and can be released at any time. They are normally held under war-
rants valid for 12 months which can, if necessary, be renewed. At
present there are 48 detainees, four having recently been released.
FLAG B 5. A study (attached) has been made by the Special Branch in Hong
39 Kong about the possibility of arranging the return of detainees to
China or their release in Hong Kong. Its recommendations (paragraph
21) were that:
(a) No attempt should be made to return detainees to China unless
the Chinese took some initiative in that direction. (Experience in
attempting to deport two film stars and statements made to Sir D.
Hopson by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking amply
bear out that the Chinese have no interest, at least at the present
time, in any form of disguised deportation though efforts in this
direction might be pursued at a later stage if relations in general
improve.)
-
(b) Consideration should be given to the unconditional release
within the Colony of a small group of the less important Communists
held under the Emergency detention orders.
(c) If the Communist and public reaction to this initial release
were acceptable to the Government, a phased release programme should
be planned, based on the general principle of releasing first those
who were less important and had been detained the longest.
(d) The political climate and the level of Communist activity, as
well as the individual potential threats posed to security by detai-
nees, should dictate the extent to which the release programme was
effected.
../ (e)
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e) When practicable, consideration should be given to "spoiling
operations" against one or more detainees prior to release.
FLAG C The Governor has indicated in Hong Kong telegram No. 802 that he
agrees broadly with these recommendations, but has made no commitment
as to the timing of releases.
5. The Governor has already begun to act on the recommendations by
releasing four detainees. The local Communist reaction has been mini-
mal, though in Peking the releases may well have been a factor in
inducing the authorities to shift their position on exit visas for the
Mission. Communist exploitation for propaganda purposes would
undoubtedly be greater if a significant number were released at once.
But as the Hong Kong Government is at present in a strong position
vis-à-vis the local Communiste, now is probably as good a time as any
to make a concession, particularly as it is in response to an "act of
FLAG D de-escalation" by the Chinese (see paragraph 4 of Peking telegram
No.
699). I see considerable force therefore in Sir D. Hopson's recom-
mendation in Peking telegram No. 698 that in the interests of restor-
ing as great a degree of normality as possible in relations with China,
we should make some significant response to the decision to grant all
outstanding exit visas, provided that the Chinese honour
their undertaking fully. He suggests that ten to twenty detainees
should be released at once. The exact number must be for the Governor
to judge in accordance with the criteria set out in the recommend a-
tions of the Special Branch study; but in order to have a significant
impact, I think the number should be not less than ten.
FLAG A
6. We have considered the point that by the release
of detainess in
../ the way
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the way proposed, we would be underlining unduly the link between
British subjects in China and our policies in Hong Kong, and that
this might encourage the Chinese to try to bargain further and larger
releases of detainees against the release of British subjects in
detention in China. However, the significance of Hong Kong is now so
clear that there seems little advantage in trying to play it down.
Moreover, we are sure that the Chinese would not consider the release
of detainees as an appropriate quid pro quo for the release of Mr.
Grey, and we doubt very much whether it would directly influence their
attitude towards other British subjects either. I very much doubt
whether they would, for example, consider releasing Mr. Watt of
Vickers-Zimmer or the two Kerchant Marine officers in exchange for
detainees. (The Merchant Marine officers may well be released in any
case if they make suitable confessions.) The chances of securing the
release of detained British subjects as a whole are however likely to
improve if relations in general improve, and for this reason alone,
the release of detainees is to be encouraged. If the Governor argues
that he has not got ten "lese important" persons according to the
criterion referred to above, we will have to be content with the
release of as many as he can offer. If he considers that the release
of ten or more at once would of itself be too dramatic a gesture
which might be exploited unduly by the local Communists, he might be
asked to release smaller groups over the next few weeks. However,
the impact would be far greater if a larger number were released
and I think that he should be pressed in this direction.
-
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../7..
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7.
We considered suggesting to the Governor that the arrival of
Sir D. Hopson in Hong Kong might be a suitable occasion for the
release of a group of detainees. But this might go too far towards
implying an exchange of "hostages".
leaves open the matter of timing.
The draft telegram therefore
James Wannay
(James Murray)
7 August, 1968
Telegram
M: Toby.
Si D. Allen as his
prabuniary view
leave.
that
you
what
was obtained before you
I think the least we
Chit
is to put them proposal to the Converans.
If he jibs, we shall han to suck som
compromise
ရွာ
but this is clearly by for the
most megetiable camercy for wiching with
Peking
Sunt fut desparth
2018/8
Синен ку
air perbally all they will acupt.
Apeed of
7/8
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Philkinson.
7/vm
HWD 13/
With the compliments of
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
Hong Kong Deft-
1/
July 1968
LONDON, W.1.
Jumil
기
CS. 41C
2600079
1000-1/67-852147
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From: Major J.A. Harrison,
M.B.E.,M.C.,R.A.
No.
SCR 1/8/2621/67
Dear faminara, Заспитани
395
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT,
LOWER ALBERT ROAD,
HONG KONG.
2nd July, 1968.
Six copies of a Special Branch paper on selective release of detainees
are forwarded for such distribution within Whitehall as you think fit.
Copies have been sent to Singapore, to Michael Wilford in Washington and
to Peking; the last without annexe having had the more sensitive
paragraphs
expurgated.
your sincerel
A.W. Gaminara, Esq., Commonwealth Offiće, London, S.W.1.
(J.A. Harrison)
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RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
- 8 AUG 1968
EDI
GET/14/369/133
Subject:
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Copy llo.29 of 33
Special Branch,
hong Long.
20th June, 1968.
Study of the future disposal of persons held under Enerzenty Botention
Regulations either by departure fros Hon. Kopi ("retien to thipal) or
relanse in the Colony.
Not eucherad
+
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines two issues, firstly the peasibility of
arranging the return to Ching of the detainees at present held in
the Vistoria Road Centre, under some formula acceptable to both the
Hong Kong Government and the Chinese People's Government (9.8.0.)
and secondly the alternative of their release in Hong Kong in a
manner most advantageous to this Government (Governor'e Committee
Minutes No. 292/58 and 324/63 refer).
2.
At present 52 persons are detained at the Victoria Road
Centre under varrants valid for 12 months issued under the provisions
of Section 31 of the Emergency (Principal) Regulations Gep. 222. The
first of these vorrents expires on the 27th September, 136" and the
final one on the 14th June, 1959. The nares of these detainess, dates
of their arrest, relevant detention orders and a brief resme of the
activities which led up to their arrest and detention are contained
191
in ennaære to this paper.
PARTON TO CHINA
Fenlaret Bollar of the 2.5.0.
3.
In considering the possibilities of enforcing the return of
any of the detainees to Chins it is pertinent First to study the
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history of the C.P.G. policy towards deportation, for during the last
few months it has been indicated by the 3.P.G. that they consider any
such action amounts to deportation.
4.
For many years the Chinese have been reluctant to accept
deportees from Hong Kong and though the Hong Kong Government has been
able to enforce Deportation Orders, from time to time, the Chinese
attitude has been one of acquiescence rather than active co-operation
and then only in cases where it was generally in the interests of the
C.P.G. to accept such persons. The most recent deportstions from
Hong Kong to China involving persons engaged in communist subversive
activity took place in 1959 at the time of the de-registration of the
communist controlled Society of Plantations. In 1960 the physical
deportation of criminals to China came to a complete halt, and the
only category which the Chinese continued to accept were persone
arrested in Hong Kong for their involvement in espionage activity on
behalf of the C.P.G. The last case in this category occurred in early
1965.
5.
It should be pointed out that the absence of any deportations
to Ching for such long perioda was not so much the result of any
declaration of opposition by the C.P.G. but rather that the
circunstances had not arisen in which it had been necessary to attempt
to enforce deportation. However, with the onset of communist
confrontation with the Hong Kong Government last year and following
several recommendations by Vegistrates, upon convictions in open Court,
that prisoners should be considered for deportation to Chine, the 6.P.3.
nade known, in unaistakable terms, its attitude towards any further
attempts to deport Chinese Nationals from the Colony. This was done
through an announcement by LEUNG Vsi Jam, Director of the Hong Kong
Branch of the New China News Agency, in a bulletin on the 15th June,
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which reed inter alia
Recently the British authorities in Hong Kong went so far as to announce
their intention to deport patriotic compatriots. According to news
reports carried on June 9th in the South China Morning Post, the
spokesman of the British authorities in Hong Kong said on June 8th:
"Deportation orders had been served on three persons and similar action
was being contemplated against others as a result of the recent
disturbances". This measure of the British authorities in Hong Kong to
persecute our patriotic conpatriots is illegal and is part of their
fascist suppression. The Chinese people will not tolerate such crimes by
the British imperialism. We lodge the most emphatic and strongest
protest against the British authorities in Hong Kong.
If Chinese compatriota in Hong Kong themselves request to return to the
interior, the people of the Homeland will welcome them at any time. But
the Chinese people and compatriots in Hong Kong will never permit the
British authorities in Hong Kong to make false charges end deporting
(sic) Chinese compatriots against their will by force. It is the
inviolable and inalienable right of the Chinese people to reside in Hong
Kong
+
This statement was given wide publicity both in the communist press
in Hong Kong and in China,
Attemta to return detainesa to China
6.
On 14th March, 1958 it was decided to test G.P.G. reaction
when the two communist film stars, Shek Wai and Fu Ki vere presented
for "release to China" at Lo i on the 14th March. After making some
propagando capitel from the situation, the .P.G. condermed this nove
as a dismised form of deportation, Imanded it as a "nev instance of
persecution" and it became the subject of an official protest to the
H.M.G. Representative in Peking. The protest included a clein thet
it was the "sacrei right of patriotic compatriots to live and work in
Hong Kong" and demanded that no further attempts should be made to
send the two film stars "to any place outside of Hong Kong on any
pretext against their will",
7.
In view of the post C.P.G. policy of continuing to accept
prisoners involved in Chinese espionage activities, en approach was
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made to the local branch of the llew China News Agency on 15th May,
1963 offering to release a person, at present detained at V.R.C. and
arrested in July last year for Chinese espionage activity, on the
understanding that the N.C.N.A. would make arrangements for his return
to China. It was pointed out that arrangements could be made to avoid
any publicity if this offer were to be accepted, After some delay
the reply from the M.C.H.A. categorically denied all knowledge of the
detainee concerned and stated that any attempt to deport him to China
would be unacceptable!
Possible means of arranging retum to China
8.
During the last months a careful study has been conducted
of the 52 detainees to ascertain whether they include any person who
might be important enough to the C.P.G. to be considered es a
bartering point, perhaps for the release of British Nationals detained
in China. The conclusion reached is that there is no such person at
present detained by Special Branch. Although sore are senior
officials in various spheres of local comunist activity none is
thought to be in possession of such important knowledge or holding
positions of such note that the 3.F.G. would be willing to relax
their present principles concerning deportation in order to obtain
his return to China; indeed, the C.P.G. might well consider that to
do so would only be to highlight to us the importance of the detainee
concerned.
9.
A deep study has also been rade of the possibility of
arriving at some formule for the release of detainees which might be
acceptable to the C.P.3. with the implicit understanding that they
return to China. For example:-
(a) release at Tsim Sha Tsui or Lo 'hu railway station on
the understanding that they return to Ching until the period
of their energency detention order has expired, when
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You, tont why wer
Privably for. ? Bulm again
consideration would be given to allowing them to re-enter
the Colony;
(b) release within the Colony, but to be handed over to
local Chinese co-mist Representatives who would then
arrange for their return to China. (Many of those who have
completed their prison sentences have, of course, paid
trips to China immediately following their release from
prison);
(c) action as in (a) and (b) above allowing the C.P.G. to
choose which detainees could be released within these
conditions or alternatively offering all detainees for such
treatment.
It is
All these formulas of course involve extensive negotiations with
Representatives of the G.P.G. and their observance of any conditions
て egread upon. Additionally it is almost inconceivable that the C.P.G.
would not also wish to extract other major concessions from Government
before agreeing to any acceptance of detainees to China.
considered that the categorical statements made on this question over
the lost year and the reaction to epproaches made so far support the
view that there is little or no likelihood of any fruktful discussion
on this matter, unless the Chinese theraelves take some initiative in
this direction.
10.
+
Hention must also be rade of the likelihood that one or more
of those detained may offer voluntarily to be repatriated to Chine.
In the early stages of their detention this might have been possible,
but, following the experience of the two film stars and the regular
visita all have received during their detention, they are in knowledge
of the communist official ettitude on this question and it is
considered that no detainee at present in V.R.C. would offer or agree
to return to China without direct instructions from the C.P.G. or its
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Representatives in Hong Kong. Clearly to do so against the known
wishes of the Chinese authorities would be to invite at least
censure and serious repercussions, even were he to be accepted across
the border which at the present stage appears highly improbable.
11.
In brief, the Chinese comranists have made it abundantly
clear during the last year that they will not accept any attempt by
the Hong Kong Government to effect the deportation of Chinese Nationals
from this Colony to China. They have also indiceted, in unmistakable
terms, that they consider any return of such persons to China, under
whatever guise it may be offered, is tantamount to deportation and
therefore unacceptable. The relative importance of the detainees at
present held is such that it is felt that no formula can be arrived
at for their return to China which would be acceptable to the C.P.G.
end to the Hong Kong Government, at the present tine.
·
RELEASE T HOT KOG
+ SE FEEL
Legal considegations
12.
The Hon. Attorney General has edvised that, upon the expiry
of the 12 month detention orders issued under the provisions of Section
31 of the Emergency (Principal) Regulations Gap 232, further detention
· orders could properly be issued following the submission of such :
recommenäntion to the Hon. Colonial Secretary. (Paragraph 9 of
Special Branch Pager GE/14/353/155 of the 22nd Kay, 1963 "Frocedures
governing the continued detention of comunists ......" refera),
There would appear, therefore, to be no legal bir to continued and
indefinite detention of the comunista currently held. Also there is
no procedural difficulty in effecting their release; Hon, C.S. can
cancel the current detention orders at any time and there are no legal
considerations, such as those which affect persons serving prison
sentences.
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Security and Political fretors affecting release
13.
Before studying the question of release in Hong Kong it is
pertinent to re-consider the grounds which support continued
detention. The detainees are dedicated communist agitators who have
openly declared that they do not recognise the right of the Hong Kong
Government to exercise its authority within the Colony, and they have
shown no relaxation in their attitude, in this respect, during their
detention. Thus they present a continuing threat to the security of
the Colony. While these are valid grounds for the issue of a
detention order under the Emergency (Principal) Regulations it must
now be taken into account that other and more senior militant
communists are still at liberty within the Colony and, on occasion,
openly voicing their opposition to the Hong Kong Government. In the
absence of any resurgence of violent communist activity in the Colony
it will become increasingly difficult to justify the continued
detention of those at present in the Victoria Road Centre.
14.
The release of prisoners has been a major communist demend
since the onset of confrontation lest year and little distinction has
been made between those held under Emergency Regulations and those
· serving prison terms, although in recent weeks there has been
increasing attention drawn to those held under the former provisions.
It is doubtful, however, if the general public dra:s any real
distinction between prisoners convicted in Court and those held under
emergency legislation. It could be said that the release of any
detainee will be hailed by the communists as a victory and encourage
increased communist agitation and at the same time be viewed by the
general public as a major concession to the comunists. While
this stand point might apply in the event of any large scale release
or if the detainees concerned were the more prominent ones, such es
members of the All Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee, it
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4
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ฯ (M~
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· Hefti )
seems likely to be less valid in the c-se of a small number of the less
Important detainees. In this context prisoners have been released,
from jail after completing their terms of imprisonment, as an almost
daily occurrence over the past few nonths, Each release has been
hailed as a victory and the prisoner greeted as a hero with due
publicity in the communist press, but the propaganda impact has
gradually died down and is now attracting little or no public
attention.
15.
It seems likely that communist agitation in connection with
the release of persons generally will continue indefinitely. Indeed
it may increase and be joined by pressure from organisations both
locally based and in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, which express
concern for "detention without trial", As mentioned above,
(paragraph 13), it may become increasingly difficult in view of the
communist policy of non-violence to justify the continued detention
of all our detainees and thus some move towards selective release not,
or in the near future, may represent less of a victory for the
communists then release at a much later date.
16.
It may be considered that some form of conditional release
should be arranged, for example:-
(a) placing the released person under conditions similar
to those applying to Police somervision, or
(b) excluding the detainee from entering or residing in
particular geographical areas of the Colony.
However, the experience of the last four months in respect of
supervision
orders issued against released communist prisoners shows that it is
extremely unlikely that these restrictions would be observed,
although any failure to comply would, perforce, drive them under-
ground and thus restrict, to sona extent, their motivities. However
their
failure to comply would present the commmists with a further field
T
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for propaganda exploitation and at the sene tine necessitate re-arrest
flours
action if they are not to be allowed to flaunt Government's authority.
In these circumstances it is considered there is no advantage to be
gained in imposing conditions of this nature.
17.
The release within the Colony of a small number of the less
important persons would present a means of judging communist reaction
and that of the general public. Should this reaction be acceptable
then a phased release programe could be planned taking into account,
of course, the political climate and the level of communist activity
generally. Should the reaction be unfavourable the vast majority
of the detainees, including the more important ones, will
atill be in custody.
18.
Frotors to be taken into account when selecting prisoners
for release should be:-
(a) their relative importance in their respective spheres
of communist activity and the threat they pose to security;
(b) the extent to which the communists are likely to give
publicity to their release in view of (a) above;.
(c) the date of their arrest and subsequent length of
detention; and
(d) the date of expiry of their detention orier (in many
cases this is not linked to the date of Frrest).
It is suggested that the general principle upon which selection should
be based is early release of the lesser important communists and,
where possible, those who have been detained the longest. However,
this latter factor should also be allied to the date of expiry or ano
the detention orders to avoid the need, if possible, of applying for
new orders.
19.
If selective release within the principles set out above is
to be considered some further advantage could, perhaps, de obtained
by endeavouring to suggest that one or more of the released detainess
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+
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.