What is even significant is the rise of paid-up members. The real
measure of support. In the same four and a half years, the paid-up
membership almost doubled from 65,800 to 115,000.
The increase came mostly in unions affiliated to the
communist-controlled Federation of Trade Unions, unions that are fully
commulted to leftist causes.
Another indication of increasing support for leftist Causes 13 the
increase in circulation of left-wing newspapers, which now have a daily
circulation of about 300,000, an increase of 16.5 per cent in four
years.
In banking, the communists now control about 20 per cent of all banking
factities. Three new communist banks have opened in the past yest.
Although no accurate Assessment of commuNISI banking turnover a
available, knowledgeable sources say it is about $1,600 million, an
increase they describe spectacular.
The volume of trade carried out by the $5 communist stores in the Colony
has grown apace with the banking industry increase.
The Chinese Merchandise Emporium is behaved to have made a clear profit
of more than $1 million last year, with all debts and expenses paid.
The Chinese Goods Centre has doubled daily turnover since 1968 and Chung
Ku Company handles at least $16. million a year.
The sources say the increase in trade between Hongkong and China is
welcomed, but point out that the inroads being made into the control of
Hongkong's Commerce should nol unnoticed.
10
In one basic industry, the communists have gained almost total
domination. That is in fishing, with all but 400 of Hongkong-registered
fishing boats also having dual registration with China. These 3.150
vestels with dual registration are regarded as being fully controlled by
communists.
The Castle Peak Fisher men's Office, a communist organisation, has total
control of all vessels working out of Castle Peak Bay.
In the vital field of education, the communists are patiently building
up influence over students.
Th
Crowil. Sony/
In Goody
FEH 356.
The percentage is shil not large but has doubled sauce 1968. There are
now about
COMMUNIT 40.000 declared students.
nt
In the school building. fell the communists have opened 70 new schools
since 1968 Only 25 of these have appked (+ registration and it seems the
remunder obviously intend to continue business with without official
registration.
There is a simple mestart in these figures: the commute are determined
to continue thui efforts to enlarge their influen in inbour. commerce
education.
14 201
·
-
+
To Forgun, CLA
If Thess,
Пау 17 Myles.
full
160
1
1 ...
CONFIDENTIAL
With the Compliments of the
Political Adviser
Hong Kong
BY BAG
CR 3/4821/52 VII
T W Keeble Esq
UN Dept FCO
CONFIDENTIAL
21 September 1972
FEH 3/30/2
UNHCR/ICEM:
CHINESE VIEWS ON REFUGEES IN HONG KONG
Timothy George and I saw Wyatt on 20 September and, as authorised in
your telegram No. 782 of 14 September, spoke on the lines of paragraph 2
of my letter of 24 August. Although he was clearly reluctant to
contemplate the possibility of closing down the UNHCR part of his office
in Hong Kong Wyatt did not rule it out entirely and agreed that,
although it would give rise to staffing problems, the White Russian part
of his operation could be handed over to the World Council of Churches.
2.
We agreed that there was little more that either of us could do until we
saw how things go at the October session of the UNHCR Executive Comittee
and during discussion of the UNHCR's report at the current session of
the United Nations General Assembly. We shall of course keep in close
touch with Wyatt when these discussions take place.
3.
If the Chinese re-state their position, either on their own initiative
or in response to an initiative by others, it will presumably be for the
United Nations in the first instance to establish exactly what they are
after and to ensure that their demands are based on correct premises.
जिल
~
(R J Stratton)
cc RM Evans Esq (FED FCO) MH Morgan Esq (FEKING)
DJ Johnson Esq (UKMIS, GENEVA) J DI Boyd Esq (WASHINGTON)
CONFIDENTIAL
73
2617
254
Mr
Eniei.
COVERING TOP SECRET (FUSD PAPERS ATTACHED) (PASS THROUGH PUSD CHANNELS)
SECRET
My
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Siv D. Watson 117 samme from I loved, as Si E. Nome and by myself. The
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2673
wizford M. Rogle. agreed taim at the Governors
tention & few weeks ago.
CHINESE REFRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
Problem
FEH
A.R.
1. One of the subjects which is bound to be discussed
during the Secretary of State's visit to China is the
Chinese proposal that we should agree to the appointment of
a representative of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in Hong Kong. What line should the Secretary of State
take?
Background
2.
There is a long history to this problem. From 1945
until the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic in
October 1949, the Nationalist Government had an official
commissioner in Hong Kong. He gave the Government of Hong
Kong a great deal of trouble (for example, by claiming a
status superior to that of the consular representatives of
other countries).
3. In February 1956 the Chinese Government formally
proposed to our Chargé d'Affaires in Peking (Mr O'Neill as
he then was) that they should be allowed to establish in
Hong Kong an "Office of a Commissioner of Foreign Affairs
of the People's Republic of China". Mr Selwyn Lloyd decided
that it would be a mistake to accept the Chinese proposal
but that it would be wiser not to reject the proposal outright.
We therefore did not reply to it. In October 1957, Chou
/En-lai
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En-lai brought the subject up with the Parliamentary Secretary
at the Board of Trade (Mr Erroll as he then was) during the
visit he paid to China at that time. Mr Selwyn Lloyd decided
that this renewal of the proposal made necessary a formal
reply. In February 1958, he told the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires
in London that, given the climate of the relations between
the two countries, we could not agree to the appointment of
an official Chinese representative in Hong Kong. The Chinese
did not formally refer to the subject again for thirteen
years although they brought it up informally from time to time,
the latest occasion being in 1962. In March 1971 Chou En-lai
brought it up during a conversation with our Chargé d'Affaires
(Mr Denson). He spoke of the "contradictory" nature of our
position in maintaining a Consulate in Taiwan while refusing
to allow an "official [Chinese] relationship with Hong Kong".
As it did not seem that this remark amounted to a formal
request or proposal, we did not respond to it.
4.
We reached agreement with the Chinese Government on an
exchange of Ambassadors on 13 March 1972. On 27 March, the
Director of the Western European Department of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, told Mr Addis that Chou En-lai had asked
Mr Denson whether it would be possible for China to send an
official representative to Hong Kong (compare Mr Denson's
version of what Chou En-lai said). He went on to ask about
the British reaction. Mr Addis asked what functions the
Chinese Government had in mind for an official representative.
The Director undertook to enquire.
15.
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5.
On 4 May, the Director told Mr Addis that he had looked
up old files and had come across the "concrete proposals"
made by the Chinese Government in February 1956. He made it
clear that his Government were reviving the proposal which had
been made then; ie the proposal described in paragraph 3 above.
6.
The Chinese proposal was discussed when Mr Royle visited
China in May and June. Quite a long exchange took place
during Mr Royle's first meeting with Ch'iao Kuan-hua, the Vice-
Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 31 May. Mr Royle, who
broached the subject, told Ch'iao that we could not accept the
Chinese proposal. He said that the situation in Hong Kong
was one of great delicacy; a balance had been kept which was
well understood in Hong Kong; the appointment of a Chinese
Government representative might disturb that balance and,
in consequence, damage relations between China and the United
Kingdom. Ch'iao asked that further consideration should be
given to the Chinese proposal. In speaking on the subject,
he said he hoped that the British Government would link the
question with "fundamental Chinese policy" towards Hong Kong.
He referred to the fact that the Nationalist Government had
been allowed to have an official representative in Hong Kong
and argued that the development of relations between China
and the United Kingdom strengthened the case for the
establishment of an official Chinese representative there.
He sketched some of the practical difficulties which arose
for all concerned in the absence of such a representative.
Mr Royle took note of what he had said.
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7. The Chinese returned to the charge two months later.
On 31 July, the new Head of the Western European Department,
told Mr Addis that he wished to say what great importance
the Chinese Government attached to the "point" which had been
made by Ch'iao Kuan-hua to Mr Royle on the question of
official Chinese representation in Hong Kong; the settlement
of many other questions was connected with it. Mr Addis
merely undertook to report.
Argument
8.
The arguments for and against acceptance of the Chinese
proposal need to be considered in the light of:
(a) Decisions which we have made about the future of
(b)
9.
Hong Kong; and
Our best assessment of Chinese attitudes and
intentions towards Hong Kong.
In December 1971 the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee
of the Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Secretary of
State for the future of Hong Kong. The Committee approved the
memorandum (DOP(71)83 of 13 December 1971) including its
recommendations.
The most important of these recommendations
was that we should seek to maintain the status quo in Hong
Kong for the time being, but take preliminary informal
soundings of the Chinese Government nearer 1997, the date of
the expiry of the lease for the New Territories, with a view
to securing their acquiescence in the status quo at least
until 1997. In his despatch of 5 May about the Chinese
proposal, the Governor of Hong Kong made recommendations which
were founded on the assumption that this would continue to
be our line of policy.
4
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10. The formal Chinese attitude towards the status of Hong
Kong was set out in a letter which the Chinese Permanent
Representative at the United Nations sent to the Chairman of
the Committee of 24 in March 1972. The crucial sentences
read as follows:
"As is known to all, the questions of Hong Kong and
Macao belong to the category of questions resulting
from the series of unequal treaties left over by
history, treaties which the Imperialists imposed on
China, Hong Kong and Macao are part of Chinese
territory occupied by the British and Portuguese
authorities"
"With regard to the questions of
Hong Kong and Macao, the Chinese Government has
consistently held that they should be settled in an
appropriate way when conditions are ripe".
During his visit to China, however, Mr Royle was assured
informally by Ch'iao Kuan-hua that China had no present
intention of disturbing the status quo in Hong Kong. I am
sure that we can accept this assurance as authoritative.
It is, moreover, given colour by a number of
reports. I attach a copy of the most interesting of these
reports, which gives an account of a conversation between a
Chinese official and a Western visitor to Peking in April
1972. I have ascertained from the Permanent Under-Secretary's
Department that the official was well placed to know what he
was talking about. His most interesting remarks are recorded
in paragraph 7 of the report.
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/11.
THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF
THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958
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11. The principal arguments for accepting the Chinese
proposal are that:
(a)
Given the ethnic character of Hong Kong, its
geographical situation and the fact that we now
enjoy better relations with China than at any time
since 1949, it would be anomalous to reject the
proposal; and
(b) We could suffer penalties,in both political and
practical terms, from rejection of the proposal.
In connection with (b), it might well be that rejection of
the proposal would make it more difficult for us to negotiate
an Air Services Agreement with the Chinese Government. (At
one stage during their exchange, Ch'iao Kuan-hua hinted as
much to Mr Royle).
12. The principal arguments against acceptance of the
Chinese proposal are that:
(a) At a time when relations between the United Kingdom
and China were good, a representative of the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be an alternative
focus of loyalty in Hong Kong;
(b)
(c)
At a time when relations between the United Kingdom
and China were strained, such a representative might
well become the principal agent in a campaign of
agitation and subversion aimed at undermining the
authority of the Governor; and
The appointment of such a representative would be
interpreted by many people, in Hong Kong and elsewhere,
as evidence that we had resigned ourselves to with-
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drawal from Hong Kong sooner or later (with a
consequent loss of political and business confidence).
13. I judge that, on balance, the arguments for rejection
of the Chinese proposal are stronger than the arguments for
its acceptance.
But each of the two sets of arguments is
powerful. The arguments for rejection of the proposal are
set out in detail in the Governor's despatch of 5 May. The
arguments in favour of our agreeing at least to negotiate
about it with the Chinese Government are set out in Mr Addis's
letter to me 3/56 of 20 June. The most serious weakness in
Mr Addis's line of argument is that it does not flow from the
decisions which have been made in London about the future of
Hong Kong.
Recommendation
14. I accordingly recommend that the Secretary of State
should not accept the Chinese proposal when he visits Peking.
On tactics, my recommendations are that the Secretary of
State should:
(a)
Leave it to his Chinese interlocutor to broach the
subject;
(b)
When, as seems inevitable, the Chinese do this, tell
them that he is carefully considering the proposal,
but does not feel able to accept it;
(c)
If necessary, say that the presence in Hong Kong of
an official of the kind the Chinese have in mind
could prove an embarrassment to all concerned, with
consequent damage to relations between China and the
United Kingdom.
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/15.
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15. If these recommendations are accepted, we shall prepare
the Secretary of State's brief on the subject accordingly.
The Political Adviser in Hong Kong has asked to see the brief
in draft. If we send it to him in draft, I think it only
fair that we should send it to Mr Addis as well.
16.
Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department concur.
even
19 September 1972
Mr Laird
亅
agree
for
R M Evans
Far Eastern Department
with M: Evans recommendation and I believe
result of the Governor's talk with the STS
сс
Hal-
Mr Hervey
few
webs
3 roo
afree.
on jo
the Sofs agreed that this was
the right line to take during
سمجھ
I recommend therefor
The Sets
non visit Paking
hmo mom
that the brief be prepares for
on there lines.
трак
To give on this world mpnt
serious risk into them
wish
policies for Shay Kang:
احال
and the counter-arguments do not suggest is me that we need to show
give, get at Cant.
I aques
8
Than Waka
2719
Kun Wilford
27/g
+
SECRET
72
FEH 3/30/2
Mr Sinclair (Legal Advisers Dept. - K 164) Mr Hervey (Far Eastern Dept.
K 251)
-
Mr Crouzon (Hong Kong & Indian Ocean Dept. - K 247)
GENERAL ASSEMBLY: CHINA, HONG KONG AND THE COMITTUE OF 24
I attach yet another contribution by Feter Hinchcliffe to the
correspondence on this subject.
2. The likelihood of the Committee of 24's recommendation being allowed
to pass through the General Assembly without comment by the Russians and
extreme Africana seems very small indeed. If there is no debate and the
paragraph goes through on the nod then this would seem to make it
unnecessary for us to take any stand on whether we were participating in
the vote or not. But I think we would still have to make a statement of
reservation though we could leave it to the delegates' discretion
whether to deliver this immediately after the vote on the paragraph
concerned or to wait until the adoption of the Report as a whole. In
these circumstances it might be enough to say: "I wish formally to
reserve my delegation's position on paragraph X of the Report", This
wording could perhaps be taken as covering the Carter XI queation and we
need not mention it specifically. Similarly if there were a debate but
none of the interventions referred to Chapter XI either specifically or
by clear implication then perhaps this formula could replace a reference
to Chapter XI. This would mean that the text of our statement would
include one or more of 3 possible phrases according to the previous
statements made by other delegates:
1. I wish formally to reserve my delegation's
position on paragraph X of the Report" (to be made even if there is no
debate).
11.
"Several delegations have made remarks about the territory of Hong Kong
which FIG cannot accept and I wish formally to reserve their position on
this question" (only if appropriate).
iii. "In my Government's view Hong Kong falls within
the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter".
3. In my previous minute I did not consider whether we need say anything
when the Report is taken in llenary. I would not think it would be
necessary since we would have put our reservation on record in the
Committee.
25 August 1972
Draina Portache
(Miss) Diana Fortescue for (Miss) TA Soleaby UN Department (K 153)
DO 191:32 $54596 SCOM 2/7 GM 14417
1
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do is quite passives? If w
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29/
Miss Kelly каво
1.
Mr Hervey is on leave. I am sorry to have held this up, but all the
papers now appear to have come together.
2. Our main concern should be to avoid a head-on clash with the Chinese.
This is not
This is not, of course because we consider that the maintenance of our
legal claim to Hong Kong is less important than the need to avoid
damagin our improved relations with China. Hong Kong is the most solid
factor in our relations with China; in considering these relations we
cannot simply put Hong Kong aside.
At the same time it is clearly in our interest to avoid driving China to
take up in international bodies too rigid a position on the question of
Hong Kong. We have recognised for a considerable time that legalities
are of little significance in Peking's continued tolerance of our
position in Hong Kong. Both we and the Chinese tacitly accept each
other's view of the situation.
3.
For these reasons either abstention or non- participation would fit the
bill, and I agree with Miss Solesby that for the reasons she gives non-
participation would be the most appropriate. In order to meet the two
requirements of keeping our heads as low as possible and at the same
time reserving our legal rights I would favour a very short simple
statement as in para 2(i) of Miss Fortescue's minute. I hope that Legal
Advisers will not feel it necessary to expand this state- ment as Mr
Sinclair's minute of 29 August seems to suggest.
4.
We await Peking's comments about the desirability of talking this over
with the Chinese. My preliminary view is that since the Chinese have
said that they regard Hong Kong as a bilateral question there would be
advantage in so doing.
31 August 1972
Kr Crowson to see or
-
HL Davies
Far Eastern Department
I have taken a copy of Mr Hinchcliffe's letter of 23 August for
Sir Murray MacLehose, as requested in Hong Kong Tel. No 794 (attached).
This question will no doubt be discussed with Sir Murray when he is in
the office next week.
Pro Hally
P. H. Kelly
31st August 1972
Mr Javis, FED
agree genially
with
Jur
minute.
I assumes that FED with be
discmany trims with the Governor (? when
Le call on Mi Event on
7 Septimber). D.^.
Lum
4/9
Mr Crowson (HK&IOD)
Mr Sinclair (Legal Advisers Dept)
Miss Solesby (UN Dept)
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.