unless large scale,
crobly desalinizati
pants
intere erected
7.
From the preceding paragraph it is
apparent that Hong Kong, without the New
Territories, would find itself in a very difficult
economic position and in fact it is, to say the 10222,
arguable whether Hong Kong could survive as an
antity if deprived of the New Terr. tories which
represent 350 square miles out of a total area of
approximately 400 square miles. Certainly it would
not be the economic dynamo which it is today.
Moreover, it would be largely dependent upon China
for its vater supply
which, as precent
experience shows, could be an extremely vital form
of dependency.
18.
From the military point of view while it
is possible that the present frontics night in
certain circumstances be defensible if nuclear
weapons were used to discourage invasion.
+
could in no sense be termed defensible if it wore
advanced from Shun Chun and Shataukok to EBoundary
Street in the middle of a densely populated urban
area. For all these reasons I find it impossible
to accept the premise that Hong Kong is a viable
entity in the 20th century unless it has mi
breathing space provided by the New Territories.
I conclude from this that if we are deprived of the
New Territories there would be no case for
retaining the coded parts of the Colony. 19.
But what is the likelihood of Britain
retaining the New Territories after the expiry
of the lease in 1997 The answer to this appeara
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and
to be that the chances are extremely slim; moreover that they depend
entirely upon the outcome of the Cultural Revolution in China. At one
end of the scale it can be said with certainty that if Wao Tse-tung
succeeds in his
fforts to create a China in permanent revolutionary ferment, there is no
chance at all of the lease being extended or inieod of any other
arrangement being negotiated which might leave the New Territories
within British control. At the other end of the scale there is tho
possibility that Kao's efforts will prove to be a İtotal failure and
that his regine will give place to another Communist, but pragmatic or
technocrat, regime in which the executive Loaders of present day China
such as Chou In-lai, ži Hsien-nien, Chen Yi, Li Fu-chun, Hoich Fu-chih
or their successors will predominate. In these circumstances it is
conceivable that there Z be in power a regine, still Communist, but
doäicated to the creation of a modern 20th century State whose first
ambition will be to create a China "great, rich, strong and socialist"
as Li Fu-chun put it in 1960. In such circumstances it is at least
conceivable that the Chinese Goverment will attach more importance to
the continucâ existence of a complex which provides 45% of
their foreign exchange earnings totalling today
U.S
more than/$600 million and by 1997 perhaps as much
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as $1,000 million thɛn to the extirpation of the
last colonial foothold on the mainland of Asia.
In thos circumstances it is not beyond the bounds
Lock
of possibility that the Chinese Govermont of the
time will decide to some sort of a rang
vivendi with fi.1.0. which will enablo Britain to
retain sufficient land to administo a viable
(that they)
concern, or will simply let things drift.
conclude that it is very unlikely, but just
possible, that some tacit acceptance of the continued
ར་
med existence of H.X. in its present form
might be permitted by China. But this would
provide no basis for planning and such uncertainty
! thave love would be intolerable. We shoula bu obligen/to
force the Chinese to some sort of conclusion.
10.-
The Possibilities.
In the next section of this paper
consider what I believe to be the possible
compromises between extreme positions which might
attract both sides. In descending order of
attractiveness from the British point of view I list the following:
(a) Continuation of present luase of
New Territories on the present no
rent terms;
continuod acceptance
by the Chinese of cession of HM.
island and Kowloon,
(b) Continuation of present lcase
New Territories with Britain paying
an economie rent;
rent; contimed
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on it's presumi per frenance HAG
is unlikely to
11.
acceptance by Chinese of cession
of H.K. island and Kowloon.
(c) Continuation of present lease of Now Territories at an exorbitant
rent as a condition of which Chinese
continue to accept cession of E.X.
island and Kowloon.
(a) Continuation of present lease of
New Territories at an economia en
exorbitant rentwith Kowloon also
converted to a rented basis; H.K.
island remaining on a ceded basis. (e) Britain retrocedes H.K. daları
and Kowloon in return for lesses of
both territories as well as the Hew
Territorios at nominal, ceont-dateN
exorbitant renta.
(f) Britain retrocedes H.X. island and
Kowloon and gives up its lease of the New Territories. (This could
happen
in 1997 when the New Territories*
lease expires or at some earlier stage.)
The problems which would be created by any
of the above solutions are legion. Who, for example, would pay any
agreed rent?
Almost certainly H.K. Government would have to do so, though-H4.6. night
help. The question how much R.K. would be prepared
to pay to survive in its present form is impossible
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זיים
rend- based in
renomable
percentage of Imestic расслобода
exports might have
1
in both sid
I
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to assess. It would almost certainly be necessary to lease unprofitable
islanda corely in order to maintain the "square boundary". Nevertheless,
if the Chinese Government show eny willingness to permit the Colony to
survive these are bases on which a negotiation might be possible.
12.
In addition to this list of graduated variations of leases with varying
rent scales and cessions, there is another grozy of
possibilities which might be described as "three China" solutions.
{Parca}
A F Chine solution
would be based on H.K. becoming an independent territory. There are
countries which are fully independent, with little more superficial
area, and nothing like the population or the econonde pátential of H.K.
But it seems unthinkable that China - or for that matter Taiwan eculd
abu- that Hong Kong, which both regard as part of China and its
inhabitants as compatriots, should become an independent sovereign state
or even an international zone housing the United NationS
as has recently been suggested. Rather than allow
such a new state to be created I believe that China would invade and
occupy Hong Kong. For Taivan to do so would be a much more difficult
task, but not impossible given real support among the masses of H.K. But
I doubt I put it no higher that such support would be forthcoming, and I
conclude that a third China
/solutica
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Ten paper.
1
x
alkiugh 4K is increasingly paying for
it's ovom commercial promotion the U.K
U.KI
By termed commercial rotations
solution does not nerit further consideration.
The issues facier Z.M.G.
I consider the following points would
Choice)
13.
affect H.H.G.'s
open to it:
exice of
of the various possibilities
(a) The .. at present gains only
marginal economic advantage from the
existence of Hong Kong in terms of
trade; ita total exports to the
Colony are of the order of £65
million; and comprise at present
about 10% of the Colony's imports
though a more vigorous policy by
British firas could increase this;
' against this it buys about £80 million
of goods from the Colony;
(b) politically H.X. 13 a continuing
#
"colonial commitment in a world widel
will probably soon seu an end of
colonies; this spoils the U.K.'s
image as a decolonising power;
(c) H.K.'s industrial expansion is a
positive danger to the U,K,'s own
production in the textile and in
certain industrial fields even though
these imports contribute to a Lower
cost of living in U.K.;
(a) the very dynamism of H.K.'s expansion
poses real commercial problems to the
U.K; witch must seek in some small
measure at least to help to promote Hong Kong's products even where
these compete with the U.5.'s; A
dave, hovenant, work, kat Valked |Malustaja mamma mojouts;
0001710
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File No.
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there may be run from (within certain limits) for
<- to dolları
a variety of pour proers, but they may not be transferred
goza, cam is -repeniest members Butte sterling area, hedge against
starting Fevaluation; if Britai leak contest of H.K she might houve
to agree to Convertibility of HK's
balances
if
H-K's commy earionily ram down for any rearth HK's balances would be
run a row at a
copt
to Britain's balace of
DRAFT
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(e) H.K. teen_open_crar"-ecumscent
in terms of sterl
sterling
Egg-balance of
pegnatan-ninee de hac a free exchange
market;hat it is a net Collar earner
for the sterling area;
(f) H.K. provides the U.E. with a source
of substantial invisible earnings;
there arise from insurance, banking,
aircraft routes and shipping; #shipping) (cachings moved
شيدي
Batter alone baye recently beca
estimated to be running at about
£7.4 million per annum;
I from
(g) H.K. Government and private investments
in sterling in U.K. amount to about
£350 million; which if withëramm und
reinvested elscmicre_could_cause
Britain-signisicent-difficulties;
(h) H.K. contains nearly four million
people of whom a substantial porcent-
age are conscious escapees from
Communian those future would, to say
the least, be compromised by
retrocession of the territory and whose
handing over to Communist rule would
cause an outery, since it is zoɛt
unlikely that safeguards for them
could be obtained;
payments.
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sime
it is
metal
+
wwww likely
that H.K.
would Rotain
mosociated stated;
1
impossibility of
anvisaging
transfer of population from HK to Britain in moer that their future may
be onfeguarded
of the
strangeor
(1) if the U.K. enters the European
Common Karket in the early 1970's
it would undoubtedly have the effect
of further limiting H.K.'s ties with
Britain
(J) despite the relative economie
unimportance to the U.X. of Hong
Kong under Britain's tutelage, F.K.
has achieved something of an economic
wiracle which starãs to the crcdit of
free enterprice and which H.X.G.
would not wish to see throw away to
the detriment of H.K.'s people, or
of the free world in its struggle
with totalitarianism;
(k) withåraval from H‚Ž., or at least
an undignified scuttle, would diminish
the U.K.'s cstige and possibly
affect seriously trade with other
nations in S.2. Asia and the Far
East;
(l) 125 years of British runde inis created
es citizens of Hong Kong who are witho Strictly Chiriace now British; to
itäma Whether Caniness of race, non-
mixed race or naturalis Britain retains
for
•prasibility sovereignty
craking tatay accommodation with
Juinas.
Ꮩ .
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Chamina
торною
if the wave to abando
H.K.; the Virtual
/Alicough
4
.F. 174
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Also an interest free loan of
₤3 millim pranmer for
at there have
the airport, beer capital grants of over £500,000 for hingnew There is
also ₤lmithin fore the Housing Com Argaming from cos as some the and of
the
ktalled about Él me the in
amgame sim 1946.
wilt the
This compares very
отторска favourably, from HEUK. print of view, large grants and Trama to
the repondent m Comment formidories cominated in 1967 to
Demont ₤250 milein
Although from the conomic, and possibly political,
point of view there does not seen to be exy selfish
reason: why II.E.G. should wish to retain control
of Hong Kong, there remain very compelling porch
reasons why H.H.G. should sook to achilove one of - (ક) the compromises
set out in paragrapì. 10(a)
above.
| 14.
―
It would be unprofitable at this stage
to decide how much H.M.G. might be asked to
contribute towards enabling E.K. to retain the
status quo or indeed to assess how much China
would want in the way of rent to agree to the
conversion of cessions into leases and vh
they would consider a fair ront for the Kev
Territories. At present the annual cost to
Britse Gost
Hakim kisiä, might be assessed at £12 million.
includes
This idea the (part) cost of maintaining
(about₤s)
a garrison (H.K. pays Emillion per Joer), Witte
contributions
K
Lägrenka and the cost of
{
A
maintaining representation here. There havo
seldom in H.K.'s life been direct budgetary
support grants If a satisfactory negotiation
with China should take place one would hope that
only a police force would thereaftor be needed,
plus a small armod gendarmerie to patrol the
border and to reinforce the police where
necessary. This would fall to be paid by the
But given the moral proli
H.K. Government.
H.K.G. might be willing for a satisfactory bu
/term
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0001740
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ith Matting
probiome, for an maple,
L
has been willing to
provide jour quarters financial moistenca
+
H.S.
1
HMG
mjoyed.
т
term solution to pay to the H.K. Government as a
contribution towards rent to China plus military
support costs a somewhat larger sun than she pays
today, but pehaps on a tapering off basis.
15.
But the possibility of such a solution
depends entirely upon the willingness of the
Government of China to negotiato. Unless therefore
a new situation arises in China in which the
Government of that country expresses a desire to
negotiate, or H.M.G. have some inducement to cater
to China which today I am unable to sue, thon
Britain will have to make up its mind that the
conclusion of the lease of the New Territories
means the end of Hong Kong as a Grown Colony
and that steps must be taken to divest herself
of the ceded territories also. An important
facet of any such scheme must be that China wil
have to obtain official representation in the
Colony.
ד
This was a demand or which much was heard
in the past, but China seems to have decided that
it was illogical to be pressing on the one hand
for consular representation while on the other
stressing that H.K. remained part of China.
Nevertheless if there is to be any possibility of
a non-chaotic handover of responsibility to China
it is essential that there should be an official
representative in H.K. to whom the Byiti sh
authorities can speak. In that case the following
possibilities seem to present themsolves:-
E
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16.
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27
(a) Britain should invite China to agree
to a condominium of 1.5. for limited period either immediately
preceding 1997 or carlier at the conclusion of which sovereignty
should revert to China.
(b) Britain should invite China to
participate in the governing of H.3.,
but under a ncutral Governor from an agreed third party state. Again
at the conclusion of such a period
sovereignty should pass to Chinu.
(c) Provided that China (Peking) had by
that time acquired her seat in the U.N., the U.N. should be invited to
take on the responsibility for providing the neutral Governor suggested
in (b) above.
(a) Subject to the same proviso; the U.N. should be invited to accept
full responsibility for H.K, either for a limited period after which
Ching would resume sovereignty ca for an indefinite period with no
indication as to the future of the
territory except that the inhabitants
should be free to decide it for
themselves.
An essential feature of all the schemes
listed in the preceding paragraphs would be that
/decisions
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Z Ordim rides
سات
25 yours
but fuit
اوانه حماية مساه
に
+
ivery to fromclusi
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