THE FUNCTIONS OF THEIR HONG KONG REPRESENTATIVE WHICH THE HONG KONG
COVERNMENT WOULD PROPERLY WISH TO IMPOSE SENI COLON IN FACT THAT THE
OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD DO NO MORE THAN THE NCNA DOES
SEMI-OFFICIALLY AT PRESENT.
I WOULD NOT BE CONVINCED BY THE ARGUMENT THAT IF GIVEN OFFICIAL
REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG THE CHINESE WOULD USE THIS TO SUPPORT
DISAFFECTION AND ORGANISE SUBVERSION IN HONG KONG, THEY WOULD DO THIS IN
ANY CASE WHEN FOR OTHER REASONS THEY DECIDED TO DO SO, WHETHER OR NOT
THEY HAD OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION THERE.
י
4
13.
:
SECRETA
I
+
1
3.
THE APPOINTMENT OF A GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE ON ACCEPTABLE
WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE FOR US OF MARKING OFFICIALLY
r
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S ACQUIESCENCE IN THE STATUS QUO IN
RING KONG.
4. IF WE WERE TO REJECT OUT OF HAND WHAT ON THE FACE OF IT SEEMED A MOT
UNREASONABLE PROPOSAL (AND EQUALLY IF WE STALLED
INDEFINITELY ON IT) THE EFFECT ON SIRO/BRITISH RELATIONS
GENERALLY WOULD BE BAD.
+
THAT COULD DE ENDURED IF THE INTERESTS
OF HONG KONG REQUIRED IT. BUT CHINESE DISSATISFACTION MIGHT BE TAKEN OUT
ON THE ADMINISTRATION IN HONG KONG IN THE FIRST FLACE, THAT IS A
CONSEQUENCE WHICH WE SHOULD HAVE TO FACE.
5. I FEEL THAT THIS AWKWARD REQUEST PUTS US AT AN IMPORTANT CROSSROAD.
IN ONE DIRECTION WE CAN TRY TO MOVE WITH CHINESE GOODWILL TOWARDS THE
CHANGES IN HONG KONG WHICH WILL BE REQUIRED AS THE END OF THE LEASE
DRAWS NEAR AND THUS BE ABLE TO SAFEGUARD MANY OF THE ESSENTIALS OF OUR
POSITION THERE.
IN THE OTHER DIRECTION WE MAY DRIFT INTO A SITUATION OF INCREASING
CONFRONTATION AND BY REFUSING A CONCESSION NOW MAY LOSE THE
GREATER PART OF OUR STAKE.
-
6. THE NEXT MOVE IS UP TO THE CHINESE. WE SHALL HAVE TO SEE HOW THEY
FRAME THEIR PROPOSAL AND WHAT FUNCTIONS THEY HAVE IN MIND TO SUGGEST. I
HOPE THAT WE CAN CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHETHER IT CONTAINS THE ELEMENTS OF
A NEGOTIABLE ARRANGEMENT.
·
WE
MIGHT FOR EXAMPLE BE ABLE TO TAKE THE LINE IN OUR REPLY THAT THE HONG
KONG GOVERNMENT ARE CONTENT WITH PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS BUT WOULD BE
WILLING TO FORMALISE THE EXISTING SEMI OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION AS PART
OF THE PROCESS OF NORMALISATION. THEY WOULD, HOWEVER, HAVE TO BE SURE
THAT THE CHANGE WOULD NOT UPSET THE EXISTING SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS
OR INTRODUCE HEW COMPLICATIONS, AND WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE FIRM
ASSURANCES THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DANGER OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
REPRESENTATIVE BEING REGARDED AS A RIVAL AUTHORITY TO THE
ESTABLISHED COVERNMENT.
י.
-
5
-2- SECRET
17.
+
+
IF IT WERE ARGUED THAT WHILE WE MIGHT GET SATISFACTORY .SSURANCES NOW,
THESE WOULD BE WORTHLESS IF THERE WERE A CHANGE OF REGIME IN CHINA, OR
IF THERE WERE AKOTHER CULTURAL REVOLUTION, I WOULD REPLY THAT IN THAT
EVEN THERE WOULD BE A THREAT TO HONG KONG IN ANY CASE WHETHER OR NOT
THERE WAS AN OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE THERE.
ADDIS
/REPEATED AS RE JUESTED//COPIES SENT TO PRIVATE SECRETARY
NO. 10 DOWNING ST & TO SIR P ADAMS, CABINET OFFICE/
DEPARKMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
FED
PROT & CONF D
H
AD
:
NAM.D.
TOD
PSD
CONS D
IRD NEWS D
ļ
+
-3-
SECRET
L
·
+
13*
SECRET
CYPHER/CAT A
FM F C 0 3812357
SECRET.
(FED) |
+
山小
¡OP COFT
Asle
TO ROUTINE GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 265 OF 39 MARCH INFO
PEXING,
YOUR TELNO 272: CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THE BALL IS NOW IN THE CHINESE COURT TO LET
US KNOW EXACTLY WHAT FUNCTIONS THEY ENVISAGE FOR THEIR REPRESENTATION
(PEKING TELNO 245). WE WOULD NOT INTEND RAISING THIS MATTER WITH THEM
AND SHOULD DEFER DETAILED CONSIDERATION UNTIL WE HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF
WHAT THEY HAVE IN MIND,
2. OUR PRELIMINARY REACTION IS THAT THE STRIKINGLY MORE FORTHCOMING
ATTITUDE IN GENERAL OF THE CHINESE WITH MR ADDIS ON 27 MARCH HAS CREATED
A NEW SITUATION. NEVERTHELESS, THE PRIMARY, AND INDEED OVER-RIDING,
CONSIDERATION IN THIS MATTER MUST REMAIN YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE
IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH REPRESENTATION IN THE COLONY (PARA 3 OF YOUR TEL
UNDER REFERENCE).
DOUGLAS-HOME
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
FED
HKD
SECRET
12
}
IKMEDIATE CYPHER/CAT A
FM F C O 331855Z
CONFIDENTIAL.
CONFIDENTIAL
(FE)H
3/2/2
TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG TELNO 263 OF 30 MARCH INFO PEKING AND WASHINGTON.
☺
HONG KONG TELNO 271: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. WE THINK IT POST UNLIKELY THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE
PUBLIC THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE RAISED THIS QUESTION.
si &
2. SHOULD THEY DO SO WE TOO WOULD SPEAK ON THE LINES OF YOUR PARA WE
SUGGEST HOWEVER THAT THE WORDS 'MEDIUM RANK'* BE OMITTED.
2*
DOUGLAS-KOME
FILES
FED
HKD
NEWS D
HR WILFORD
CONFIDENTIAL
L
+
:
PRIORITY
CYPHER/CAT A
FM HONG KONG 300300Z
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
TOP COPY
FEA 3/29/2
TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 271 OF 30 MARCH INFO PEKING WASHINGTON.
རྒྱ་
PEKING TELNO 245 TO YOU: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS WHETHER THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT
ARE LIKELY TO MAKE PUBLIC THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE RAISED THIS
QUESTION AND IF THEY DO WHAT YOU WOULD PROPOSE TO SAY.
2. IF IT IS LEAKED WE WOULD PROPOSE SIMPLY TO CONFIRM THAT THE
MATTER DID COME UP IN A GENERAL CONVERSATION WHICH MR ADDIS HAD
WITH A MEDIUM RANK OFFICIAL IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
MACLEHOSE
!
FILES
FED
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
HKD
P & C D
N AM D PS TS/TUS
MR WILFORD
CONFIDENTIAL
L
TRIOTITY
CYPHER CAT. A
SECRET
Mi Davies-
то
бе
FM KING 290145Z telponnice si Murray Maaleh sve
SECRET
F.E. Deft. Wo
sends his furke, ses
Jurkeview.
in
Issoume
tô
You
have to DOP.
3063.
will be submitti this question which
we to go
(Hong Kong rein are grey might, I suffuse Team No. 359).
R.E. 1/5.
TO PRIORITY F C O TEINO 251 OF 29 MARCH INFO HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR
GOVERNOR).
CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG,
1.
} DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION WITH MACLEHOSE BEFORE HE LEFT
LONDON AND AGAIN WHEN I PASSED THROUGH HONG KONG IN JANUARY AND
TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS THE ONLY MATTER ON WHICH HE AND I HAD NOT SEEN EYE
TO EYE. I HOPE HE WILL EXCUSE MY SETTING OUT IN THIS TELEGRAM, REPEATED
ONLY TO HONG KONG, MY VIEW ON A QUESTION WHICH CONCERNS HIS
RESPONSIBILITIES FAR MORE THAN MINE.
2. OUR FIRST CONSIDERATION MUST OF COURSE BE THE LONG-TERM
INTERESTS OF HONG KONG. IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT THE SITUATION
THERE CANNOT EVOLVE SATISFACTORILY TOWARDS THE END OF THE LEASE WITHOUT
THE ASSENT OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AT EACH STAGE. THE PRESENT
POSITION, BY WHICH THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS
IN HONG KONG IS CONDUCTED BY NCNA BELONGS TO THE PERIOD OF PARTIAL
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WHICH HAS NOW ENDED. CHANGE TO A MORE
REGULAR ARRANGEMENT IN HONG KONG WOULD FOLLOW LOGICALLY ON
FORMALISATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND WOULD SURELY CAUSE LESS OF A
SHOCK TO MORALE AND CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG NOW THAN AT ANY OTHER TIME.
TRANSITION COULD BE MADE SMOOTHLY NOW BUT WOULD BE AWKWARD IF MADE LATER
UNDER PRESSURE. IN THE PRESENT CLIMATE OF
OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS IT IS A REASONABLE HOPE THAT THE CHINESE MAY
AGREE TO THE LIMITATIONS ON THE FUNCTIONS OF THEIR HONG KONG
REPRESENTATIVE WHICH THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT WOULD PROPERLY WISH
TO IMPOSE SEMI COLON IN FACT THAT THE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD DO
NO MORE THAN THE NCNA DOES SEMI-OFFICIALLY AT PRESENT.
I WOULD NOT BE CONVINCED BY THE ARGUMENT THAT IF GIVEN
OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG THE CHINESE WOULD USE THIS
TO SUPPORT DISAFFECTION AND ORGANISE SUBVERSION IN HONG KONG.
THEY WOULD DO THIS IN ANY CASE WHEN FOR OTHER REASONS THEY DECIDED
TO DO SO, WHETHER OR NOT THEY HAD OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION THERE.
13.
SECRET
SECRET
3. THE APPOINTMENT OF A GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE ON ACCEPTABL
TERMS WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE FOR US OF MARKING OFFICIALLY
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S ACQUIESCENCE IN THE STATUS QUO IN
HONG KONG.
4.
IF WE WERE TO REJECT OUT OF HAND WHAT ON THE FACE OF IT SEEMED A NOT
UNREASONABLE PROPOSAL (AND EQUALLY IF WE STALLED INDEFINITELY ON IT) THE
EFFECT ON SINO/BRITISH RELATIONS
GENERALLY WOULD BE BAD.
OF HONG KONG REQUIRED IT.
THAT COULD BE ENDURED IF THE INTERESTS
BUT CHINESE DISSATISFACTION MIGHT
BE TAKEN OUT ON THE ADMINISTRATION IN HONG KONG IN THE FIRST PLACE, THAT
IS A CONSEQUENCE WHICH WE SHOULD HAVE TO FACE.
5. I FEEL THAT THIS AWKWARD REQUEST PUTS US AT AN IMPORTANT CROSSROAD.
IN ONE DIRECTION WE CAN TRY TO MOVE WITH CHINESE GOODWILL TOWARDS THE
CHANGES IN HONG KONG WHICH WILL BE REQUIRED AS THE END OF THE LEASE
DRAWS NEAR AND THUS BE ABLE TO SAFEGUARD MANY OF THE ESSENTIALS OF OUR
POSITION THERE.
IN THE OTHER DIRECTION WE MAY DRIFT INTO A SITUATION OF INCREASING
CONFRONTATION AND BY REFUSING A CONCESSION NOW MAY LOSE THE
GREATER PART OF OUR STAKE.
6. THE NEXT MOVE IS UP TO THE CHINESE, WE SHALL HAVE TO SEE HOW THEY
FRAME THEIR PROPOSAL AND WHAT FUNCTIONS THEY HAVE IN MIND TO SUGGEST. I
HOPE THAT WE CAN CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHETHER
IT CONTAINS THE ELEMENTS OF A NEGOTIABLE ARRANGEMENT. WE
MIGHT FOR EXAMPLE BE ABLE TO TAKE THE LINE IN OUR REPLY THAT
THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT ARE CONTENT WITH PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS BUT WOULD
BE WILLING TO FORMALISE THE EXISTING SEMI OFFICIAL
REPRESENTATION AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF NORMALISATION. THEY WOULD,
HOWEVER, HAVE TO BE SURE THAT THE CHANGE WOULD NOT UPSET THE EXISTING
SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS OR INTRODUCE NEW COMPLICATIONS, AND WE WOULD
HAVE TO HAVE FIRM ASSURANCES THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DANGER OF THE
CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE BEING REGARDED AS A RIVAL AUTHORITY TO
THE
ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENT.
-2- SECRET
17.
SECRET
L
7. IF IT WERE ARGUED THAT WHILE WE MIGHT GET SATISFACTORY ASSURANCES
NOW, THESE WOULD BE WORTHLESS IF THERE WERE A CHANGE OF REGIME IN CHINA,
OR IF THERE WERE ANOTHER CULTURAL REVOLUTION, I WOULD REFLY THAT IN THAT
EVEN THERE WOULD BE A THREAT TO HONG KONG IN ANY CASE WHETHER OR NOT
THERE
WAS AN OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE THERE.
ADDIS
/REPEATED AS RE WESTED//COPIES SENT TO PRIVATE SECRETARY
NO. 10 DOVNING ST & TO SIR P ADAMS, CABINET OFFICE/
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
FED
PROT & CONF D
TPD
N AM D
POD
PSD
CONS D
IRD
NEWS D
-3-
SECRET
+
+
+
NOVINY
CYPHER CAT. A
SECRET
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 52
PEKING 2901457
30 MAR 1972
SECRET
FEAT 3/2151
TO PRIORITY F C O TELNO 251 OF 29 MARCH INFO HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR
GOVERNOR).
CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. I DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION WITH MACLEHOSE BEFORE HE LEFT
LONDON AND AGAIN WHEN I PASSED THROUGH HONG KONG IN JANUARY AND
TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS THE ONLY MATTER ON WHICH HE AND I HAD NOT
SEEN EYE TO EYE. I HOPE HE WILL EXCUSE MY SETTING OUT IN THIS TELEGRAM,
REPEATED ONLY TO HONG KONG, MY VIEW ON A QUESTION WHICH CONCERNS HIS
RESPONSIBILITIES FAR MORE THAN MINE.
2. OUR FIRST CONSIDERATION MUST OF COURSE BE THE LONG-TERM
INTERESTS OF HONG KONG. IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT THE SITUATION
THERE CANNOT EVOLVE SATISFACTORILY TOWARDS THE END OF THE
LEASE WITHOUT THE ASSENT OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AT EACH STAGE. THE
PRESENT POSITION, BY WHICH THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS IN HONG
KONG IS CONDUCTED BY NCNA BELONGS TO THE PERIOD OF PARTIAL
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WHICH HAS NOW ENDED. CHANGE TO A MORE REGULAR
ARRANGEMENT IN HONG KONG WOULD FOLLOW LOGICALLY ON
FORMALISATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND WOULD SURELY CAUSE LESS OF A
SHOCK TO MORALE AND CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG NOW THAN AT ANY OTHER TIME.
TRANSITION COULD BE MADE SMOOTHLY NOW BUT WOULD BE AWKWARD IF MADE LATER
UNDER PRESSURE. IN THE PRESENT CLIMATE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS IT IS
A REASONABLE HOPE THAT THE CHINESE MAY AGREE TO THE LIMITATIONS ON THE
FUNCTIONS OF THEIR HONG KONG REPRESENTATIVE WHICH THE HONG KONG
GOVERNMENT WOULD PROPERLY WISH
TO IMPOSE SEMI COLON IN FACT THAT THE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD DO
NO MORE THAN THE NGNA DOES SEMI-OFFICIALLY AT PRESENT.
I WOULD NOT BE CONVINCED BY THE ARGUMENT THAT IF GIVEN
OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG THE CHINESE WOULD USE THIS
TO SUPPORT DISAFFECTION AND ORGANISE SUBVERSION IN HONG KONG. THEY WOULD
DO THIS IN ANY CASE WHEN FOR OTHER REASONS THEY DECIDED
TO DO SO, WHETHER OR NOT THEY HAD OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION THERE.
13.
SECRET
to
[
SECRET
1
1
3. THE APPOINTMENT OF A GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE ON ACCEPTABLE TERMS
WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE FOR US OF MARKING OFFICIALLY
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S ACQUIESCENCE IN THE STATUS QUO IN
HONG KONG.
T
4. IF WE WERE TO REJECT OUT OF HAND WHAT ON THE FACE OF IT SEEMED A NOT
UNREASONABLE PROPOSAL (AND EQUALLY IF WE STALLED INDEFINITELY ON IT) THE
EFFECT ON SINO/BRITISH RELATIONS GENERALLY WOULD BE BAD.
THAT COULD BE ENDURED IF THE INTERESTS
OF HONG KONG REQUIRED IT. BUT CHINESE DISSATISFACTION MIGHT BE TAKEN OUT
ON THE ADMINISTRATION IN HONG KONG IN THE FIRST PLACE, THAT IS A
CONSEQUENCE WHICH WE SHOULD HAVE TO FACE.
5. I FEEL THAT THIS AWKWARD REQUEST PUTS US AT AN IMPORTANT CROSSROAD.
IN ONE DIRECTION WE CAN TRY TO MOVE WITH CHINESE GOODWILL TOWARDS THE
CHANGES IN HONG KONG WHICH WILL BE REQUIRED AS THE END OF THE LEASE
DRAWS NEAR AND THUS BE ABLE TO SAFEGUARD MANY OF THE ESSENTIALS OF OUR
POSITION THERE.
IN THE OTHER DIRECTION WE MAY DRIFT INTO A SITUATION OF INCREASING
CONFRONTATION AND BY REFUSING A CONCESSION NOW MAY LOSE THE GREATER PART
OF OUR STAKE.
6. THE NEXT MOVE IS UP TO THE CHINESE. WE SHALL HAVE TO SEE HOW THEY
FRAME THEIR PROPOSAL AND WHAT FUNCTIONS THEY HAVE IN MIND TO SUGGEST. I
HOPE THAT WE CAN CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHETHER IT CONTAINS THE ELEMENTS OF
A NEGOTIABLE ARRANGEMENT. WE MIGHT FOR EXAMPLE BE ABLE TO TAKE THE LINE
IN OUR REPLY THAT THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT ARE CONTENT WITH PRESENT
ARRANGEMENTS BUT WOULD BE WILLING TO FORMALISE THE EXISTING SEMI
OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF NORMALISATION. THEY
WOULD, HOWEVER, HAVE TO BE SURE THAT THE CHANGE WOULD NOT UPSET THE
EXISTING SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS OR INTRODUCE LEW COMPLICATIONS, AND
WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE FIRM ASSURANCES THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DANGER OF
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE BEING REGARDED AS A RIVAL
AUTHORITY TO THE ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENT.
-2- SECRET
17.
SECRET
IF IT WERE ARGUED THAT WHILE WE MIGHT GET SATISFACTORY ASSURANCES NOW,
THESE WOULD BE WORTHLESS IF THERE WERE A CHANGE OF REGIME IN CHINA, OR
IF THERE WERE ANOTHER CULTURAL REVOLUTION, I WOULD REPLY THAT IN THAT
EVEN THERE WOULD BE A THREAT TO HONG KONG IN ANY CASE WHETHER OR NOT
THERE WAS AN OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE THERE.
ADDIS
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED//COPIES SENT TO PRIVATE SECRETARY
NO. 10 DOWNING ST & TO SIR P ADAMS, CABINET OFFICE/
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
FED
PROP & CONF D
SIKOR
IPD
N AM D
POD
PSD
CONS D
IRD
NEWS D
-3-
SECRET
PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT. A
+
CONFIDENTIAL
FM PEKING 28/53*Z
29 MAR 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
TOP COPY
TO PRIORITY F C O TELEGRAM NO. 245 OF 28 MARCH INFO ROUTINE
HONG KONG AND WASHINGTON.
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. DURING A DISCUSSION ON 27 MARCH ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF SIKO-BRITISH RELATIONS, THE DIRECTOR OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN AND
AMERICAN DEPARTMENT REMINDED ME THAT PREMIER CHOU EX-LAI HAD RAISED THE
QUESTION OF CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG WITH DENSON IN
MARCH LAST YEAR. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE MANY QUESTIONS AFFECTING
RELATIONS PETWEEN HONG KONG AND CHINA,
SOME OF WHICH WERE DEALT WITH BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WHILE OTHERS
VERE HANDLED BY THE PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES IN CANTON. THIS STATE OF
AFFAIRS WAS NOT CONVENIENT. THE PREMIER HAD ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE
POSSIBLE TO SEND AN OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE TO HONG KONG. WHAT
WAS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S REACTION TO THE PREMIER'S PROPOSAL?. I
REPLIED THAT I WOULD REPORT WHAT HE HAD SAID AND ENQUIRE. CHANG SAID
THAT THIS WAS AN OLD QUESTION BUT IT WAS NOW A MATTER TO RE TAKEN UP IN
THE LIGHT OF OUR NEW RELATIONS. I ASKED CHANG WHAT FUNCTIONS HE
ENVISAGED SUCH AN OFFICIAL HAVING. HE SAID THAT HIS RECOLLECTION WAS
THAT THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL HAD BEEN FOR THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO HONG
KONG. HE WOULD HAVE TO FIND OUT EXACTLY WHAT FUNCTIONS WERE
ENVISAGED.
ADDIS
FILES
FED HKD
P & C D
N AM D PS
PS TO PUS
MR WILFORD
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
CONFIDENTIAL
+
A.
1
cr
RECEIVED IN
TRY No. 52
RIORITY
CYPHER CAT A.
FY PEKING 2208547.
CONFIDENTIAL.
! 29 MAR 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
(OP COPY
TO PRIORITY FCO TELO 243 OF 28/3 INFO HONG KONG AND WASHINGTON. HONG
KONG/CANTON AIR LINK.
1. DUPING MY CALL ON THE DIRECTOR OF VESTERN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN
DEPARTMENT ON 27 MARCH I ASKED HIM WHETHER IT WOULD BE USEFUL
+
TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIRECT AIR LINK BETWEEN HONG KONG AND
CANTON. CHANG REPLIED THAT THIS QUESTION HAD BEEN PAISED BY MANY
VISITORS TO CHINA, BUT BECAUSE OF THE OF STACLES IN OUR RELATIONS BEFORE
WE AGREED TO EXCHANGE AMBASSADORS IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIPLE TO GIVE THE
QUESTION SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. HE THOUGHT THAT THE SETTING UP OF A
DIRECT AIR LINK WOULD GREATLY FACILITATE TRAVEL FOR VISITORS. PE ASKED
HOW LONG SUCH A FLIGHT WOULD TAKE. I SAID I THOUGHT ABOUT HALF AN HOUR,
BUT
THAT WE WOULD FOLLOW THE MATTER UP AND HAVE FURTHER
DISCUSSIONS IN DETAIL WITH THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES, "
ADDIS
ADDIS
FILES
FED
HONG KONG DEPT:
A.T.D.
NORTH AMERICAN DEPT:
MR WILFORD
MR TURPIN
i
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
FRIORITY
COMPIL
ITA
YPHER CAT. A
FM PEKING 280831 29 MAR 1972
RECEIVED IN
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 52
REGISTRY No B 26MAR1/2
YOR COM
CONFIDENTIAL
En 3/201
XUT3130N
TO PRIORITY F C O TELEGRAM NO. 249 OF 28 MARCH INFO ROUTINE
HONG KONG AND WASHINGTON,
COMMUNICATIONS WITH HONG KONG.
DURING MY CALL ON THE DIRECTOR OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN
DEPARTMENT YESTERDAY, I RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE PROPOSED TELEX LINK
BETWEEN HONG KONG AND CANTON AND SAID HOW USEFUL THIS WOULD BE,
PARTICULARLY DURING THE PERIOD OF THE SPRING AND AUTUMN CANTON
FAIRS.
I REPLIED THAT I WAS NOT AN EXPERT IN SUCH MATTERS BUT THAT THE MAIN
THING WAS TO GET DISCUSSIONS GOING BETWEEN THE PEOPLE CONCERNED IN HONG
KONG AND THE AUTHORITIES IN CANTON. I BELIEVED THAT COMMUNICATIONS
PERSONNEL IN HONG KONG HAD ALREADY BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE CHINESE
AUTHORITIES ON THIS MATTER. CHANG SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE THE MATTER
LOOKED INTO.
ADDIS
FILES
COMMS DEPT
DWS
FED
HKD
N AM D
MR WILFORD
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
CONFIDENTIAL
+
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No.52
22 MAR 1972
Kar
PRIORITY
CYPHER/CAT A
FA HONG KONG 221442Z
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CUFT
1
TO PRIORITY F C O TELEGRAM NUMBER 248 OF 22ND MARCH 1972. INFO
ROUTINE PEKING.
-
YOUR TELEGRAM MUMBER 237: HONG KONG CHINA COMMUNICATIONS.
WE AGREE THAT CPA ARE PROBABLY UNACCEPTABLE TO CHINA BECAUSE OF TAIWAN.
WE DO NOT KNOW HOW BOAC FEEL ABOUT A FEEDER SERVICE AS OPPOSED TO AN
EXTENSION INTO CHINA OF THEIR EXISTING SERVICE TO HONG KONG BUT KESWICK
SEEMED TO THINK AND HE AGREE THAT THE SOLUTION MOST LIKELY TO GET
CHINESE ACCEPTANCE WOULD BE A NEW COMPANY
IN HONG KONG FOR THIS PURPOSE, THERE IS ALSO THE POSSIBILITY THAT CHINA
WOULD WANT TO SUPPLY HALF THE SERVICE. ALL THIS MUST BE SPECULATIVE
UNTIL CHINA HAS BEEN SOUNDED OUT.
FCO PASS COPY TO HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON.
RACLEHOSE
FILES
PED
COPIES TO:
HONG KONG GOVERMENT OFFICE,
54 PALL MALL
HKD
ATD
MR WILFORD
CONFIDENTIAL
1
I
+
+
:
•
+
1
6
PRIORITY
CYPHER/CAT A
FM FCO 211500Z
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBỶ 223108Z
CONFIDENTIAL
L
(FEC)
spridz
-
TO PRIORITY HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 237 OF 21 MARCH INFO PRIORITY PEKING.
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 14 TO PEKING: HONG KONG
CHINA COMMUNICATIONS.
1. WE AGREE IN GENERAL WITH THE PRIORITIES SET OUT IN YOUR TELEGRAM
UNDER REFERENCE BUT ARE NOT CLEAR HOW THE AIRLINE SERVICE SUGGESTED IN
PARAGRAPH 4 WOULD OPERATE, IN SUGGESTING A FEEDER SERVICE RUN WITH
MEDIUM-SHORT HAUL AIRCRAFT, DO YOU ENVISAGE THAT BOAC WOULD PROVIDE THE
AIRCRAFT REQUIRED FOR SUCH A SERVICE OR THAT CPA SHOULD OPERATE IT? THE
LATTER ARE UNLIKELY TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE CHINESE AS LONG AS THEY
CONTINUE TO OPERATE SERVICES TO TAIWAN.
DOUGLAS HOME
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