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IMMEDIATE PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno. 740
jupa is/s
1818
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES N. 31 15 AUG 1968
foo
14 AUGUST, 1968
FD1/1
CONFIDENTIAL
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 748 of
14 August. Repeated for information to Hong Kong.
(21
F4240 Hong Kong telegram No. 988.
390
Although original proposal in Peking telegram No. 698 was for release of
a number of detainees (10-20) if all outstanding, exit visas were
issued, I hope we can consider grant of Sir D. Hopson's visa a
sufficiently important step in that direction to warrant a response in
itself, in the form of release of some detainees even while remaining
applications are outstanding. (This would be over and above the two
scheduled for release on 15 August). Such a move on our part (quite
apart from its value in broader political context) should encourage
grant of remaining viges, at which point a small group of detainees
could be released. This would not affect size of the package, merely its
presentation.
2. I hope we can take fairly flexible attitude on this. telegram No.
1362 to Hong Kong envisaged the possibility of releases in instalments.
The Chinese have taken a big step in the right direction. Let us
encourage them to continue, particularly when Chung Jah issue may
incline them to be difficult.
Foreign Office pass Priority Hong Kong.
Mr. Cradock
Repeated as requested
Your
FILES
F.0.
F.E.D.
ADVANCE COPIES SENT
Permanent Under Secretary Sir D. Allen.
c.o. Hong Kong Department.
Sir A. Galsworthy.
D.S.A.0.
Sir C. Crowe
Personnel Department.
CONFIDENTIAL
XXXXX
3178
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TU COMMONWEALTH WEINE
Ich conÂN NUNDER 977
9 AUGUST 1960-
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.3 1
1 2 AUG 1968
CONFIDENTIAL
ADUKESSED CU TILEGkm nu. 9/7 OF 9TH AUGUST xepeated Peking.
399
COPT
YOUR TELEGRAM "U. 1302 : PULIVY Juwanus Chbaa.
I WOULD HOPE TU DE AULE TU Agkee geneRALLY WITH These PROPUSALS,
BUT IT WILL TAKE c A LITTLE TIME TU EXAMINE THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS IN
SUFFICIENTLY CLOSE DETAIL TO ENABLE ME TO REPLY MORE SPECIFICALLY. I
WILL TelegraPH FURTHER IN ABOUT 10 DAYS AT LATEST.
2. MEANWhile we STILL PROPUSE TU Release TJU MOKE IN THE EVENING OF
THE 15TH AUGUST (VIJE HY Telegram NO. 968 PARAGRAPH 2).
FO PLEASɛ PASɔ ROUTINE PER ING.
SIR D. TRENCH
/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
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PRIORITY COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM. HUMBER 1362
340)
CONFIDENTIAL.
CONFIDENTIAL
TOP COP
TO HONG KONG
8 AUGUST 1968.
AL
PAD IN
Ne 31
(*) AUG 1968 :
pumppu i Edili
ADDRESSED TO GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELEGRAM NUMBER 1362 OF 8 AUGUST
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PEKING,
PEKING TELEGRAM NO. 6981 BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS CHINA,
AS WE VIEW THE SITUATION FROM HERE, AND SUBJECT OF COURSE TO YOUR VIEWS
AS REGARDS THE KONG KONG END, WE SEE FORCE IN SIR D. HOPSON'S
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THE RELEASE OF A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF
DETAINEES AS ** AN ACT OF DEESCALATION "', PROVIDED THE CHINESE
IMPLEMENT IN FULL THEIR UNDERTAKING TO GRANT ALL OUTSTANDING VISAS
FOR THE MISSION. YOU HAVE ALREADY INDICATED BROAD AGREEMENT WITH
THE STUDY ON DETAINEES (YOUR TELEGRAM 802) WHICH RECOMMENDED THAT
CONSIDERATION DE GIVEN TO THE UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE WITHIN THE
COLONY OF A SMALL GROUP OF THE LESS IMPORTANT COMMUNISTS AND -
DEPENDING ON COMMUNIST AND PUBLIC REACTION TO A PHASED RELEASE PROGRAMME
BASED ON THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF RELEASING, FIRST, THOSE WHO ARE LESS
IMPORTANT AND HAVE BEEN DETAINED THE LONGEST. COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO THE
FIRST FOUR RELEASES SEEM TO HAVE BEEN MINIMAL AND SATISFACTORY FROM OUR
POINT OF VIEW. WE SEE ADVANTAGE THEREFORE IN MAKING FURTHER RELEASES AS
HOPSON PROPOSES. THE CHINESE LEADERS NO DOUBT REGARD THIS LATEST SHIFT
ON VISAS IN PEKING AS A CONTRIBUTION ON THEIR PART TO REESTABLISHING A
MODUS VIVENDI WITH US, AND EXPECT RECOGNITION OF THIS ON OUR PART. IF
THEY DO FULFIL THEIR UNDERTAKING ON VISAS, IT MAY WELL SIGNAL THE
BEGINNING OF AN IMPROVE- MENT IN SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS WHICH WE WOULD
NATURALLY WISH TO ENCOURAGE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AND WHICH WE COULD
REASONABLY EXPECT TO BE REFLECTED IN THE CHINESE ATTITUDE TOWARDS HONG
KONG. SPEEDING-UP OF RELEASES COULD THEREFORE REASONABLY BE PRESENTED
NOT AS A CONCESSION TO CHINESE PRESSURE, BUT AS AN ACTIVE CONTRI- BUTION
ON OUR PART TO A RETURN TO SOME DEGREE OF NORMALITY IN OUR RELATIONS. WE
AGREE THAT THE RELEASES WOULD NOT NECESSARILY YIELD DIRECT RESULTS, BUT
THEY WOULD IN OUR JUDGEMENT IMPROVE THE ATHOSPHERE OF SINO-BRITISH
RELATIONS, AND SUCH AN YIELD SOME DIVIDEND IN HONG KONG.
IMPROVEMENT SHOULD
/2.
WE HAVE
CONFIDENTI AL
$6
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
2. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE POINT THAT BY THE RELEASE OF DETAINEES IN THE
WAY PROPOSED, WE WOULD BE UNDERLINING UNDULY THE LINK BETWEEN BRITISH
SUBJECTS IN CHINA AND OUR POLICIES IN HONG KONG, AND THẦY THIS MIGHT
ENCOURAGE THE CHINESE TO TRY TO BARGAIN FURTHER AND LARGER RELEASES OF
DETAINEES AGAINST THE RELEASE OF BRITISH SUBJECTS IN DETENTION IN CHINA.
HOWEVER, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HONG KONG IS NOW SO CLEAR THAT THERE SEEMS
LITTLE ADVANTAGE IN TRYING TO PLAY IT DOWN. MOREOVER, WE ARE SURE THAT
THE CHINESE WOULD NOT CONSIDER THE RELEASE OF DETAINEES AS AN
APPROPRIATE QUID PRO QUO FOR THE RELEASE OF MR. GREY, AND WE DOUBT VERY
MUCH WHETHER IT WOULD DIRECT- LY INFLUENCE THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS OTHER
BRITISH SUBJECTS EITHER. WE RECOGNISE THAT THERE IS NO MOMENT WHICH FROM
THE HONG KONS POINT OF VIEW COULD BE REGARDEN AS IDEAL FOR MAKING
CONCESSIONS, BUT SINCE NEITHER WE NOR YOU WOULD JUDGE RELEASES OF THIS
SORY TO BE A MAJOR CONCESSION, WE WOULD HOPE THAT THEY COULD BE MADE AT
A TIME WHEN THE SITUATION VIS-A-VIS THE LOCAL COMMUNISTS IS NOT
UNFAVOURAM E'' (YOUR TELEGRAM 938).
YOUR TELEGRAM 938). IF YOUR WERE TO SEE STRONG OBJECTION TO THE
SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE OF THE NUMBER OF DETAINEES HOP SON PROPOSES, WE
THINK THAT THE RELEASE OF SEVERAL SMALL GROUPS OVER A PERIOD OF WEEKS
WOULD ALSO BE BENEFICIAL. BUT IN THE LIGHT UP THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, AS SEEN HERE WE BELIEVE THERE COULD HS SUBSTANTIAL
ADVANTAGE IN A LARGER GESTURE INVOLVING A MINIMUM OF TEN PERSONS.
4. WE SHOULD BE HOST GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD CONSIDER THESE SUGGESTIONS
AND LET US HAVE YOUR VIEWS.
5. IF THE CHINESE HONOUR THEIR UNDERTAKING ON VISAS AND WE MATCH IT BY A
GESTURE ON RELEASE OF DETAINEES, THIS MIGHT CREATE THE SORT u ATMOSPHERE
IN WHICH WE COULD WORK TOWARDS A SOLUTION TO THE INTRACTABLE PROBLEM OF
GREY. WE SHALL BE TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY ABOUT THIS.
CROSEC
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CONFIDENTIAL
398
Registry No. 11
Top Secret ябл
PRIORITY
EMERGENCY IMRENA
Confidential
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
with
Relected Open-
without
DEFERRED
-priority
• Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addresse={1}
CYPHER
Draft.
Telegram to:--
GOVERNCH/HONG
X Ng136.
(Date)
And to :-
KONG
8/3
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
[Sec
Security classification -if any
CONFIDENTIAL
[Codeword-if any]
Address 10.........
POMBEROR HONG KONG...
telegram No.-
(date)
repeated for information to-
کیو
Repeat to
PEZING
Ex Slair.
Code
Cypher
Distribution :- 7.2.D. Newa
Consular
FLAG
Defence PLAG C JIPGD
Coples to :-
coi Hong Kong
Nowa Defence D.1.3.
Peking telegram No. 698: British policy towards
China.
!
As we view the situation from here, and
aubjact of course to your views as regards the
Hong Kong end, we see force in Sir D. Hopson! as
arguments in favour of the release of a signi-
cent number of detainees as "an act of de-
escalation", provided the Chinese implement in
full their undertaking to grant all outstanding
visas for the Mission. You have already indi-
oated broad agreement with the study on detai-
nees (your telegram 802) which recommended that
consideration be given to the unconditional
release within the Colony of a small group of
the less important Communiste and depending
on Communist and public reaction to a phased
../release
-
-
CONFIDENT IAL
(9335) WL 47403;47: 200m 1/64 Hw.
release programme based on the general principle
of releasing, first, those who are lese important
and have been detained the longest.
+
Communist
reactions to the first four releases seem to
have been minimal and satisfactory from our point
of view. Te see advantage therefore in making
further releases as Hopson proposes. The Chinese
leaders no doubt regard this latest shift on
viess in Paking as a contribution on their part
to reestablishing a modus vivendi with ue, and
expect recognition of this on our part.
If they
do fulfil their undertaking on visas, it may well
signal the beginning of an improvement in Sino-
British relations which we would naturally wish
to encourage se much as possible and which we
could reasonably expect to be reflected in the
Chinese attitude towards Hong Kong. Speeding-up
of releases could therefore reasonably be pre-
septed not as a concession to Chinese pressure, but
as an active contribution on our part to a retura
to some degree of normality in our relations.
+
agree that the relases would not necessarily
yield direct results; but they would in our judet
ment improve the atmosphere of Sino-British relat
tions, and such an improvement should yield some
dividend in Hong Kong.
2.
We have considered the point that by the
release of detainees in the way proposed, we
would be underlining unduly the link between
British subjects in China and our policies in
Hong Kong, and that this might encourage the
Chinese to try to bargain further and larger
../releases
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
FLAG E
releases of detainees against the release of
British subjects in detention in China. However,
the significance of Hong Kong ie now so clear
that there seems little advantage in trying to
play it down. Moreover, we are sure that the
Chinese would not consider the release of detal-
nees as an appropriate quid pro quo for the
release of Er. Grey, and we doubt very much
whether it would directly influence their atti-
tude towards other British subjects either.
3. We recognise that there is no moment which
from the Hong Kong point of view could be regar-
ded as ideal for making concessions, but since
neither we nor you would judge releases of this
sort to be a major concession, we would hope
that they could be made at a time when the situ-
ation vis-à-via the local Communists is "not
unfavourable" (your telegram 928). If you were
to see strong objection to the simultaneoue
release of the number of detainees Hopson pro-
poses, we think that the release of several
small groups over a perios of weeks would also
be beneficial. But in the light of the fore-
going considerations, as seen here we believe
there could be substantial advantage in a larger
geature involving a minimum of ten persons.
4. We should be most grateful if you would
consider these suggestions and let us have
your views.
5. If the Chinese honour their undertaking on
visas and we match it by a gesture on release
of detainees, this might create the sort of
atmosphere in which we could work towards a
../solution
+
solution to the intractable problem of Grey.
We shall be telegraphing separately about this,
:
8
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
[
Fool's
53
A
SECRET
HONG KONG TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
12 JULY, 1968
Par
(397)
P. Denim Rm q...
TELEGRAH MO, 648 : POLICY IN HONG KONG.
NO.
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
-19 AUG 1968
FD1/1
西川
TREET THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE CURRENT PHASE OF CONFRONTATION
1
OP AT A HIGH LEVEL HAVE ALREADY INSTRUCTED INFLUENTIAL
IAL JORKUNST LEADERS TO DROP VICLENCE AND CONCENTRATE ON BROADEN-
-ING THE CASE OF COMITUNIST CUPPORT. THIS ATTEMPT TO WIN OVER
ABREMENTS 15 OF COURSE A POLICY OF MANY YEARS STANDING AND IS
ODVIGUSLY ONE WHICH WILL NEVER EE AGANDONED. TO THIS LIMITED
BE
ד
T
JATENT ME ARE ALREADY DACK TO NORMAL, WITH CONFRONTATION IN HONG
KUVA LARGELY OVER FOR THE TIME BLING: BUT THE PROPAGANDA ATTACK
17 MORE OVERT AND MORE DITTERLY PROSECUTED THAN PRE-1967, AND
(0) ......TOVER VE 00, ACTIVE CONFRONTATION COULD START UP AGAIN AT
ANY TIME IF THE CALANCE OF INFLUENCE WITHIN THE CPQ CHIFTS.
THE POLICY IN (A) HAS GENERALLY SPEAKING BEEN SUCCESSFULLY
[POSED UND, PARTLY AG A RESULT, MORALE IN LABOUR CIRCLES PARTIC-
LY IS LOJ: SUT THERE ŘEZAIVO A HARD CORE OF THE MILITANTLY
15. THIS MILITANT HARD CORE WILL ALWAYS SEEK TO MAKE TROUBLE,
ARE GERTAINLY NOT INTERESTED IN ANY ACCOMODATION WITH US EXCEPT
OLLY ON THEIR OWN TERMS. THE AUTHORITY OF THE MODERATE LEADERS
IN ... CPG AND SLE IS NOT SO COM/LATE THAT THEY CAN ENTIRELY
|
J
C
LISTAŁE THE MILITANTS. THEY CANNOT AVOID SOME EENDING TO
1
A LITA AT VID.C, NOA AVOLO SIVING THEN SOKE OSTENSIBLE SUPPORT. IT
1. 1000 ARQUADLE THAT THE SUNKUNIST LEADERSHIP MERE IS AT PRESENT
+
17 QUITE GLAD TO SEE US OCCASIONALLY TAKE A FIRD LINE WITH
copied
oria.
KESINT POOR STATE OF SINO-DRITISH RELATIONS, WITH ALL THE
FLOW THAMISWON, RESULT COGONTIALLY FROM A
CHÍNÁ SPRÍ
ALME FERLANG OPEN. LAMH OF SUCCESS IN HONG KONG
AMERICAN
t
SECRET
2.
AMERICAN CONNECTIONS SEMICOLON AND THE RITUAL NEED TO BE BOTH
ANTI-COLONIAL AND ANTI-CAPITALIST.
(E) AS FAR AS HONG KONG IS CONCERNED, THE JOKER IN THE PACK IS (5)
THIS IS WHAT WE MUST GUARD OURSELVES ACAINST, AND BE IN A BETTER
POSITION TO MEET IF IT HAPPENS.
·
2. WHERE IN THIS MIXTURE DO FURTHER SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS ON
HONG KONG'S PART, OR A SEARCH HERE FOR MEASURES TO END CONFRONTATION,
COME IN ? SUCH MEASURES COULD NOT HELP TO MODIFY THE GENERAL STATE
* KIND OF THE CHINESE NOR UNDO THE EVENTS OF LAST YEAR.
Y CANNOT EXPECT TO PERSUADE LOCAL COMMUNISTS TO STOP OR
STANTIALLY MUTE THEIR ATTEMPTS TO GAIN ADHERENTS AND STRENGTHEN
THEIR INFLUENCE: CONCESSIONS WOULD ONLY HELP THEM IN THIS.
ITHER THE MILITANTS HERE NOR THE MODERATES WILL EVER BE PERSUADED TO BE
ANYTHING BUT BASICALLY HOSTILE TOWARDS US. CONCESSIONARY
NOTES WOULD NOT BE HELPING THE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP TO ENFORCE THEIR
PRESENT TACTIC OF AVOIDING MILITANCY, WHICH WOULD ONLY BE
ENCOURAGED SY PROSPECTS OF 'VICTORY'.
L
1. POSSIBLY A HIGHLY CONCESSIONARY ATTITUDE MIGHT STRENGTHEN THE HANDS
THE MODERATES IN THE CPG AND THUS AVOID THE HYPOTHETICAL
QND STUALITY OF A CHANGE IN POLICY LEADING TO HILITANCY AGAIN
THE PARAGRAPH 1(8) SITUATION). BUT IT IS JUST AS
ARGUMILE THAT WE WOULD ONLY DE PROVIDING AMMUNITION FOR THE MILITANTS
JOULD CLAIN THAT PRESSURE HAD BROUGHT RESULTS. IF THIS OCCURRED HODLO
HAVE WEAKENED OUR PUJITION FOR NO GAIN, AND IRRETRIEVABLY.
MAIS, THE BENEFITS TO BE OBTAINED ARE VERY CERTAIN, THEREFORE,
I CANNOT SEE MUCH SE.SE IN RICKING IT.
SECRET
1
SECRET
HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 884 TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
3.
IN ALL THE ABOVE I AM REFERRING TO MAJOR CONCESSIONS AND THEIR
EFFECT IN HONG KONG. SHALL CONCESSIONS, IF NOT TOO DAMAGING TO
PUBLIC CONFIDENCE AND TO OUR POSITION, GENERALLY, CAN SOMETIMES
HELP TO MUTE THE STRIDENCY OF THE COMMUNISTS BY CUTTING THE GROUND
FRON UNDER THEM, SUCH CONCESSIONS CAN ALWAYS BE CAUTIOUSLY
ATTEMPTED TO TEST REACTIONS AND TO MATCH EITHER CONCESSIONS
+
ON THEIR PART OR TOUGHER ACTION BY US IN SOME OTHER SPHERE, WHEN SUCH
ACTION IS NECESSARY. THE SEARCH FOR SUITABLE MINOR CONCESSIONS
HAS CONTINUOUSLY ENGAGED OUR ATTENTIONS: IT IS HOWEVER AN AD HOC
JUSINESS, IN WHICH DAY-TO-DAY CHANGES OF SITUATION PLAY A CONSIDERAELÉ
PART. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY CAN BE COMPREHENSIVELY PLANNED IS
LIMITED.
5. BUT MINOR CONCESSIONS, WHILE THEY HAVE THEIR PLACE HERE ARE
UYDENIABLY UNLIKELY TO RESULT IN ANY SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN
SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS GENERALLY. IN ANY CASE, THE SCOPE FOR REAL
YEMENT SEEMS SHALL, WHATAYER WE DO. AS MENTIONED IN
ZARAGRAPH: 100), WE ARE UNALTERAGLY OPPOSED ON SEVERAL BASIC ISSUES:
1.:DEAD THE CHINESE MAY WELL NOT CARE VERY MUCH WHAT THEIR
PENEKAL RELATIONS WITH THE U.K. ARE.
2. JOULD MAJOR CONCESSIONS HERE IN HONG KONG, THEN, HAVE THIS LAST
OFTECT? VERHAPS: IF E VIRTUALLY SURRSIIDERED OUR AUTHORITY
PONICONDITIONALLY. I DO NOT BELIEVE ANYTHING MUCH LESS WOULD DO: NOR
+
20 1 PINK THAT EVEN THIS WOULD BE ANY GUARANTEE OF PROPER BEHAVIOUR
7.7 FUTURE. HAVING SĠULIZED US THROUGH THE MISSION AND BRITISH
BARDOTI SUCCESSFULLY ONOL, THEY WOULD ALWAYS BE TEMPTED TO TRY ANTH FOR
ANY NEW PURPOSE THAT SUITED THEM. 1 THEREFORE BELIEVE OUR
ї.
LE LIES IN TRYING TO FIND HEANS OF PERSUADING JIEN THAT, IN
JI, IT IS NUTÍ ADVANTANEOUS TO CONTINUE TO BEHAVE LIKE MID THAT NOT
UNTIL THIL LESSON HAS BECH LOVÁNT WILL THẸRE ŚC
JANY
من
SECRET
4.
نا
+
ANY CHANCE OF THEM BEHAVING DECENTLY IN THE LONG TERM. THERE MUST
SE ELEMENTS IN THE CPG WHO FEEL THE SAME WAY. I DO NOT DOUBT ALSO THAT
THE FORTITUDE OF THE MISSION STAFF HAS IN ITSELF PARTLY TAUGHT
THIS LESSON: THAT THEY ARE EMBARRASSED BY WHAT THEY DID: AND WOULD LIKE
TO UNDO IT IF THEY KNEW HOW WITHOUT TOO MUCH LOSS OF FACE:
**DEKANDS'' IN HONG KONG NOW BEING IN TRUTH PARTLY DESIGNED TO COVER
THEIR EMBARRASSMENT. IF WE CAN FIND WAYS TO DRIVE HOME THE LESSON THAT
ILL GEHAVIOUR DOES NOT PAY BY MEANS E.G. OF
AN EFFECTIVE DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE OF THE KIND NOW CONTEMPLATED: BY
PUBLICITY: OR BY ANY OTHER SINILAR MEANS WE CAN THINK OF
AND
THEN, AND ONLY THEN, DO WE
HAVE SOME CHANCE OF BEING ABLE TO ESTABLISH A RELATIONSHIP OF
PREFERASLY EVEN MORE TELLING ONES
REASONABLE RESPECT: WHICH IS THE ONLY KIND THAT CAN PERHAPS ENDURE.
SIR D. TRENCH
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·
Kr Wilkinson
o.c. Mr. Carter,
Hong Kong Dept.,
C.0.
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RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.51 |
- 8 AUG 1968
FD
RELEASE OF DETAINEES IN HONG KONG
(396) зав
FLAG A
PROBLEM
In Peking telegram No. 698 Sir D. Hopson proposes that as soon
as the Chinese grant the outstanding exit visas for members of the
Mission which they have promised, we should respond by releasing a
sizeable number of detainees in Hong Kong. We have to decide
whether to pursue this proposal.
RECOMMENDATION
I
2. I recommend that the Governor of Hong Kong be asked whether he
would be willing to act on the lines Sir D. Hopson proposes.
attach a telegram which was drafted in collaboration with the
Commonwealth Office and already has their approval.
BACKGROUND AND ARGUI
3. It has become increasingly clear that of the various "demands* which
the Chinese made at the time of "confrontation" last year in
Hong Kong, the one to which they attach the most importance and which
would in consequence contribute most significantly to an easing in
Sino-British relations is the release of prisoners.
The Chinese pro-
bably do not differentiate between convicted prisoners and detainees, as
they regard both as having been "illegally" detained. point of view,
however, the problem of detainees is much easier in
From our
SECRET
../ that
SECRET
that they are being held under emergency administrative regulations
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.