1. I am sorry that as a result of pressure of business arising out of
the Prime Minister's visit to Japan etc
I have not minuted on these papers before. I understand that there was
no time to show these to Sir Murray MacLehos when he called here last
week.
2.
I agree strongly with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Nr Davies minute of 31
August, in particular the recommendation that non-participation would be
the most appropriate solution for us. I would however prefer any
statement of reserva- tion to be on the following lines:" "entirely
without prejudice to their views about the status of Hong Kong my
delegation are content to accept the recommendation of the Committee"x
(he recommendation being that referred to in paragraph 2 of Mr
Hinchcliffe's letter of 23 August.
15 September 1972
RB R Hervey
Far Eastern Department
DO MT152 154STA SOOM 2/12 OM 14411
RESTRICTED
J M Addis Esq CMG PEKING
930 8440 Extn 553
12 September 1972
1.
You must think me very remiss for having failed to thank you sooner for
your letter 3/56 of 20 June.
2. I am about to put up a fresh submission on the subject dealt with in
your letter. I shall make sure that your point of view is put on record
in what I draft.
3. I have decided that the subject is important enough to warrant our
seeking the views of Ministers before we start drafting the steering
brief for the Secretary of State's visit to China.
As I discussed the subject at some length with the person to whom you
copied your letter, I am not copying this letter to him. He knows how I
plan to proceed.
69
RESTRICTED
RM Evans
Far Eastern Department
71
GS. 41A
T
2600077
20,005-10/75-894067
CONFIDENTIAL
2/1126/50
RM Evans Esq FED
ī
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT
LOWER ALBERT ROAD
HOME KENG
13 July, 1972
+
J
My dran Richard,
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
FEH3/30/1
669
As a newcomer I have read with great interest the résumé in John Addis's
letter to you of 20 Júne. I do not think its arguments weaken the
objections from our point of viev raised in the Governor's Despatch of 5
May. Nor does it raise any point about the future of Hong Kong not
covered in that despatch. But I do not propose to rehearse the arguments
now as the ground has been covered before, and the question vill
presumably be looked at again when you are preparing the briefs for the
Secretary of State's visit to Peking.
2.
We are assuming that the line on Chinese representation in Hong Kong
will be generally the same as the advice provided for Mr. Royle. You
agreed when I saw you in London just bebre I came out that we should
have an opportunity to comment at the drafting stage. The need for us to
do so may depend to some extent on whether the subject is discussed when
the Governor calls at the office in September, and on whether the
Secretary of State decides to look in here on his way to Peking.
cc
J M Addis Esq CMG PEKING
다리,
रेक
(R J Stratton)
CONFIDENTIAL
109
IMMEDIA
CYPHER CAT A
FM PEKING 310895Z
CA
$
CRET
10
2
•
ເ
L
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NO 7681 OF 31 JULY INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG (
PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. AT THE END OF A VERY LONG DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL MATTERS, INCLUDING
MR THORPE'S, SIR DESMOND PLUMMER'S PROPOSED VISITS ETC ( SEE MY
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS) AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER A DISCUSSION OF
PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR YOUR OWN VISIT, HEAD OF WEST EUROPEAN
DEPARTMENT SPOKE TO ME THIS MORNING IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS (CLEARLY ON
INSTRUCTIONS).
2.
WANG REFERRED TO THE SUCCESS OF MONSIEUR SCHUMANN'S VISIT AND
SAID THAT HE EXPECTED YOURS TO BE EQUALLY SUCCESSFUL.
BOTH SIDES SHOULD MAKE EFFORTS TO THIS END-TO PROPEL THE RELATIONS
BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES FORWARD. MR ROYLE'S VISIT WAS A GOOD
PREPARATION FOR YOURS.
THERE HAD BEEN A USEFUL MUTUAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. WANG SAID THAT I MUST
HAVE NOTED THAT DURING THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN MR ROYLE AND CHIAO
KUAN-HUA ON BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES THE QUESTION
OF HONG KONG HAD BEEN RAISED.
HE WISHED IN HIS CAPACITY AS HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT DEALING WITH THE
AREA TO SAY WHAT GREAT IMPORTANCE THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT ATTACHED TO THE
POINT MADE BY CHIAO CONCERNING THE QUESTION
OF OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
HE SAID THAT THERE WERE MANY OTHER QUESTIONS, THE SETTLEMENT OF W HICH
WERE CONNECTED WITH IT. THIS WAS WHY HE WISHED TO
MENTION IT IN A FRANK WAY.
3. I SAID THAT I KNEW THE REPLY MR ROYLE HAD GIVEN TO CHIAO HAD BEEN THE
RESULT OF THE MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION IN LONDON OF ALL
ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION.
I WOULD HOWEVER REPORT WHAT WANG HAD SAID. WANG REPLIED THAT WE WERE NOW
MOVING FORWARD IN OUR RELATIONS IN OTHER RESPECTS FOR EXAMPLE TRADE,
BANKING AND INSURANCE, COMMUNICATIONS AND
TRANSPORT: AND AT THE PRESENT TINE DISCUSSIONS WERE BEING HELD ON THE
SALE OF BRITISH AIRCRAFT TO CHINA. HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD MOVE FORWARD
ON THIS OTHER MATTER ALSO.
ADDIS
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
FED HKLOD
SECRET
+
3/56
4...
SECRET
BRITISH EMBASSY
PEKING
LFEH 3/30/2
20 June 1972
28
69
RM Evans Esq
Far Eastern Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
LONDON SWI
Dean Richand,
HONG KONG AND CHINA
A.
Lave sn: Addiis.
R.EE.
та
79.
Mr Royle discussed with me my views on Chinese representation in Hong
Kong, and since his departure I have been thinking further on the
subject. I should like if I may to set out my views in the following
paragraphs which go a little further on a few points than the
necessarily brief telegrams which I have sent from here.
I do not of course have the advantage of having here the various policy
studies which have been made on the Hong Kong question, and some of the
points on which I myself feel convinced may already have been carefully
weished and dismissed.
2.
3.
Taking first the question of the future of Hong Kong at the end of the
lease, I feel that there can be no doubt but that Hong Kong will have to
return to China. It does not seem to me conceivable that Hong Kong will
be able to cont.nue under British rule and under British administration
after the end of the lease. It may be that some special status within
the Chinese state may be possible for Hong Kong after 1997, and possibly
we may be able to negotiate with the Chinese some of the provisions of
that special status, if the process of rendition becomes a matter for
negotiation. But whatever may be the precise nature of any special
status which Hong Kong may be able to enjoy after the end of the lease,
it seems to me certain that Hong Kong will at that time be Chinese and
c.a no longer be British.
4. It seems to me beyond the bounds of possibility that between now and
1997 it might be possible to negotiate an extension of the lease with
the Chinese Government. This seems to me certain whatever the nature of
the Chinese Government at the relevant time. I think it is equally out
of the question that the present status quo would te allowed to continue
after 1997 without a formal enten ion of the lease but with the tacit
consent or acquiescence of the Chinese Government of the time. Any
policy on the future of Hong Kong based on either of these premises
seems to me dangerously illu certain to fail.
BOTY
and
/5.
SECRET
SECRET
?
5.
I take it that our major concern in considering the future status of
Hong Kong must be the welfare of its inhabitants, and that we must try
to obtain for them the best possible terms in the eventual arrange- ment
and the easiest transition towards the final result. That consideration
must surely have priority over all others, including our own economic
interests and such questions as national prestige.
6. The present Chinese Government acquiesce in the status quo in Hong
Kong because it is in their own interests to do so. 15 19 only a
relatively strong government in China which would be able to overrule in
this way the easy claims of irredentism, Any successor to the present
Chinese Government would vary probably be weaker and therefore more
likely to wish to reclaim Hong Kong for China. The economic value of
Hong Kong to China and the relative strength of the present Chinese
Government are thus two factors which are favourable to the status quo
in Hong Kong at the present time, but which may lost their validity with
changing circumstances. These two factors make the present a better time
for settling Hong Kong questions with China than any time in the future
is likely to be. It goes of course without saying that both the present
statua of llong Kong and any change in that status require at least the
acquicscence of the Chinese Government of the time.
7.
The present state of relations between HNG and the Chinese Government is
also favourable for discussing Hong Kong questions. I am glad that Mr
Royle and you have been here this month to see for yourselves how
greatly relations between the United Kingdom and China have changed with
the exchange of Ambassadors in March. The change has really been v ry
complete and profound. The phrase that the Chinese Government use
repeatedly is that a new leaf has been turned. The estimates of Chinese
attitudes towards our position in Hong Kong which were relevant until a
few years ago no lon、 r apply. The Chinese Government have oven gone so
far as to let us know, informally but explicitly (Chou En-lai to Neville
Maxwell and Ch'iao Kuan-hua privately to Mr Royle), that while they
regard Hong Kong as Chinese territory they do not intend to ups. t the
present arrangements for the time being. By proposing official Chinese
representation in Hong Kong they have in effect off red to fix and
formalise their acceptance of the present status of Hong Kong for the
time being.
8.
The refus 1 of the Chinese proposal conveyed by Mr Royle at the time of
his visit to Peking has not spoiled the new state of good relations
between Great Brit: in and China. At the same time, howev r, it has been
made clear that the Chinese Government do not accept our refusal as
final and intend to revert to the matter. It is certain that if the
question is not settled meanwhile it will be a major issue in the
Secretary of State's talks with the Chinese leaders when he comes to
Peking in the autumn.
9.
In the light of these considerations I still stand by my view tht the
right policy is for us to try to reach an acceptable
SECRET
/agreement
.
SECRET
agr ement with the Chinese Government for their official representation
in Hong Kong. If in the process of doing so we secure from them a more
formal commitment to the continuation of the status quo in Hong Kong for
the time being, I should sec furtar dvantage in that. As regards timing,
I think it would be pref rable to try to carry matters a stage further
before the Secretary of State's visit in the autumn,
10. In setting out ry views for you in this way I am not asking you to
reopen the whole question now. I know that firu decisions have been
taken for the time being. But I think it is right that my minority view
should be available on the record so that it can be easily referred to
ir the subject comes under review again.
Yours ever,
John Addis
J M Addis
Copy to:- Personal
Sir Murray MacLeHose KCMG MBE HONG KONG
י!
SECRET
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
TEA 2/20/2
From the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1
31 August, 1972
15
X
Thank you for your letter of 3 August about my visit to China.
You said you wondered whether it would be suci. a bad thing if the
Oninose were to have a fairly low level mission in Hong Kong. We really
think that it would. If an official Chincse representative fere to
conduct himself like any other official foreign representative in the
Colony, he could be a positive assct in many practical (und perhaps
political) ways. But we do not think that he could possibly benave IL
this way, even if he wanted to do To. Given that tie Chinese Government
maintain that lɔng Kong is Ominute Gerritory, and given that Se per cent
of the population of the Colony is of Chinese race, we till.a that he
would be bound to become an allcmative focul of loyalty. This, we
believe, would be the situation even if he were under instructions to
behave wit.. discretion and relations between Uhina and this country
were to remain as good as they are now.
K.C.B., K.0.v.0., 0.B.2., D.9.0., M.O., M.A., Headquarters,
General Sir Basil Eugster,
United Kingdom Lund Forces,
Salisbury, Wilts
-Wilton,
If
/over
.
-1-
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
1
PARCOLAL AND CU FIDENTIAL
ever these relations were to deteriorate, we think that the position of
the Governor would become well righ impossible.
Therc. is another consideration. Very many people (in the Jolony and
elsewhcrc) would interpret our acccptar.ce of wn official Chinese
represuntutive us evidence talt we were thinking In terms of withdrawal
from liong Kong wd of its ultimate incorporation in the Chinese PČople's
Republic.
In those circumstances, we think that we munt continue to play this
issue with a very struint but. as part of the procces, we shall have to
restrict knowledge of what the Chinese nave proponcu to lo LuProw &
circle as possible. I should therefore dir grateful if you would keep
all this very much lo yourself.
Anthony Royle
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
Flag A
CONFIDENTIAL
LB
Thi Logan.
Mr Vans
165
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG: GENERAL SIR BASIL
EUGSTER'S LETTER
1
I submit a draft reply to Sir Basil Eugster's letter of 3 August.
2 HKIOD concur.
I have made
some changes.
24 August 1972
HL1 Davies
Far Eastern Department
R.M. Evans
29 Auguoi, 1972.
CONFIDENTIAL
CS. 41A
2600077
29,000-10/71-894067
BY BAG
CONFIDENTIAL
66
REF. SCR 92/65
X
Who, I wonder, owned their IN Comaction-buili vessels. ?^un. 50
Mr Daisen (again),
We should have to ark HK but I imagine Bray were
other owned or chartered
by
CN Co.
H L1 DAVIES ESQ FED
F CO
17/46 Been Hugh
R.E.
16/8
кон
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT
LOWER ALBERT ROAD
HONG KONG
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN HONG KONG AND CANTON
31 July 1972
Do Evans the
The Hervento 20 3/4 Mr Coorleston R. C.
17/8
HIORD
Рак Enter 1618
The old ferry service last mentioned in the Secretary of State's
telegram No. 624 to Hong Kong is ancient history now.
2.
бо
In 1947 China Navigation (one of the Butterfield and Svire companies)
vere running three ferries to Canton. Two were London registered and one
was registered in Canton; this last was transferred to Hong Kong
registration in
February 1949.
3.
In 1948
49 seven river steamers built in Quebec
for the Yangtze River with a Canadian government' loan came to Hong Kong
as the Yangtze was by that time controlled by communist armies. These
were handsome steel-hulled ships with aluminium superstructures. All
were registered in Canton and plied on Passenger and Safety Certificates
issued by our Marine Department. By mid-1950 with communist armies in
Kwangtung the Canadian government became concerned about the outstanding
mortgages on these expensive ships. They vere transferred to the
Canadian Flag and registered at Montreal but continued to run between
Hong Kong and Canton with their Chinese masters and crews.
CONFIDENTIAL
-/2
CONFIDENTIAL
2
4.
During 1950 - 51 the China Navigation ships abandoned the Canton service
and were transferred to the
Macau run, At intervals up to 1952 the Canadian built ships developed
'engine failure' at Canton and disappeared from the service. In this way
the ferry link between Canton and Hong Kong simply withered avay
without, as far as ve are avare, official representations on either
side.
Yours
Chains
(C J Howells)
What an extraordinary aby &
CC
Chancery, Peking
Chancery, Ottava
CONFIDENTIAL
From General Sir Basil Eugster, KCB, KCVO, CBE.DSO, MC. MA
Cinc 1701
Anthony Royle Esq MP
CONFIDENTIAL
Drati
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State
Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW1
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED KINGDOM LAND FORCES WILTON. SALISBURY, WILTS
Telephone Salisbury 6222 ext 2208
Mr. Doyles (FED)
reply.
Enter [Chinese Rep mittk
R.E. 29/8
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3 August 1972
Aletter exple
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Repre
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Please
A.R.
I was fascinated to read the report of your deliberations with the
Chinese; thank you very much for sending it. I have always felt that the
best hope for stability in SE Asia is to press for normalisation of
relations between China and Japan. With the recent change of Government
in Japan, perhaps an initiative will be forthcoming.
I wonder if it would be such a bad thing if the Chinese were to have a
Pirly low level Kission in Hong Kong. It could not carry out any more
clandestine activities than the New China News Agency does, or at any
rate did; and it ought to improve communications with Canton and Peking
on day to day matters. I don't believe the people of Hong Kong would
feel that this was a first step towards handing them over to the
Chinese, and being, as you stress yourself, so pragmatic they are likely
to see the sense of it.
-
I must say I envy you your visit which has obviously achieved a good
deal, which must be pleasing after all the work you have put into Sino
British relations over the past years.
eve
You
Back
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
RECORD A
VISIT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND
COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS TO CHINA 30 MAY TO 6 JUNE
RECORD OF A MEETING AT NO 3 GUEST HOUSE AT 4.30 PM 31 MAY
Present:
Mr Anthony Royle MP
The Hon Adam Butler MP
HE Mr J M Addis
Mr R M Evans
Mr J G B Weait
Mr D BC Logan
Mr M J Richardson
HE Mr Ch'iao Kuan-hua (Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs)
HE Mr Chang Wen-chin (Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs)
HE Mr Sung Chih-kuang
(Ambassador designate to Britain)
Mr wang Tung
Mr Li Pao-cheng
Mr Chang Yi-chun
1. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs began by saying that he
extended a warm welcome on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
the Chinese Government to Mr Royle and his colleagues. Their visit
provided an excellent opportunity to deepen mutual understanding and to
strengthen relations between the two countries and friendship between
the two peoples. On procedure, his proposal was that the talks should
cover two fields: international problems of common concern and bilateral
relations. When the two sides discussed problems in the first field, he
hoped that it would be possible for them to have a really free exchange
of opinions. The discussions were between governments, but this need not
and should not fetter them. He wished to propose that the talks should
remain entirely confidential.
2. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State thanked Mr Ch'iao for his
words of welcome and for the hospitality which he had himself received
on this, the first visit by a British Foreign Office Minister to Peking.
He was glad to be back in China again and could already see great
changes since his last visit to Canton 9 years before. He hoped that his
visit would be the first of a series between Ministers of the two
countries. The Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, who sent the
Vice-Minister his warmest good wishes, was greatly looking forward to
coming to Peking and meeting both him and the Foreign Minister, Mr Chi
P'eng-fei. He (Mr Royle), was much looking forward to the
Vice-Minister's visit to London and would like to know if the
1
CONFIDENTIAL
/Chinese
CONFIDENTIAL
Ch ese had yet been able to decide on dates. He wished to have the
opportunity to return the magnificent hospitality he already had
received. Sir Alec Douglas-Home was similarly looking forward to seeing
Mr Ch'i in London. Was there any news about when the Foreign Minister
would find it convenient to make his visit?
3. On procedure, Mr Royle said he thought it right that the discussions
should cover international affairs and Sino/British relations. He would
however like to begin by discussing bilateral matters, There was not
much on which the two sides disagreed and the discussion need not be
very long. They could then range around the world, which would take
time.
4. Mr Royle emphasised how pleased his Government was with the improved
relations between Britain and China. When the Conservative Party won the
General Election in 1970 the Prime Minister had appointed him to the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
had given him responsibility for European and Asian affairs. The
foremost aim in the foreign policy of the new Government had been to
achieve the enlargement of the European Community and to negotiate full
membership for Britain. A second important objective had been to improve
relations with China. The Government had more or less achieved the first
ain; this could be discussed further when the two sides came to talk
about international affairs. They had also, he thought, been successful
in their pursuit of the second aim. Mr Addis, the British representative
in Peking, now had the full rank of Ambassador. Mr Sung would soon be in
London also with the full rank of Ambassador. The Conservative
Government had also given China consistent support over membership of
the United Nations. Now an exchange of Ministerial visits between the
two countries was to follow.
5. Mr Ch'iao expressed his thanks for the Foreign Secretary's message.
The Chinese Government looked forward to the Foreign Secretary's visit
to China. The Chinese had a proverb which said: "for others to come and
not to go oneself is discourteous". The Chinese Government were
therefore very happy to have received invitations for both the Foreign
Minister and himself to visit Britain. As soon as the dates were
definite, the British Government would be notified.
6. As far as procedure was concerned, he could agree with what Mr Royle
had suggested. Mr Royle said he entirely agreed that discussions should
be confidential. He suggested that advisers could get together
afterwards to decide what to say to the press. Mr Ch'iao agreed and,
after a short discussion on mechanics of dealing with the press, said
that he would turn to bilateral relations between China and Britain.
Britain was one of the West European countries with which the Chinese
People's Republic had had the earliest contacta. But agreement had only
been reached on the establishment of full diplomatic relations at a
rather late date. The Chinese had another ancient saying which said
"sometimes those who come late take precedence over those who came
earlier". Although Ambassadors had been exchanged rather late in the
day, it was possible and desirable that relations between the two
countries could become better than those between China and some other
countries. He believed the necessary conditions existed. He agreed with
the principles adopted by Britain over the conduct of her relations with
2
CONFIDENTIAL
/China
CONFIDENTIAL
China, which were based on what Mr Heath had said in his speech to the
Conservative Party Conference in 1971. It was the Chinese Govern- ment's
desire to increase and develop relations. Accidentally or other- wise,
the two countries had reached agreement to exchange Chargés d'Affaires
when Mr Eden was Prime Minister. Now full diplomatic relations had been
achieved when Mr Heath was Prime Minister. Mr Royle said that he
appreciated what Mr Ch'iao had said. In the earlier Conservative
Government to which Mr Ch'iao had referred, Mr Butler's father had been
a senior and distinguished member.
It was appropriate therefore that fir Butler should be present. Britain
had a proverb similar to the one which Mr Ch'iao had quoted.
The
7. Mr Royle said he considered that there were two major areas in which
relations between Britain and China could be improved. One was trade.
Here there was much to be done; he would discuss the possibilities
further with the Vice Minister for Foreign Trade. second was the general
field of culture and sport. The Chinese ping pong team had been made
very welcome in Britain the previous year. He and Mr Addis had been
present when the Prime Minister had received the team at No 10 Downing
Street. He hoped that it would soon be possible to send a British
football team to China. The British played football better than ping
pong. They wished to send a good team because they wished to beat the
Chinese. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office were discussing the
question with the football authorities, who were aiming to send a team
next year. The British would be very glad to receive theatrical
companies from China, although there were problems; impresarios had to
be encouraged to take them on. There was no govern- ment backing for
this sort of thing. British orchestras also wished to come to China.
Officials of the two sides could discuss these points in detail. He had
been glad that the recent visit to China of the delegation from the
Royal Society had gone so well. He hoped that members of the Academia
Sinica would be able to visit London soon. Mr Addis added that the Royal
Society hoped to invite a group of 5 or 6 members of the Academia Sinica
to Britain at the end of September.
8. Mr Ch'iao replied that the Chinese side would consider these ideas.
Further exchanges in the fields of trade and culture were, he believed,
possible. In principle, the Chinese did not object; but detailed
discussions could take place with those concerned. A British football
team would be welcome, even if they beat the Chinese. The Chinese would
welcome a bit of pressure on their backward football teams. could spin
small balls better than they could spin big ones. Mr Royle anything more
to say?
They
Had
One was
9. Mr Royle replied that he had one or two more things to say. a
request. He had to answer to the British public in Parliament. There
continued to be concern in Parliament and among the public in
/Britain
3
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Britain about the three British subjects still under detention in China.
He would be grateful for any news of them. There was also the case of Mr
Edmunds, an elderly British subject who lived in Shanghai and who was
unable to obtain exit permits for his family. Could he ask Vice Minister
to arrange for the necessary permits to be given on purely humanitarian
grounds, so that this old man could leave China with his family? It was
a small thing to ask.
10.
Mr Royle said that there was one other matter which he wished to raise.
He had dined recently with Mr P'ei in London. Mr P'ei had raised a
particular question. This question had also been raised recently with
the British Ambassador in Peking. It was that of Chinese representation
in Hong Kong. He thought Mr Ch'iao was well aware that the situation in
Hong Kong was one of great delicacy. A balance had hitherto been kept
which was well understood in Hong Kong " He believed that the
appointment of a Chinese Government representative might disturb that
balance. He felt that any such disturbance could damage the important
progress made in relations between their two countries. For these
reasons, the British Government could not accept the proposal made to
him by Mr P'ei and by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Mr Addis. Their
desire was for better relations; and it had been made clear that the
Chinese reciprocated this desire. But he had to say that he feared that
the appointment of a Chinese representative in Hong Kong could have an
adverse effect. He himself knew Hong Kong very well.
His own feeling was that sufficient practical benefits would accrue
neither to the Chinese Government nor to the British Government to
justify the risk of such an appointment. He thought that relations
between them were too important to inject anything which might influence
them adversely.
11. Mr Royle said that he thought an area where there was room for
improvement was that of communications. The British Government were most
anxious to sign an Air Services Agreement with the Chinese Government.
BOAC wished to fly into Peking. He himself wanted to go to London
airport and see aircraft in Chinese colours on the tarmac. He also felt
there would be a tremendous increase in travel to China in the coming
months and years.
What were the views of Vice Minister on a feeder air service between
Hong Kong and Canton? He assumed that such a service could not be
introduced in advance of the conclusion of an Air Services Agreement.
There was a further question of travel between Hong Kong and Canton by
train. This was difficult. Would the Chinese Government consider a
through-train from Kowloon to Canton which stopped on the border for
immigration formalities on both sides? Perhaps the Chinese had proposals
to put on more trains. If so, he knew the Hong Kong Government would
give such proposals most careful consideration.
The
12. Mr Ch'iao replied he was very familiar with Hong Kong before
"Liberation". Since "Liberation", he had been to Hong Kong once. journey
had been very troublesome. It had taken place when he went to Geneva
with Premier Chou En-lai in 1954. Hong Kong was a very special issue in
relations between Britain and China. The Chinese Government had made
their proposal (that a permanent representative of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs should be stationed in Hong Kong) because of their
desire to have a more appropriate form of representation to deal with
the troublesome problems which arose between Hong Kong and Canton over
visits and other matters. The Chinese Government had been quite candid
gut Jabout
4
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
about their policy towards Hong Kong and Mr Royle would be clear about
it. There was no need for him to rehearse it. He therefore hoped that
the British Government would link this question with fundamental Chinese
policy towards Hong Kong. Troublesome administrative problems arose
between Hong Kong and Canton. These were difficult to deal with without
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.