C.I.V. vas of the order of 500,000 sq.ft.
In the circumstances ve agreed that he should make further enquiries as
to the exact position as seen by Johnson, Stokes & Hasters. When these
enquiries were complete he would hold further discussions with me.
(please see paragraph 3(3) below.)
WOLF Cho Gan, WONG
Referring back to our discussion of 2nd Hay, 1 informed Jay that WONG
had now written a letter to Government which could be interpreted as
being a request for permission to visit the premises of the Yu Hua
School. I said that H.E. was now giving consideration to permitting WONG
to visit the school four times each year, with a limit of three hours
for each visit: if vong wished to make further visits outside of these,
then he would have to make special application to the Director of
Education. Jay thought the proposals to be reasonable. He confirmed that
after my meeting with him on 2nd May he had passed back the varning that
WONG should be careful not to contravene the provisions of the ordinance
as it affected him. jay believed that the proposals now made would show
VỌNG
d the local communists that Government was prepared to be fair in
matters such as this and clearly had taken into consideration VONG's
position as owner of the building. He did give one word of varning,
howev to the effect that once the rulings on visits had been
laid down it was very important that the H.K.G. should stick to them: be
knew WONG to be a difficult person who was likely to try and take
advantage of the situation and visit the school more often than allowed.
/contd.
SECRET
3.
SECRET
Jay had a few items of information to pass to me:-
(1) CHOU En Lai. Jay repeated auch of what he had said on previous
occasions, to the effect that CHOU's position had been somewhat eroded
as a result of the Party Congress, but reiterated that it was the
general opinion both in communist circles in Hong Kong and in Peking
that CHOU would re-assert his position in the not too distant future.
(2) Anthony Grey/levsworkers. Jay said that Peking had expressed
pleasure at the information given on 9th May to the effect that the
sentences of 11 confrontation prisoners (including that of WONG Chak)
vere to be reduced. Surprise, however, had been expressed that this move
on the part of the H.K.G. had been taken outside of the "negotiations
for the release of Anthony Grey". I again explained to Jay that this had
never been, and could not be, part of a political deal and that our
action had been taken solely on the grounds of justice, being of course
yet another indication of the H.K.G.'s desire that relations return to
normal. Jay said that, whilst he understood the position, he very much
doubted whether Peking could see it in this light. In a recent
communication Jay claims that he had proposed to CHOU En Lai that, as it
was now known that the 11 newsworkers would definitely be released
legally and at the latest by October of this year, he saw good reason
from Peking's point of view to effect the release of Grey in the near
future. Jay himself was optimistic that Grey would now be released
before September although he cautioned that with the more militant
elements in pover in Peking they might wish to abide by the original
statements on Grey that he would not be released until all the
newsworkers were freed in Hong Kong.
(3) South China Iron Works. Suddenly and in the context of our
discussion on trey, Jay expressed the opinion that it was most important
in terms of good will and mutual understanding that this question of the
purchase of the S.C.I.V. land should be resolved: he hastened to add
that there would be no question of considering this as part of a deal
for Grey but at the same time felt that Peking would see it as a gesture
of friendship and might even consider that they had some obligation to
repay.
(4) Bank of China, Singapore. Jay said that Peking was now taking action
to ensure that ample funds were avalable in Singapore for the bank to
seet any obligations to depositors: he was aware that within the past
few days some Straits $20 M. had been transferred to Singapore.
Referring to our discussion on à May when I had expressed personal
concern that there sight be repercussions here in Hong Kong if the
singapore Government decided to apply for attachment on funds held by
the Bank of China in Hong Kong, Jay said that he had made some
enquiries. He now thought it highly unlikely that there would be "any
repercussions either in Hong Kong or in London; that as a result of the
transfer of funds to the Bank of China in Singapore there would be ample
money available to cover not only with- draval of deposits but also the
small fine of $129,000.
SECRET
/contd...
He
SECTET
3
further understood that the legal position was that if the Bank of China
refused to pay the fine, then the Singapore Government would first have
to take all possible steps (including, Jay suggested, even the seizure
and sale of the Bank of China building) before they could reasonably
take action against branches in, say, Hong Kong or London. He was quite
confident that the Singapore Government/Bank of China squabble would not
spill over into Hong Kong.
30th May, 1969.
ее
(J. Cater)
C.C. Mr. J. Murray, CMG (London)
Mr. J.B. Denson, OBĖ (Peking)
D.S.B. H./A.R.G. B.5.5.
Enclosure.
SECRET
+
r
!
al Building lond 175,669 51, 15.
by
Foi cultural land. 572,378 sq ft.
(a) at $25 p.s
$4,391,725.
(b) Garden & Myston
at dit pin.
572 378
h
4,964,103
Leccow of sum doubt about. The
statio of a portion of the laust, other
of
$52 m. would appear : fuis.
M.
If it was all values
ao indentaid
tand, it wons to worth $105 Ṁ ad
taan of chauped wwer: but to change ferasi
The inver
trowel cost approx SM-
which fali 110 take to mylly 157M
This comms vocant pissedion, which they casert pira
I
[
P
·
}
+
47
CONFIDENTIAL
TOP Curi
Rt. IN
REGISTRY M 12
20 JUN 1969
Jh ber
En Clair
FEC 120
pa
IZZEDIATE HONG KONG
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
24/6
Telno.493
20 June, 1969
UNCLASSIFIED
Addressed to FCO Telno.493 of 20 June. Repeated for in-
formation to Peking.
Your Telno.405:[Grey]
No comment.
241
Sir D. Trench
FILES
F. EASTERN DEPT. H.K.D.
NEWS DEPT.
CONS. D.
SIR J. JOSTON SIR A. GALSWORTHY
GGGGG
ADVANCE COPIES SENT
CONFIDENTIAL
•
TEC Fec 1341
COVERING SECRET
19 June, 1969.
pakonyb
L? HK 416.
To keep you in touch with the latest developmenta
5. Kewrary's. in the Grey case, I am enclosing a copy of a submission
(9) June) commenting on Lord Shepherd's initial report by telegram of
his discussions with the Governor. We now have the Governor's appraisal
referred to in paragraph 5 of the telegram and will be submitting on it
in the next few days in the light of Lord Shepherd's own comments on his
return from his visit to the Far East.
2. Next instalment by next bag!
7/6/69.
J. B. Denson, Esq., 0.8.I.,
PRKING.
(C. Wilson)
COVERING SECRET
Lespatched
1916 AR.
Mr. Murray
Sir Arthur had occasion to come
out of his meeting to take a
telephone call so he has dealt with
these telegrams.
He has made one
or two amendments and if you agree
with them the telegrams may issue.
6.6. Shumpion
18th June, 1969.
*
The tets she came.
17
работель
Платина.
г
With the compliments of
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE
LONDON, S.W.1
1886.
Sir J. Johnston
Sir A. Galeworthy
CONFIDENTIAL
COVERING TOP SECRET
Mr. Anthony Grey
Mr. Molloy has put down for answer on 23 June the
following question:
"To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, when he now expects the release
of the British journalist, Anthony Grey, and the
British subjects illegally detained by the Chinese
Government; and if he will make a statement."
Recommended Reply
2.
I propose that the reply might be on the following lines:
"The Chinese have indicated that if certain newsworkers
in prison in Hong Kong are released they will restore
Mr. Grey's freedom. Under normal circumstances all
the newsworkers in question will be released with full
remission by early October. The Chinese have given no
indication of their intentions about the other British
subjects, some of whom they allege have violated Chinese
law,"
Argument
3.
I had hoped that we would have been able to avoid commenting publicly on
the release date for Mr. Grey at this
stage. The question comes at an awkward moment before
Lord Shepherd has had an opportunity of reporting to the
CONFIDENTIAL
1
COVERING TOP SECRET
C
(840)
Flags A B and
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State on his discussions with the Governor of
Hong Kong about the Grey case.
keep the position open.
Our answer therefore must
4.
You will remember that during discussions with
Mr. Moreton on 19 May, the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires stated
that "If all patriotic journalists were released, Grey's that
freedom of movement would be restored. The Chinese
Government means what it says." Although I regarded this
as an unequivocal and formal assurance that the release of
the eleven newsworkers would result in Mr. Grey's release, we
decided not to make this statement public since we wished to
avoid committing ourselves publicly as to whether it should
be regarded as a firm assurance or not. However, I did
envisage at the time that we might eventually have to make
some use of it in answer to a Parliamentary Question. The
Chinese might think it rather odd if in answering a question
on this subject we appeared to ignore entirely Ma's conver-
sation with Mr. Moreton. In addition, I see some advantage
in pinning the Chinese down to this position in public.
will then be more difficult for them to change their ground
later. The reply therefore follows closely the words of
Mr. Ma which we believe were carefully chosen for him by his
Government. At the same time we must avoid being drawn in
supplementaries on our interpretation of his statement.
5. In drafting the second sentence of the answer we have
not in effect precluded the possibility of the premature
It
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
Flag D
عليكم
CONFIDENTIAL
release of the newsworkers.
But lest the Governor should
interpret it as meaning that the Secretary of State has
already decided that the newsworkers should be left to
serve out their sentences until September/October, it would
be well to make it clear to him that a final decision has
not yet been taken.
6.
In view of the strong views expressed by the Governor
of Hong Kong in his telegram No. 478of 13 June on the question
of the newsworkers, I propose that we ask by telegram for
his comments on the proposed answer.
should issue today if possible.
I attach drafts, which
Jann Unnay.
(James Murray)
18 June, 1969.
Copy to: Mr. Carter
1
squee, but we add before the last sentence often reply "Despite repenter
requests....
ANS.
7/6
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
186
829
SECRET
twem pa kozolo
Mr. Hupray
Buy 16 June.
Kr. Anthony Grey of Reuters
I agree generally with the conclusions in your minute of
11 June in respect of the implications for the Grey case of a
bargain with the Russians over Brooke, though I think our chief
defence if we come under pressure over the Grey case must be based
on the considerations of security and public confidence in
Hong Kong I would not for example be very anxious to draw the
distinction that Mr. Brooke faces the prospect of a new and
longer prison sentence, which might suggest to the Chinese that
if they chose to invent a charge against Mr. Grey they could
twist our arm more effectively.
For the moment, however, a final decision has not yet been
taken whether or not to accept the latest Soviet proposal about
the Brooke case,
and until this is done we can make no firm
plans for handling any repercussions over Grey.
The only thing that is clear is that, come what may, it is
quite impracticable, given the views of the Governor, to
contemplate that the Grey case could be disposed of by 1 July,
I understood from you this afternoon that the Governor's
promised assessment is now in and that you are making the
necessary preparations to review the whole matter with
Lord Shepherd on his return on 19 June.
R
JB&rheaton
IN
50
(J.B. JOHNSTON) 13.6.69.
23 N 1969
I
ᅥ
KEL 15C/1
wele
Copy to:
Private Secretary
Mr. Baker
Miss Deas
Sir T. Brimelow
Sir A. Galsworthy Hr. Giffard
Mr. Carter
SRÖRET
Flag A
Sir J. Johnston
SECRET
Буджендъ
men for 2076
Enter apa Lecado
(899)
MR. ANTHONY GREY OF REUTERS
PROBLEM
In Hong Kong telegram No. 466 of 7 June, Lord Shepherd
has informed the Secretary of State that he is deferring his
recommendation on the future handling of the Grey case until
his return on 19 June, by which time we are promised a
further full appraisal by the Governor of Hong Kong. Lord
Shepherd doubts if this appraisal will differ greatly from
the arguments already put forward by the Governor and
summarised in the telegram. Lord Shepherd has evidently
been impressed by these arguments, since he goes on to
suggest that it would be very desirable to defer public
knowledge of any deal over Mr. Brooke until after October,
since otherwise Mr. Grey's chances of early release might be
affected adversely.
2. East European and Soviet Department on 9 June put
forward a recommendation that we should accept the latest
Soviet counter-proposal about the Brooke case which, if
adopted, would mean that by 1 July at the latest it would
become public knowledge that we had made a bargain with the
Russians over Mr. Brooke. What are the immediate implications
of this for the Grey case?
SECRET
-
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.