YOUR TEL NO 252 AND HONG KONG TEL NO 26 TO ME:
CONFRONTATION PRISONERS.
34
+
1.
AS REGARDS COMMUNICATING TO THE CHINESE ADVANCE INFORMATION OF RELEASES
I THINK THE POSITION HAS CHANGED SINCE WE CONSIDERED THIS QUESTION IN
JANUARY. AT THAT TIME IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE ISSUE OF CONFRONTATION
PRISONERS WAS NOT LIKELY TO BE FROUGHT UP DIRECTLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. IT SEEMED BEST THEREFORE TO TAKE
NO INITIATIVE ON OUR SIDE WHICH MIGHT RISK REVIVING THE ISSUE. THE
POSITION NOW IS THAT AFTER THE AGREEMENT ON AMBASSADORS THE CHINESE HAVE
REVIVED THE ISSUE, NOT WITH ANY GREAT PRESSURE AS YET BUT WITH THE
STRONGLY IMPLIED SUGGESTION THAT 1# THE NEW STATE OF OUR RELATIONS SINCE
THEY HAVE MADE THE GESTURE OF RELEASING GLADYS YANG, WE SHOULD MAKE SOME
RECIPROCAL GESTURE OVER THE CONFRONT- ATION PRISONERS. WE MUST EXPECT
THE ISSUE TO BE BROUGHT UP AGAIN AND WITH INCREASING VIGOUR.
+
+
2
+
Į SHOULD THEREFORE LIKE NOW TO NOTIFY THE CHINESE OF THE ACCELERATED
RELEASES WHICH HAVE NOW BEEN APPROVED. IN DOING SO, I SHOULD LIKE TO GO
ON, IF THE GOVERNOR AGREES, TO GIVE THEM A FORECAST OF PROBABLE RELEASES
OVER THE NEXT 12 MONTHS ON THE GENERAL LINES OF HONG KONG TELEGRAM UPDER
REFERENCE. MY OBJECT IN MAKING THIS COMMUNICATION WOULD BE TO TRY TO
REP- RESERT IT AS A CONCESSION ON OUR PART WHICH, DESPITE THE DISPARITY
OF THE TWO CASES, COULD RE TAKEN AS BALANCING TO SOME EXTENT THE RELEASE
OF GLADYS YANG.
CONFIDENTIAL
/3. AT
CONFIDENT LAL
AT THE SAME TIME I MUST CONTINUE TO MAKE IT CLEAR, AS I TRIED NA MESTI
TY WITH CONSULAR DEPARTMENT (IFT) THAT THERE IS I FACT NO REAL
SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE CONFRONTATION PRISONERS A THE THREE BRITONS STILL
DETAINED FOR INVESTIGATION INTO POLITICAL OFFENCES IN PEKING. IT WOULD
STRENGTHEN MY HAND IN THIS IF I COULD TELL THE CHINESE THE PARTICULAR
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES FOR WHICH EACH OF THE HARD CORE CONFRONTATION
PRISONERS HAS BEEN SENTENCED. I HOPE THAT THE GOVERNOR CAN TELEGRAPH
THIS INFORMATION AND AUTHORISE ME TO USE IT.
AS REGARDS DEPORTATION I AM NCT SURE THAT CHINESE REFUSAL IN THE PAST
NECESSARILY IMPLIES THAT THEY WOULD STILL REFUSE IN THE ALTERED
CIRCUMSTANCES OF TODAY. I CANNOT ASSESS WITH ANY CONFIDENCE HOW THEY
WOULD REACT BUT I THINK IT WOULD BE WORTH- WHILE SOUNDING THEM OUT. IF
THEREFORE FAIL IN THE OBJECTIVE OF PERSUADING THE CHINESE TO ACCEPT
ADVANCE NOTIFICATIONOF RELEASES AS A SATISFACTORY RECIPROCAL GESTURE
SHOULD LIKE TO HAVE DISCRETION TO ARGUE THAT WHAY I HAVE TOLD THEM IS
THE FOST WE CAN DO FOR THEM IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT THE ONLY OTHER
WAY TO SOLVE THE QUESTION OUTRIGHT WOULD BE TO DEPORT THE PRISONERS IF
THE CHINESE WOULD ACCEPT THEM. THERE IS PERHAPS A CHANCE THAT THEY WOULD
ACCEPT THIS BUT EVEN IF THEY DID NOT IT SOULD STRENGTHEN OUR POSITION IN
RESISTING FURTHER ARGUMENT
THAT WE HAD MADE THE OFFER.
IN GENERAL IF THERE IS ANYTHING WE CAN TELL THE CHINESE ON THIS MATTER
WHICH CAN BE REPRESENTED AS A CONCESSION TO THEIR POINT OF VIEW IT WILL
BE BETTER TACTICS TO DO IT NOW AS A FREE GESTURE TO MARK THE IMPROVEMENT
IN OUPRELATIONS THAN LATER AS SOMETHING YRUNG OUT OF US UNDER PRESSURE.
ADDIS
FILES
NED
HKD
GIPD
HEME D CONS D
PEPPE
/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
RES D (F.E SECT)
(AM SECT)
SIR L MONSON
MR WILFORD
2
COMPETE1NMETAT.
J
PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT, A
FM PEKING 220415Z
CONFIDENTIAL
RASIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 52
24 APR 1972
Fax
#01
1
28
י
CONFIDENTIAL
TO PRIORITY F C O TELEGRAM NO. 346 OF 22 APRIL INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG
(PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).
MIPT:
CONFRONTATION PRISONERS.
1. I CALLED ON CHANG TAI-MIN, HEAD OF CONSULAR DEPARTMENT, YESTERDAY TO
RAISE SOME PRESSING CONSULAR NATTERS. WHEN I PASSED ON FOR THE RECORD TO
THE THREE BRITISH SUBJECTS STILL REPAINING IN DETENTION IN PEKING AFTER
THE RELEASE OF
É GLADYS YANG (MY TEL NO. 344) CHANG TAI-MIN RIPOSTED WITH AN
ENQUIRY ABOUT THE CONFRONTATION PRISONERS IN HONG KONG, HE HOPED THEY
WOULD BE SET FREE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
2. I SAID THAT MR CHANG WAS AWARE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE
PRISONERS HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN 1967.
THEIR CASES
|| THAT RESPECT
WERE NOT MERELY UNDER INVESTIGATION COLON THEY HAD
BEEN TRIED AND SENTENCED BY A COURT OF LAW. THEIR SITUATION WAS
DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE THREE BRITISH SUBJECTS DETAINED IN CHINA
WHOSES CASES HE HAD WERE STILL REING INVESTIGATED.
JUST TOLD ME MORFOVER THESE PERSONS IN
+
HONG KONG HAD BEEN ARRESTED NOT FOR TAKING PART IN DEMONSTRATIONS OR FOR
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES, BUT FOR CRIMINAL OFFENCES, SUCH AS PLANTING BOMBS
WHICH, HAD THEY EXPLODED, COULD HAVE KILLED INNOCENT PEOPLE. HERE WAS
ANOTHER
RESPECT IN WHICH THE SITUATION OF THE PRISONERS IN HONG KONG WAS
DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE THREE DETAINED IN PEKING.
3. I SAID THAT THE PRISON TERMS OF THOSE NOW HELD VARIED IN LENGTH.
UNDER HONG KONG LAW THERE WAS PROVISION FOR A REGULAR SERIES OF REVIEWS
OF THEIR CASES, THE REVIEW BOARD
COULD RECOMMEND THAT PRISONERS PE RELEASED PEFORE THE END
OF THEIR SENTENCE. THE REVIEW PROCESS NATURALLY OPERATED IN
CONFIDENTIAL
/THE CASE OF THOSE
L
1
+
CONFIDENTIAL
THE CASE OF THOSE IMPRISONED FOR OFFENCES COMMITTED DURING
THE 1967 TROUBLES AS WELL AS FOR OTHER PRISONEPS.
A NUMBER OF THESE PRISONERS HAD ALREADY BEEN RELEASED REFORE THE END OF
THEIR SENTENCE UNDER THIS PROCEDURE. WE HAD NOTIFIED IMPENDING RELEASES
TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE LAST OCCASION BEING LAST
JANUARY, THE REVIEW PROCESS WOULD CONTINUE IN OPERATION AND THE BOARD
WOULD MEET FROM TIME TO TIME TO CONSIDER THE REMAINING CASES.
4. CHANG REPLIED RATHER LA'FLY THAT ON THE QUESTION OF CHARGES AND
SENTENCES OF THE OPPRESSED PERSONS IN HONG KONG THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES
HAD A DIFFERENT VIEWPOINT, BUT HE HAD NO WISH TO DISCUSS THE MATTER THIS
MORNING. HE WISHED ONLY TO SAY THAT HE HOPED THEY WOULD SOON BE SET
FREE. 1 UNDERTOOK TO REPORT WHAT HE SAID.
ADDIS
FILES F.E.D.
S.E.A.D.
CONSULAR DEPT: NEWS DEPT:
HONG KONG DEPT: MR WILFORD
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
-2- CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
1,572
MR. Eyang (FED)
S.J. Yen day
Mi Davidy за Спалнотомі R.C.14
Elnie..
Mr. Royle has seen Hong Kong telegram to Peking No. 26 about
Confrontation Prisoners. He has commented on paragraph 4 on the line Mr.
Addis should take if the Chinese Government raise the matter of
Confrontation Prisoners:-" I am certain this is right".
R.E.
12/4
Copied to:
Sir Leslie Monson Mr. Wilford
Mr. Laird
CONFIDENTIAL
Mord for!
Marl
M.F. Forrester 18 April, 1972
Y Morgan Esq PEKING
CONFIDENTIAL COVERING BECRET
930 8440
PEI 14/1
19 April 1972
MONSON'S VISIT TO HONG KONG
1.
As we said in FCO telegram No 252, Leslie MonsoN is now visiting Hong
Kong. I now enclose copies of the briefs we prepared for him on
Confrontation Prisoners, Chinese Representation in Hong Kong and Hong
Kong/China
Commmicatious.
2. As the briefs were personal in character, I should be grateful if you
would destroy your copies when they have been seen by all concerned in
the Embassy,
EM Evans
Far Eastern Department
CONFIDENTIAL COVERING SPORET
Regy (36
PRIORITY CYPHER/CAT A
FM FCO 1710352
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
RE FIVED IN
N-50
:
FEB 1411
до
75
TO PRIORITY PEKING TELNO 252 OF 17/4 INFO HONG KONG (PERSONAL
FOR GOVERNOR). +27
J
I
(FED)
YOUR TELS NO 239 AND 21 TO HONG KONG CONFRONTATION PRISONERS 1. WE HAVE
BRIEFED SIR LESLIE MONSON, WHO WILL BE VISITING HỌNG KONG FROM 14 APRIL
TO 22 APRIL, ON THIS SUBJECT. INTER ALIA, WE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT HE
MIGHT ASK THE GOVERNOR WHETHER HE THINKS
THAT IT WOULD NOW BE WORTH TRYING TO STRIKE A BARGAIN WITH THE
CHINESE OF THE KIND YOU HAVE SUGGESTED. IN THE CHANGED SITUATION
CREATED BY THE AGREEMENT TO EXCHANGE AMBASSADORS, AND BY CHANG
WEN-CHIN'S MENTION OF THE SUBJECT TO YOU, OUR OWN VIEW IS THAT THERE
MIGHT BE ADVANTAGE IN YOUR MAKING DISCREET SOUNDINGS IN
PEKING.
26
+
23
2. WHATEVER THE GOVERNOR'S VIEWS ABOUT THIS, WE NEED TO DECIDE WHETHER
YOU SHOULD NOTIFY THE CHINESE ABOUT THE RELEASE OF
CHAN CHIN-FONG ON 12 MAY (HOWELLS'S LETTER TO DAVIES OF 23 MARCH, COPIED
TO SAMUEL). DO YOU STICK TO THE VIEW YOU EXPRESSED IN YOUR LETTER TO
WILFORD (1/7) OF 8 FEBRUARY: JE THAT THE BALANCE OF ADVANTAGE LIES IN
STOPPING NOTIFICATIONS? OUR OWN MOST RECENT
VIEW WAS GIVEN IN WILFORD'S LETTER TO MADDOCKS OF 18 FEBRUARY, 3.
CHINESE REPRESENTATION AND A POSSIBLE BARGAIN ON CONFRONTATION PRISONERS
ARE BOTH VERY SENSITIVE SUBJECTS AND WE ARE RESTRICTING HERE
DISTRIBUTION OF TELEGRAMS ABOUT THEM. SUBJECT TO THE GOVERNOR'S VIEW YOU
MAY THINK IT WISE TO PREFACE ANY TELEGRAMS GOING TO
HONG KONG **PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR'' LEST ANY SHOULD RECEIVE AN
AUTOMATIC WIDER THAN NEED TO KNOW
DOUGLAS-HOME
FILES
DISTRIBUTION.
FED
100
NEWS D
GIPD
RESEARCH D (F E SECTION)
川
MR VILFORD
(AM SECTION)
SIR L MONSON
CONFIDENTIAI.
PRIORITY
CYPHER/CAT A
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 52
TOP COPY
17 APR 1972
F HONG KONG 1707102
кон
CONFIDENTIAL
TO PRIORITY PEKING TELNO 26 OF 17 APRIL INFO FCO.
YOUR TELNO 21 TO ME: CONFRONTATION PRISONERS.
YOUR TEL COINCIDED WITH MEETING OF BOARD WHICH WILL RESULT IN 7
ADDITIONAL RELEASES BETWEEN NOW AND APRIL 1973 (WHICH WILL MAKE 11
RELEASES IN ALL BETWEEN NOW AND THEN). DETAILS TO FCO AND YOU
BY BAG.
2. IF, AS IS POSSIBLE, ATTORNEY GENERAL IS EQUALLY SUCCESSFUL AT JUNE
MEETING WE SHOULD HAVE ONLY ABOUT 6 LEFT BY NEXT SPRING.
3. WE HAVE ALWAYS REGARDED OFFER TO DEPORT AS COUNTER-TACTIC TO ANY
STRONG CHINESE PRESSURE TO RELEASE RATHER THAN AS SOMETHING LIKELY TO
APPEAL TO CPG BECAUSE IN THE PAST THEY HAVE IGNORED OR REJECTED SUCH
OFFERS THREE TIMES. LOCAL COMMUNISTS WOULD REGARD CPG ACCEPTANCE OF
DEPORTATION AS LET-DOWN, CONSEQUENTLY I FEAR SOUNDINGS PROPOSED MORE
LIKELY TO REVIVE ISSUE THROUGH ARGUMENT THAN TO SOLVE IT. MOREOVER I SEE
NO OBJECT IN RUNNING SUCH A RISK SO LONG AS TEMPERATURE IS LOW AND
PRESSURE IS OFF AS NOW AND STEADY FLOW OF RELEASES IS IN PROSPECT. IF
PRESSURE ROSE AGAIN
WE COULD RECONSIDER.
4. FOREGOING IS FOR BACKGROUND. SUBJECT TO VIEWS OF FCO I WOULD PREFER
TO RECONSIDER FUTURE TACTICS AFTER JUNE MEETING. MEANWHILE IF CPG REVERT
TO THIS I SUGGEST YOU MIGHT REPLY THAT THEY MUST SEE HOW THE PROBLEM IS
BEING STEADILY REDUCED AND ADD OR IMPLY THAT TO CARP IN THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE TO MAKE UNNECESSARY AND
UNJUSTIFIABLE DIFFICULTIES.
MACLEHOSE
/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
GIPD
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
FED
HKD
NAM D
NEWS D
FFFFF
RES D (FE SECT)
(AM SECT)
CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT A
FM PEKING 1503052
CONFIDENTIAL
R
CONFIDENTIAL
IN
REGISTRY No. 52
7
17 APR:972
For 14/1
TOP COF
TO PRIORITY FCO TELEGRAM MO 315 OF 15 APRIL INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG,
WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, ISLAMABAD, DELHI, TOKYO
CANBERRA AND PARIS.
MIPT.
CONFRONTATION PRISONERS IN HONG KONG,
1. VICE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CH'IAO KUAN-HUA RAISED
THIS QUESTION WITH WINSTON CHURCHILL. HE SAID THAT WHENEVER
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT ASKED ABOUT THE PRISONERS THEY WERE TOLD
THAT THEY HAD BEEN SENTENCED BY THE COURTS AND THAT IT WAS
IMPOSSIBLE TO INTERFERE WITH THE LEGAL PROCESSES. THIS WAS THE
SAME ARGUMENT OF LEGALITY THAT HAD PEEN RAISED OVER THE STATUS
OF TAIWAN. WHY COULD WE NOT GET OVER THE LEGAL DIFFICULTIES.
IN THIS OTHER CASE TOO?.
ADDIS
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED] [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
FED
EESD WED
NEWS D
RES D (FE SECT)
#
(SOV SECT)
H
(CR SECT)
IRD
+
(AM SECT)
CONFIDENTIAL
1
33
CONFIDENTIAL
A
PQ
126
21
Mr Wilford
Mi Logan.
Agreed. AR.
Feli
CONFRONTATION PRISONERS IN HONG KONG
132
18.4.77
The Gangon (HK)
then Enlarge.
1. You told me yesterday that you would like to write to Mr Addis on
this subject, letting him know about the line which we had suggested Sir
Leslie Monson might take with the Governor and asking him to mark
telegrams addressed or repeated to Hong Kong about a possible bargain
with the Chinese over deportation "Personal for Governor". You asked me
to draft.
2. As the next confidential bag to Peking does not leave until
Wednesday, 19 April, and as we need in any case to consult Mr Addis
about notification (see paragraph 3 below), I have drafted a telegram
instead. This I now submit. As you will see, it outlines a tentative
view about the possibility of trying to strike a bargain with the
Chinese over deportation.
3. On notification, the position is that we need to decide (in
consultation with Mr Addis) whether the Chinese should be notified about
the release of the next confrontation prisoner on 12 May (Mr Howells's
letter to Mr Davies of 23 March). Our own most recent view was given in
your letter to
Mr Maddocks of 18 February. Since then, however, we have reached
agreement with the Chinese over the exchange of Ambassadors and Chang
Wen-chin has broached the subject of confrontation prisoners with Mr
Addis (Peking tel No 239). In these circumstances, I think we need to
consult Mr Addis before making up our own minds.
4. Hong Kong Department concur in the terms of the draft telegram.
5. I shall in any case submit a draft letter from you to Mr Addis. This
will cover copies of our briefs for Sir Leslie Monson and say something
about our handling of telegrams dealing with Chinese representation in
Hong Kong.
13 April 1972
रिल Rim. Evans
R M Evans
Far Eastern Department
When the Chinare turned to the idea of
accepting confrontation prisoners
do
Sir Leslie Monson
Mr Laird Mr Hervey
кру на комму
of them, bee are
there
11/4
L
CONFIDENTIAL
Down to
very
muca
smalle
aww bert
adh
Janne for
wwwbar of years
ન
yet.
I'm there
air constances
The Chinese may
Finall
member -but each
prismar
will
withy to accept
Tore offered
the option of staying in prison
kill
Story
gong to Chic
Kl relevesex
よ contence is up. Sme, trenspect, may pre for tho
in prison.
2. The
The important thing is to leave the timing of
in Sin M. Machehood's hands
He home this very
any nove
a
proposition.
belegvan
-
at
not war
a aptorsporiate
-M: Addi
will put forward
his elbow.
jrgg's
3. Unless M: Royle
attached
seas dejectin
I would like the
to be despatched.
14! 14
CONFRONTATION
PRISONER Reference
54F
IN FEH 14/1 32
1874
на стуко
fo
1
agree
with the attacked draft submission
regards
the draft lecar to Maddocks,
M: Heigey.
es.19.
4
х
As
groin
the Limitations within which we are working,
I authore
the line prposed in paragraphe I
as ford as away.
the won't day.
3. As
H.
regardo
Bust
Care
merely putting on
1
the draft brief for Sai L. Monson, have suggested Minative parcs 546.
The Chinese are making much in
argument of the wimprovements
their
relations leading
to an exchange of Ambassadas etc.
do not see why
Lave
1
should not were as
auch
of the same arguments by offering to reheave
ཆ།"
all the remaining pusoners together pariond
that the Chinese agreed
thei'r
deportation vitó
China
d
to ensure
that they
did not return to Hong Kong. I think it is
а
pount which Sir L. Monson Роств
worth suggesting
to the Games.
might conicor
ANE
[overleed]
I agree
6.4.72.
It would be meash better if we aud
The wendy get rid of the frothan finnelly
1
as Mr. Gaminma
DD 196437
глуздий DA.
100 GM 3641 2
+
По наход
I
agree
thrak "release to China" should be seriously
considered. Its a bony deal about thin
shoot. perhaps we could make a parlage
да
ted in
with the Chimere wish to establish
a representative in Hong Kong.
мо
Eyrna.
Доврами
2014
Thank-you.
I have dratied
a teem of enquiry to Peking and have submitted is to th: Wilford.
R.E.
12/4
CONFIDENTIAL
With the Compliments of the FIVED IN
REG. TRY N 00
; Political Adviser 12 APK 19/2
Hong Kong
141
SCR 7/3371/68 II
CONFIDENTIAL
до
31
J M Addis Esq CMG PEKING
6 April, 1972
Mi Laird мене
нето
yیلاتا
hir darily
A usethe exercise in educat
переехат
"DETAINEES" IN HONG KONG
and correction.
27
1714
に Knici.
In your telegram No. 239 to the FCO of 28 March
R.E.
you used the word "detainees". We use this word to indicate persons held
without trial under the Emergency Regulations and never to describe the
convicted criminals in Stanley Prison. The current legal description of
the latter is "criminals", but ve recognise that it is necessary to have
some general description of those criminals who committed their crimes
as part of the 1967 communist confrontation with the Hong Kong
Government and ve have therefore accustomed ourselves to the use of the
phrase "confrontation prisoners" which was of course the title of your
telegram under reference,
2.
174.
The "detainees" were mainly persons who committed offenses during the
1967 confrontation but could not be brought to trial because we could
not produce evidence likely to satisfy a court. The main reason for the
inadequacy of the evidence was our unwillingness to risk compromising
our sources. The "detainees" were held not by the Prisons Department but
by the Hong Kong Police in a special detention centre which had not
originally been designed for that purpose, Their conditions of detention
vere in some respects vorge (e.g. facilities for exercise and
recreation) and in some respects better (e.g. Food and clothing) than
those in the prisons. They were held on warrants signed by the Colonial
Secretary.
/contd..
CONFIDENTIAL
[
CONFIDENTIAL
2
Each warrant specified the period of detention (which could not exceed
one year) but the Colonial Secretary had power to
release a detainee before that period had expired. He also
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.