fco-21-1018-relations-between-hong-kong-and-china — Page 9

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HKO

ATO

MR WILFORD

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNIN

1

CYPHER/CAT A

}

RECEIVED IN CONFIDENTIAL

REGISTRY N..52

21 MAR 1972

TOP COF

For 3/34/2

FM HONG KONG 291138Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 14 OF 20 MARCH 1972. INFO ROUTINE F C
0.

1

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 15% HONG KONG CHINA COMMUNICATIONS.

1. GENERALLY SPEAKING I WOULD HOPE THAT HONG KONG WAS KEPT WELL TO THE
BACKGROUND IN YOUR INITIAL TALKS. WE HAVE NO REQUIREMENT OF ANY REAL
IMPORTANCE TO ASK FROM THE CHINESE, AND IN CONSEQUENCE ARE MORE
CONCERNED AT THE MOMENT TO AVOID THE CHINESE REQUIRING ANYTHING FROM
HONG KONG.

2. AS WE SEE IT RAIL PASSENGER LINKS BETWEEN CANTON AND HONG KONG ARE
THE LEAST IMPORTANT OF OUR COMMUNICATIONS BUT THE PRESENT SCHEDULE
BETWEEN CANTON AND SHUM CHUN IS RIDICULOUSLY INCONVENIENT TO PASSENGERS.
WE AGREED WITH DENSON (MADDOCKS LETTER OF 18 MAY TO MORGAN) THAT THE
MISSION WOULD SUGGEST WIEN POSSIBLE AN IMPROVEMENT ON A PERSONAL
INFORMAL BASIS. THE ITEM DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE LIST OF MATTERS TO BE
TAKEN UP AFTER THE EXCHANGE OF ADASSADORS (MORGAN'S LETTER OF 26
NOVEMBER 1971 TO SAMUEL) AND WE SUGGEST THAT IN VIEW OF ITS UNIMPORTANCE
IT SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN UP THIS WEEK, A RESCHEDULING ON THE CHINESE SIDE
WOULD HOT INCONVENIENCE US BECAUSE WE RUN A REGULAR, ROUCHLY HOURLY
SERVICE LO WU KOWLOOIT. IN ANY CASE IT WOULD BE BETTER TO START THIS
OFF, IF WE DO, ON A TECHNICAL DASIS BETWEEN THE TWO RAILWAY MANAGERS. IN
ANY CASE THE REAL ANSWER LIES IN

-

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PARA 4.

13. OF

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3. OF THE THREE ITEMS THAT DIRECTLY CONCERN HONG KONG IN THE LIST IN
MORGAN'S LETTER UNDER REFERENCE THE CABLE AND WIRELESS REQUEST FOR A
HONG KONG CANTON TELEX LINK HAS BEEN EXPANDED TO INCLUDE OTHER POINTS IN
A LETTER OF 28 JANUARY FROM DAVIES OF CABLE AND WIRELESS, LONDON TO
CHUNG FUCHSIANG (COPIED TO MARCH). I RECARD TELECOMMUNICATIONS AS MORE
IMPORTANT TO HONG KONG THAN THE MACAO HELICOPTER SERVICE. THE CLOSING OF
THE HONG KONG PANK IN SHANGHAI IS THE LEAST IMPORTANT OF THE THREE. BUT
ALL THREE OF THE INTERESTS CONCEPPED WILL NO DOUBT BE BADGERING US FOR
INFORMATION AND

I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD FIND AN OPENING TO MENTION ALL THREE
SOMETIRE - NOT NECESSARILY THIS WEEK.

4. OF MUCH MORE POTENTIAL CONVENIENCE TO BOTH HONG KONG AND CHINA, AID
OF MORE SIGNIFICANCE IN NORMALISATION, WOULD BE AN AIR SERVICE HONG
KONG - CANTON WHICH I KNOW KESWICK HAS IT IN HIND TO SUGGEST TO THE
CHINESE. SUBJECT TO HIS VIEWS AND THE FCO'S YOU MIGHT TRY TO SOUND OUT
THE MINISTRY ON THAT POSSIBILITY. AN EXTENSION OF EXISTING ROAD SERVICES
TO CANTON WOULD HOT SERVE HONG KONG AS WELL AS A FEEDER SERVICE RUN WITH
MEDIUM SHORT HAUL AIRCRAFT ON A YORE FREQUENT BASIS- THIS IS WHAT
KESWICK HAS IN HIND.

FCO PASS COPY HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON.

MACLEHOSE

*

FILES FOD

HN WILFORD

REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

COPIES TO

HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON

2

CONFIDENTIAL

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C

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L

FOX 3/201/1

PRIORITY

CYPHER/CAT A

FM PEKING 180450Z

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEFC IN

REGISTRY No. 52

20 MAR 1972

FEH 3/301

TO PRIORITY HONG KONG TELNO 15 OF 18 MARCH,

1..

PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR.

HONG KONG-CHINA COMMUNICATIONS.

↑ SHALL BE SEEKING AN APPOINTMENT NEXT WEEK WITH THE

DIRECTOR OF WEST EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN DEPARTMENT TO

DISCUSS BILATERAL MATTERS WHICH HAVE REMAINED IN SUSPENSE

DURING THE AMBASSADORIAL NEGOTIATIONS. NOW THAT THEY HAVE DEEN

SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED I HOPE WE SHALL BE ABLE TO MAKE PROGRESS

ON AS MANY OF THEM AS POSSIBLE.

2..

IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW, IN ORDER OF PRIORITY, WHICH

YOU REGARD AS THE MOST URGENT PROBLEMS FROM THE HONG KONG

POINT OF VIEW. COMMUNICATIONS WITH CANTON ARE PRESUMABLY

AMONGST THEM, THOUGH I AM AWARE OF THE NEED NOT TO INVITE

COUNTER-DEMANDS ON GROUNDS OF RECIPROCITY (POLITCICAL ADVISER'S LETTER
CR 14/2221/50 OF 1P MAY). AM I RIGHT IN THINKING THAT

THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY IN REARRANGING TRAIN LINKS BETWEEN

KOWLOON AND LOWU TO FIT IN WITH RESCHEDULED SERVICES PETWEEN

CANTON AND SHUM CHUN, ASSUMING THE CHINESE CAN BE PREVAILED

UPON TO AGREE?

ADDIS

FILES

TED

HKD

ÞA WILFORD

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1

CS. 41A

15,800-4/71-345403

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REF.

SCR 2/2/4841/66 II

1

JAL Morgan Esq

FED

F CO

Dear John,

SIR SIK NIN CHAU

F1

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT

LOWER ALBERT ROAD

HONG KONG

21 February, 1972

настик

th5

Pro 373

M. Henny Po

O Mile 29.2 see ☹} 3/m

Thank you for your letter of 4 February. The Governor agrees that the
advice indicated in paragraph 3 would be appropriate. If Sir Sik-nin
raises the subject he will speak on those lines but he would not propose
to take the initiative in raising the subject, partly because he would
not want to imply that he was positively encouraging Sir Sik-nin to go

to China.

eve

You

Auther

(A F Maddocks)

cc

B Hitch Esq TOKYO

RC Samuel Esq PEKING

JDI Boyd Esq

WASHINGTON

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A P Maddocks Enq

BONO KON

CONFIDENTIAL

izspatches

A.J. 4/2

4 February 1972

SIR SIK WIN CHAU

John Keswick recently invited Mr Royle to dinner with Sir Sik Xin Chan.

2. In the course of the evening Bir Bik Xin gave Mr Royle the attached
piece of paper. He alleged that it had been given him by a friend in Mr
Fukuda's office and that it constituted an agreement which had been
reached between the Japanese and the Americans before Mr Kissinger's
visit to Peking. It all seens pretty dubious to me.

3.

Bir Sik Nin also told Mr Royle that he had been invited to visit China.
He was nevertheless wary about his personal safety and would only agree
to go if he received a personal invitation signed by Chou En-lal. Mr
Royle wondered whether the Governor might think it appropriate to
reassure Sir Sik Nin that, if a visa vere forthcoming, he would be well
looked after. Moreover, Cheu En-lai would be most unlikely to send an
invitation of this kind to someone other than a protecol equal.

ec B Hitch Esq

TOKYO

RO Samuel Esq PEXING

JD I Boyd Esq WASHINGTON

J A L Morgan

Far Eastern Department

CONFIDENTIAL

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.

FIVE-FIVE-FIVE-TURDE PROVISIONS

1

A.

FIYE TERMS TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1.

INSTRUCTIONS FROM PEKING

7320

५०

THE UNITED STATES, to agree on the admittance of the Peoples Republic of
China into the United Nations.

2.

THE UNITED STATES, to give approval to the Peoples' Republic of China
the scat on the United Nations Security Council.

3.

THE UNITED STATES, to abrogate the U.S. Defence Treaty with Taiwan.

4.

THE UNITED STATES, to withdraw American Forces stationed on Taiwan.

5.

THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF CHINA, to cooperate with the U.S.A. on the
settlement of Viet Nam problems, simultaneously with helping casc the
U.S.A. evacuate all of its forces safely from the Southeast Asian
Countries.

Should the above-mentioned terms turn out agreeable, the relationship
between China and the United States will be stabilized.

B.

FIVE TERMS TO TAIWAN

1.

TAIWAN, to recognize itself as one of the provinces of China.

2.

TAIWAN, to be recognized the autonomy of its Province.

3.

TAIWAN, to denounce the Treaty with the United States.

4.

TAIWAN, to dissolve the Treaty with Japan.

5.

TAIWAN, to be understood that Chiang Kai-shek, the generalissimo, retire
his position after his full term, and Chiang Ching-kuo being appointed
as the Covernor of Taiwan Province of the Peoples' Republic of China.

Should the above-stated five terms turn out agreeable, the Peoples'
Republic of China will take such a step that exempt from the ruling
taxations for the period of three years for the purpose of improving the
daily life of the Taiwanese People.

C. FIVE TERMS TO JAPAN

1.

2.

JAPAN, to agree on the Peoples' Republic of China's admission to the
United Nations as well as taking the seat on the Security Council.

JAPAN, to relinquish the Treaty with Taiwan, at the same time ceasing
the calling në "One China, One Taiwan".

3.

JAPAN,

to arrest such a plot as calling "Dual China".

4.

5.

JAPAN, to be opposed the revival of Japan's Militarism.

JAPAN, to conclude on the spot Peach Treaty with the Peoples' Republic
of China.

[

FINAL THREE TERMS

2

1.

2.

3.

Should the aforementioned terms be accepted in all respects, the
Peoples' Republic of China shall guarantee an amicable settlement of all
problems having remained unsettled between China and Japan since
China-Japan Wars.

To conclude the Mutual Non-Aggression Pact.

To be afforded Most Favored Nation Treatment.

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