been rumours that pro-Communist distributors are putting pressure on
retailers, including hawkers, and threatening them with cutting off all
supplies of foodstuffs unless they co-operate.
6.
Food and water supplies continue to come in from China but the import of
livestock from the mainland has been disrupted to some extent by
transport difficulties in
China.
There is a noticeable shortage of Chinese rolling stock, and wagons are
doing two or more Journeys into the Colony per day which is most
unusual. Mainland exporters have admitted having difficulties over the
railway.
The
7.
All the indications are that the initiative on the poster issue comes
from the rank and file. higher echelons are believed not to welcome a
major confrontation at this time but appear, temporarily at least, to
have lost control. There is a danger that this continued intransigence
will generate a major conflict with the police. There are reports of
increased bellicosity among some of the workers particularly those in
Taikoo docks and on the waterfront. The next few days could well be very
difficult.
(Passed as requested and advance copies to
Private Office for Commonwealth Secretary, Messrs. de la Mare, Wilson
and Bolland.)
Distribution
-
H.K. W.I.D. 'C' I.G.D.
J.I.C. BXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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/Copies
SECRET
Copies also sent to:-
P.S. to Prime Minister
Cabinet Office
Foreign Office
H
忖
H
サ
Treasury
t
-
D.I.O., J.I.R.
P.S. to Mr. Rodgers
Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Bolland
Kr. Wilson
Mr. Denson
Mr. Foggon
Mr. D. Hawkins
Export Credits Guarantee Department
Ministry of Defence (Room 7365
#
1+
H
Board of Trade
Australia House
Room 7163
Room 5131
-
-
Hr. C.P. Rawlins
Mr. Henn
Major Koe
- 1.0.2
Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
Mr. T. Critchley
(Senior External Affairs Representative)
Canada House (Counsellor)
SECRET
Mr. K. MacLellan
LIB 1/14
116
With the compliments of
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
A.W. CAMINARI
+
2 force 1967
LONDON, S. Wet. LONDON
FFVED IN
<HIVES No.31
- JUN 1967
FO1/1
2600029 C.8. 200
•
SECRET
From the Governor, Hong Kong Commonwealth Art No. 9.76. To the Secretary
of State for "Gabodes |
.9.7.6........
Repeated to:-
ARCHIVES No.Rd..
Repeated to:-
Dot
- JUN 1967 No.
18th May, 1967.
1
My Reference TS...1/3/1168/47
Your Reference
Ri
The Communist Challenge in H.K.
An Annexe, for your information, is a paper prepared by Special Branch
examining the capacity of the Left Wing in Hong Kong to exert pressure
on the Government, and considering some of the counter measures
available to the Hong Kong Government.
+
Enol.
7. Denay
Mr.
the
Fuseful paper
Sec. L.I.C.
fensoo.
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Para. 18. pérlé
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problem there will be of the Commit deant I we the Schoolchild in a
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2.
0003160 0.7. 316
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C
C
Ref: GEN/14/368/3 (3)
THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE
Special Branch,
Hong Kong Police.
%
15th May 1967.
The following note is a preliminary examination of the capacity
of the organised left-wing in Hong Kong to exert pressure on Government,
should it wish to do so, and considers some of the counter-measures
avail-
able to the Hong Kong Government in such an eventuality.
2.
It is assumed that any trial of strength undertaken by the
organised left-wing would be planned in advance and controlled from its
inception by a central co-ordinating body such as the Hong Kong
Federation
of Trade Unions (F.T.U.) or the Hong Kong office of the New China News
Agency (N.C.N.A.); that it would be put into effect by officials of the
co-ordinating body acting openly who, however, might be advised or
direct-
ed by other communist personalities who would remain under cover; and
finally, it is assumed that any campaign to coerce Government would be
undertaken only with the agreement of the C.P.G. and would then be
carried
only so far as the C.P.0, decided it could go.
THE MINIHOD
3.
The manner in which the communists of Hong Kong are able to bring
pressure to bear on the colonial authorities falls into three broad
categ-
ories, which are examined separately below. They are -
(a) labour;
(b) propaganda; and
(c) political action.
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External Support
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Page 2.
In addition to whatever action the Hong Kong left-wing might
take, attempts to bring pressure to bear on the Government of Hong Kong
can also be made by the C.P.G. through such means as :
(a) the interruption of the normal supply
of water and foodstuffs; and
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(b) an increase of Chinese military
activities in the border region calcu-
lated to to preoccupy the attention of
the British Military Forces that they
are unable to support the Hong Kong
Police during civil disturbances.
LABOUR
5.
The communists have a wide choice of action in the field of
labour and, by agitation, could spread disaffection in many sectors of
essential services. However, they would probably choose to avoid,
initially at least, any action where the weight of its effect would fall
on the Chinese population, since they would be reluctant to be charged
with causing hardship to the local population whose interests they claim
to champion. The greater probability is that they would seek to incon-
venience and embarrass the European element of the community and Hong
Kong Government employees, in an attempt to sap their morale and to show
up their own activities to the general public in a favourable light, as
was done in Macau
6.
One of their best assets in this direction would be strike
action by those workers who serve the mainly European community, e.g.
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Page 3.
domestic servants, hotel employees, etc., auch strikes could be inter-
mittent or continuing. The unions in which they would choose to agitate
for strike action would naturally depend very much on the political
complexion of their membership. (Details of membership of the unions
which could be involved are attached at Appendix 'A')
Public Utilities
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7.
Insofar as public utilities are concerned, the factor noted in
para 5 above would probably inhibit the controllers of the left-wing
from
taking any drastic action, but token strikes could be expected in such
utilities as the bus companies, and maintenance staff in the gas and
electricity companies could also probably be induced to strike long
enough to impress upon Government the dangers of a full scale strike but
short
enough not to cause the general public any great inconvenience, so as
not
to alienate their sympathies.
8.
The principal utilities likely to be affected are as follows :-
(a) Waterworks
Over half the labour force belongs to a left-wing union.
However, a full-scale strike which resulted in the disruption of the
Colony's water supply would bear hardest, on the poorer classes of the
community and the left-wing might suffer a substantial propaganda
set-back.
In view of the praise showered by left-wing propagandists upon China for
her solicitude in supplying water to the Colony, it seems improbable
that
action on this scale would be resorted to. On the other hand, the
cutting
off supply to specific areas such as the Peak, Government House, police
stations and other particular buildings, might be attempted but this
could
be quickly countered by alternative arrangements made by P.W.D. A token
strike would seem more probable.
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The Electric Companies
4
0003160 0.P. 316
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Page 4.
(b) The Electric Companies
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More than one quarter of the labour force employed by
the China Light & Power Co. Ltd., and one half of the Hong Kong
Electric Co., are members of left-wing unions which are fairly active.
Strike action by these unions would boomerage on the left-wing element
by necessitating the closure of the industries which employed labour,
but token strikes or local power cuts might have serious effects on the
community without seriously inconveniencing the poorer classes, few of
whom use electricity for domestic purposes other than lighting. The
security forces would not be likely to be seriously affected, having
alternative arrangements to which they could resort.
(c) The China Gas Company
More than two-thirds of this Company's work force are
The main effect of a total members of a fairly active left-wing union.
strike in this concern would be the closure of certain industries which
would have an adverse affect on the workers' livelihood. Here again, a
token strike, or the withdrawal of services from particular areas or
from
certain segments of the population, e.g. Europeans, would cause consid-
orable inconvenience.
(d) The Telephone Company Telephone_Company
The left-wing press has already accused the authorities
of disrupting telephone services. In view of this, and of their own
need for telephonic communications (in which they differ from the
security
forces which have other means, such as radio), it is improbable that
strike action would be taken in this industry, notwithstanding the fact
that a third of the Company's work force are members of a left-wing
union.
The withdrawal of telephone services from European premises could cause
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inconvenience,
900JH0 C.P. DIE
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inconvenience, however, and maintenance could be affected.
Public Transport
Page 5.
9.
The left-wing is relatively weaker in the field of public
transport than in some of the essential utilities and the majority of
the European population, which would be a major target of left-wing dis-
suption, is perhaps less vulnerable to the effects of strike action in
this field than the local population. Nevertheless limited action in
some branches of transport could lead to inconvenience and could have
an adverse psychological effect on the public. The major divisions of
public transport are as follows :-
(a) Cross-harbour ferries
Less than half the work force of the Star Ferry Company
are left-wing; only a handful of the Hong Kong and Yaumati Ferry Company
are left-wing. Indeed, the majority of union members in the
last-mentioned
company are right-wing and can be expected to oppose any communist
agitation.
Although strike action in either company seems unlikely, it would not
A sudden token hinder the movement of security forces should it occur.
strike, however, could cause disorderly crowds at the ferry termini.
(b) Buses
Well over a third of the Kowloon Motor Bus Co., and a
quarter of the China Motor Bus Co., work forces belong to active
left-wing
unions. There have already been incidents which indicate an antipathy on
the part of some of the staff towards Government and the Police, e.g.
posters on K.M.B. buses. A strike in either or both of these companies,
even if of short duration, would be very effective but could just as
easily
discredit the left-wing in the eyes of the inconvenienced public as
impress
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Page 6.
them with a display of left-wing power, In addition to strike action, or
instead of it, workers in these companies could :-
(1) plaster their vehicles with posters;
and
(11) refuse to carry Europeans and other
designated passengers,
(c) Trams
Nearly two thirds of the work force are left-wing and they
could adopt the same policies as union members in the bus companies.
(a) Railway
Union members comprise less than a quarter of the work force
and are mainly neutral. Combined with their status as Government
servants,
this might render strike action less likely. However, should a strike
occur, it could seriously interfere with food supplies entering the
Colony
from China.
Government Departments
10.
Seven thousand employees of Government belong to the Government,
Armed Services and Hospitals' Workers' Union, a left-wing union
affiliated
to the F.T.U. Were such a body to become inflamed against their employer
a serious disruption in the public service could occur. Dislocation in
the
Urban Services Department alone, 3,150 of the staff of which are members
of
the union, could have grave consequences to public health if the refuse
removal services were withdram, even if it were done on a selective
basis.
The work of the Public Works Department, with 2,000 union members, could
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be slowed down or
0003160 0.7. JI
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Page 7.
be slowed down or brought to a halt and other essential services, such
as
those provided by the Medical and Health Department (with 570 union
members) and the Tung Wah Hospitals Group (also 570 members) would be
seriously interfered with,
Persons in "Western Style Employment"
11.
Of an estimated labour force of 28,930 working in what is known
as Western-style employment (domestics, office clerks, lift attendants
and
watchmen for European firms, etc.), 6,357 are members of the Union of
Chinese Workers in Western Style Employment, a labour organisation
affil1-
ated to the F.T.U. Whether any large number could be persuaded to with-
draw their services is debatable, since they themselves would be the
first
to feel the pinch from loss of employment.
It is probable, however, that
a certain amount of inconvenience could be caused either by go-slow
move-
ments, by non-cooperation or by the temporary withdrawal of staff from
such areas as the hotel trade (800 union members), clerical staff in
non-
local firms (1,800 members) and the domestic service of Europeans.
Counter-measures which could be taken in regard to Labour agitation
12.
The counter-measures which Government could take to cope with
left-wing attempts to disrupt labour would inevitably have to be
tailored
to fit each specific situation. A number of general measures could be
instituted, however, such as 1-
(a) the initiation of an intensive propaganda
campaign emphasising the necessity of
keeping the Colony tranquil for the good
of all and for the workers in particular,
and indicating the suffering which would
be caused to the goneral public by ill-
advised left-wing activities;
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0003160 0.F. 314
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(b) the provision of guards at key points
such as telephone exchanges, electric
sub-stations, pumping stations, water
turncocks, Cable and Wireless installa-
tions, etc;
(c) preparation for the requisition of
transport, the use of Government vehicles
for public transport and appeals to the
public for assistance in offering lifte,
etc; and
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(d) by ensuring that efforts are made in
right-wing and neutral unions to ensure
that strikes do not become general
-
possible by intervention by the Labour
Department and by bodies such as Fedora-
tion of Industries, Chinese Manufacturers'
Association and so forth.
PROPAGANDA
Page 8.
13.
The main vehicles for left-wing propaganda are the newspapers,
radio (from Canton and Peking), and posters. Malicious propaganda could
be expected to be disseminated by all three media which could also serve
to 1-
·
(a) re-assure those involved in disturbances
in the Colony that the protection afforded
by the C.P.G. was close at hand;
(b) persuade the uncommitted that the left-
wing account of events was true and
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0003166 G.P. DIE
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deserving of support;
(c) undermine the morale of the Police and
the employees of other Government
departments by singling out particular
units and individuals for special
attack; and
(d) publicise the scope and nature of pro-
tests, petitions, demonstrations and
marches organised by the left-wing.
Page 9.
14.
The wall poster (big character poster) has been especially
favoured in China over the past year as the medium for registering pro-
tests against authority and passing on news of a revolutionary nature.
Its use was adopted in the Macau riots and it is already being used
extensively in the present Hong Kong trouble on premises and on buses.
Its use would probably be greatly extended, and it is likely that a
mass-
ive poster campaign could be mounted with a relatively small
organisational
effort. Such a campaign would probably be supported by the widespread
distribution of handbills (small character notices) which could be pro-
duced easily and economically.
15.
Two courses of action to counter such propaganda are open to
Government. First, to publish the true facts of the situation fully,
prompt-
ly and as widely as possible, and to repeat them in every medium
available
to Government. Second, to take prompt legal action against the
newspapers
which publish subversive material and those who put up offensive posters
or distribute objectionable handbills, not only to restrict their
capabil-
ity for doing damage but also because they stand openly in defiance of
authority and may symbolise in the minds of many, including Government
servants, a lack of will on the part of Government to act against the
left-wing.
OVERT POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
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OVERT POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
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Page 10,
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16.
Communists in Hong Kong have the capacity to organise public
demonstrations and the manpower to present a considerable problem to the
Police. One of their most effective weapons is the use of
school-children,
indoctrinated in left-wing schools, full of the enthusiasm of youth and
armed with the invincible Thoughts of MAO Tse Tung. An organised march
by
children from left-wing schools, on Government House for example, would
pose an extremely difficult problem for the Police, on tactical as well
as
humanitarian grounds. This particular manoeuvre was used to great effect
in Macau and the efficacy of this means of "persuasion" cannot have been
lost on the leaders of the left-wing here who, during the past few
months,
have made a close and detailed study of the "Hacau campaign". The
partici-
pation of school children in any demonstration of protest is a severe
handi-
cap to Police action, and one which the left-wing can use to make more
effective their harassing tactics designed to reduce morale in Police
and
Government.
Counter-measures in connection with Political Action
17.
It is not the intention of this note to try to formulate a code
of tactics to be used on the ground but in broad terms it would seem
that
Government can beat nullify the effects of overt political activities by
left-wing organisations first by exercising the utmost restraint when
dealing with demonstrations and processions, and secondly by effective
use of counter-propaganda (..g. distribution of Government-produced
leaf-
lets).
18.
The employment of school children for political ends, however,
is a more difficult problem to resolve. The essential strength of the
school children lies in their obvious sincerity and in the natural
sympathy which sincere young people evoke, For Government to hold back
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/when faced with
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Page 11.
when faced with demonstrations of this nature would, however, be taken
as
a sign of weakness and in any event matters might easily get out of
hand.
It appears necessary, therefore, to exercise the utmost restraint in
handling any procession or demonstration in which children play a
promin-
ent organised part. When it is known that children are to be used for
such purposes, it is essential that the full force of Government's
informa-
tion media be brought into play and parents be cautioned against
allowing
their children to be used for political purposes, making it clear at the
same time that all who break the law, children as well as adults, will
be
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