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FILE NUMBER
<p> <span></span></p><!--more--><p></p>
FED 528 400 10:
PART
FAR
EXIST DEPARTMENT
FILE PERIOD
FILE TITLE
1963-1965
EVACUATION OF BRITISH SUBJECTS
HONG KONG IN THE
FROM
EVENT
OF AN EMERGENCY
When circulated this file must be enclosed in a "Special Care" numbered
box and must be kept under lock and key when not in use.
INDEX HEADINGS
PART
FILE NUMBER
FED 528/400/01
|EVACUATION
H-504
¦
HONG KONG
!
1
(0 1030 1703
Ө
REC
19/2/91
куха
х
P.L. 51.3502
C.O.R. 30,
mleden v ang
1960-62-
PRECEDENTS NOTED UNDER:-
RELATED FILES :-
(Previous -Same Title (No.)
CROSS REFERENCED UNDER:-
RESTRICTED
UNITED KINGDOM SECURITY WARNINGS
1. Category AC telegram. Paraphrase NOT required.
GRANJA CIRE
18 JUN 1963 correspondence
A telegram which contains a reference to any classified telegram of
correspondence must itself be classified.
3. The Ministry of Defence Cypher Office must be consulted if it is
desired to distribute or release this telegram, or any part of it, to a
person or nation who would not normally be authorised to receive it,
FAR EASTERN
FRO
: MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, LONDON
2 4 JUN 1963
1
ΤΟ
: CINC FAR EAST
DEU KRED
MAGUNTA 28
33/60-64 Reference
02
7033 TOO 171620Z
17th June, 1963
Reference: JP(61)51(A) (Draft) → FED 5-28/400/0
Regret no progress to report. Subject at
present under consideration in the Colonial Öffice.
CIRCULATION
Director of Plans, C.D.S.
TOO 171620Z
Director of Plans, Admiralty
Director of Plans, er Office
Director of Joint Plans, Air Ministry Secretary, Joint Planning Staff
0.0.S.
RESTRICTED
|
Our reference: Your reference:
From:
TOP -OBORET - QUARD))|
Captain I.G. Mason, R.N.
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Storey's Gate, LONDON S.W.1 Telephone: WHitehall 7000
7th November 1963
૫
り
Dear Alee,
I have been taking a look at the state of various studies undertaken by
the Defence Planning Staff over the past two years and which have not
yet been completed.
(33 Pree) As
(35
As you know the study on Hong Kong (JP(61)51) came to a halt in November
last year at the draft stage. The last paper on our file is a letter
from you to Wernon Erskine Crum (FED 528/400/01 (TS) of 13th November
1962) forwarding a copy of a minute you had put up on the subject.
I wonder if you could let me know how this matter now stands. In June
this year we told the Far East
Planners that the subject was under consideration in the Colonial
Office. Perhaps we ought to consider sending them a further situation
report unless you feel they are already aware of the position. If there
is no intention or progressing this study at the moment we ought,
perhaps to consider letting the Chiefs of Staff know. Could we discuss
this next time you are over here?
The Hon. A.P. Cumming-Bruce, 0.B.E.,
Colonial Office,
Church House,
London, S.W.1.
Jours sicurly
Ian Maan
Warnin 8/11
TOP-JEGRET---GUARD
1504
FEAR
L
Feel
75/51/02
in
3
TOP SECRET
BIGOT
loopy for FED 52.8/400/01)
30th December, 1963
I really must apologise for the delay in replying to your manuscript
letter of the 25th October in which you asked whether there were replies
to several outstanding questions, 1.8. the role of the garrison, denial
policy, dormant Commission and evacuation policy. Even now I cannot do
more than indicate the present state of the play at this end and give
you an ides of the line we have taken in a preliminary talk we have had
with Tright, the Unie -- Secretary who is accompanying the Minister of
Defence on his visit to you next month. Clearly, there is little more we
can do at this end until after the Minister's return, and I am sure that
it will help matters along a great deal for you to have been able to
discuss all these questions with him, particularly as the new CBF will
be a member of his party.
In your Top Secret savingram No. 1805 of the 9th August, you said that
you have accepted the revised directive to the CRP subject to the
proviso that it would be liable to amendment in the light of any
decision on the ultimate purpose of the garrison. You asked however that
the role of the garrison should be further clarified and that "our
policy and purpose" should be re- examined. Our feeling is that while
there is not likely to be any diaposition to insist on resistance for
its own sake it is not possible to define in advance when resistance
would become useless. We doubt therefore whether we shall get
We
think that our very far with any attempt to secure such a definition.
tactics should be primarily directed towards securing satisfactory
answɑr's on the related questions of denial policy, the dormant
Commission and evacuation. If you have these, then perhaps the lack of
definition of the role of the garrison will not be so important.
Taking denial first, we gather from your letter of the 14th June that it
is the interpretation to be placed on the general phrase that appears in
the prosent directive, i.e. "to deny an aggressor the use of
installations of shart term military value" with which you are concerned
rather than with the phrase itself. It is of course just possible to
conceive of circumstances where even a limited denial of this kind might
be inappropriate and where, as between helping to cover the sscape of
persons who would be in special danger if the Chinese occupied the
Calory and such denial, the former justified a higher priority in the
use of scarce troops. With the directive as it stands at present the CBF
of the tins would obviously have to give priority to the latter. This is
a point you my wish to raise with the Minister,
In your letter you draw attention to the BDCC(FE)'s views of 1960 and to
the difficulties that these would raise. We think the most promising
line of approach here would be to try and secure a closer definition of
what is involved. in "installations of short term military value," and
in particular of items such as fuel stocks, docking and repair
facilities: for example, we should expect
SIR ROBERT BLACK, GCMG, OFE,
GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
VICTORIA
5913 593
TOP SEC E
BIGG
/the
TOP SECRET
The
the military authorities to be very resistant to the idea of leaving any
aviation fuel intact, but to be less vorried about ordinary diesel fuel.
planning work on this will, we think have to be carried out locally, but
we shall seok to secure a directive to the lossl military authorities
that will exolude installations or resourose the destruction of which
would impose hardship on the local population disproportiomte to the
military advantages of denial,
In
any onse, thereafter the proposals of the local, military authorities
(which they would of course be instructed to discuss with you) would
have to be referred back to London for approval.
On the dormant Commission, we have already indicated to you, with the
agrement of the Chiefs of Staff (our Top Secret savingram No. 1122 of
the 3rd July) that in principle we (at least at the official level) are
in sympathy with your point of view. Even though we should probably be
unable to secure any closer definition of the role of the garrison we
are rolsonably confident that in the light of the further comments in
your savingram No. 1805 and of the preliminary discussion we have had
with Bright, there should not be undue difficulty in securing acceptance
of your recommendation, particularly now that the garrison has been so
drastically reduced since the original decision.
I shall be sending you a seperate talegren to arrive in tine for you to
consider it before Mr Thorneycraft's arrival, on the most difficult
question that of evacuation policy, This of course is a question that
will have to be submitted to our Secretary of State and probably to
Ministers collectively. Before doing so we shall seek the views of the
Chiefs of Staff and it is on some points on which we require further
clarification that I shall be telegraphing you very shortly.
Once more may I apologise for the delay in dealing with these complex
and important questions ?
(V. I. J. Wallsos)
TOP SECRET
BIGO.
PRIORITY MARKINGS
Emergency Immediate
equired
File No. FED 528/400/01
DRAFT
*TELEGRAM
SECURITY, ETC., MARKINGS Top Secret Secret
*SAVINGRAM Confidential
* Delete whichever is inapplicable. If necessary. "Priority" may be
inserted before "Savingram."
Restricted Unclassified Personal Guard
Addressed
Mr. Higham
ali
Mr..
Wallace lot
(Insert appropriate priority marking)
Mr........
چاہتا
GOVERNOR, HONG KONG
Mr......
Sir......
Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Secretary of State
ENCLOSURES
(Savingrams only!
MEDIUM
En clair
Code
Cypher
¡Delete whichever
is inapplicable)
SAVINGRAMS ONLY
Your Reference
File References
TOP SECRET
Insect appropriate security, etc., marking)
No.
Repeated
(Insert appropriate priority marking)
такл
Corouter
unto la then
ملنا
رہا
13/1
FOR USE IN TELEGRAPH BRANCH
Despatched.
Oa.......
At.
No
Code
.19
Cypher OTP Simplex En clair
..Hrs.
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
182 DEF 75/51/2
Come &
No copying
DISTRIBUTION AND
FURTHER ACTION
the file
+
32:
62 vol
29A: 62 vol.
Following from Wallace.
My letter of 30 Je promised telegram
about evacuation
onpolicy.
2. Before we finally put this to Chiefs of
Staff preparatory to submission to Ministers we
must establish whether there are still any
differences between you and the military
authorities (1.e. C-in-C Far East, now that BDCC
dissolved) on extent to which outline/planning in advance
is necessary. ん
3. Para. 11 of your despatch of 13 October 1962
shows there may still be some misunderstanding.
We think it is clear that, despite some verbal
ambiguity in their paper, BDCC accepted foo
TOP SECRET
Delete whichever.
PRINT NO PRINTING in inapplicable)
TOP SECRET
-2-
o, for different
and that therfore there "plamming Thanks! be mo
this.
for the
and (b) against the ponovility I military situation often outbreak y
Thostilitus parving
ma
lou un formmable than expireted the preparation of outline plans
(presumably modest banke) on the evenation, I wider catagoring them are
him ted kuum brey
colored by (a)
(28) '62 vol
Townage for comunation.
AL.P.
#ill Planner here) that there could be no
t during a period o planning for large-scale evacuation either tention
before hostel has food after hostilities have beskerm and before or
during hostilities (DCC paper referred to in para. 10 of your despatch
still
however seems to envisage preparation of - outline plans (presumably on
a modest scale)
against the possibility of military situation proving less unfavourable
uger
(a) _expected-as-
/outline planning for
transpurt for evacuation of particularly vulnerable
valuable categories after start of hostilities
on lines of para. 9(c) of your despatch) Whatove.
5. Presumably objection in para, 35 of paper
enclosed in your letter of 18 June 1962 to
Martin that evacuation of a small proportion of
European women and children would increase
dangers of those left behind would still apply
even if arrangements could be made in more
favourable ciruumstances referred to above,
It would, however, be difficult to deny any
who were willing to risk the hazards the
opportunity of accepting passages if there
Ships and
were spare capacity. In these circumstances
would it not be advisable to have some kind of
priorities or additional categories worked
out and some plans
(a) oborei
L
in the stocks for wing available
I take it that you would have no
objection to planning on lines of para, 9(c) of
your despatch (which on your side may amount to
little more than preparing lists of names).
6. If that to so, then sole divergence between you
and BDCC relates to "less unfavourable situation"
referred to in para, 4 above,
TOP SECRET
SECER
Ev.
Pps.
:
!
Original
on FED 382/400/01 T.S.
Extract from Record of Mtg between V.C.D.S. / Governor Hong Kong-
Tom 15
(b) The suggestion that an evacuation policy was feasible was very
dangerous and unrealistic due to the insuperable difficulties of
discrimination. This was also being considered by the Colonial
Office.
5
64
TOP SECRET BIGOT
Avs
by
Hr & Record loopy
FED 528/400/01 TS
TOP SECTET BIGOT
(6)
13th Jamary, 1964
82 on DEF 75/ (3) In the penultimate paragraph of my letter of the 30th
December I promised
51/02 - copy
a telegram, to arrive in time for you to
consider it before Mr Thorneycroft's marked to come arrival, seeking
further clarification on the question of evacuation policy. to this
file, but not/yet
here.
This telegram was in draft when we heard that Mr Thornycraft would not
after, all be visiting Hong Kong. This removed the immediate urgency,
which would have necessitateda telegram, and, in view of the
desirability of doing all we can to keep consideration of this question
to as small, a number of people (particularly at the Hong Kong end) as
possible, it semed to me that it would be better to send the enquiries
in today's diplomatic bag.
What follows therefore is the text of the telegram which would have been
sent. John Higham saw it as a telegram on Friday and this letter should
arrive in good time for you to discuss the matter with him while he is
in Hong Kong. Perhaps you would kindly show him this letter.
The draft text of the telegram was as follows 1-
Before we finally put this to Chiefs of Staff preparatory to submission
to Ministers we must establish whether there are still any differences
between you and the military authorities (i.e. C-in-C Far Bast, now that
BDCC dissolved) on extent to which outline planning in advance is
necessary,
(32 pew)
Paragraph 11 of your despatch of 13th October, 1962, shows there may
still be some misundara tanding. We think it is clear that, despite some
verbal ambiguity in their paper, BDCC accepted that there could be no
large-scale evacuation either during a period of tension before
hostilities or, for different reasons, after hostilities have broken out
and that therefore there should be no planning for this.
BDCC
paper referred to in paragraph 10 of your despatch still however seems
to envisage (a) outline planning for transport for evacuation of
particularly vulnerable categorias after start of hostilities (on lines
of paragraph 9(c) of your despatch, and (b) against the possibility of
military situation after outbreak of hostilities proving less
unfavourable than expected, the preparation of outline plans (presumably
on a modest scale) for the evacuation of wider catagories than the very
limited mmbers covered by (a).
(a) above.
I take it that you would have no objection to plaming on lines
of paragraph 9(a) of your despatch (which on your side may amount to
little more than preparing lists of names,
SIR ROBERT BLACK, GONG, OBE,
GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
VICTORIA,
FONE KH
TOP SECRET BIGOT
/(b) above.
!
ply
TOP SECRINT BIGOT
(28 Pru) (b) above.
Presumably objection in paragraph 35 of paper enclosed in your letter of
18th June, 1962, to Martin that evacuation of a small proportion of
Ewropean women and children would increase dangers of those left behind
would still apply even if arrangements could be made in more favourable
circumstances referred to above. It would, however, be difficult to dery
any who were willing to risk the hazards the opportunity of accepting
passages if there were ships and spare capecity. In these circumstances
would it not be advisable to have some kind of priorities or additional
ostegories worked out and some plans on the stocks for using available
tonnage for evacuation?"
(3ga)
(W. I. J. Wallace)
TOP SECRET
ETCOT
TOP SECRET
Hary Ra R
BIGOT
6:
(4)
Exacvation p
Love
7/2
GOVERNMENT HOUSE
Dear Jan.
HONG KONG.
بنا
6
30th January, 1964.
Thank you for your letter FED 528/400/01 TS of 13th January, 1964.
I showed it to John Higham and later discussed it with him at a meeting
attended by my senior advisers, We considered specifically the points
you raise in your letter, and then went over again our own views on
evacuation policy.
2.
On "outline planning for transport for evacuation of particularly
vulnerable categories after the start of hostilities", so long as this
amounts to no more than making lists of names of specialists in
Intelligence and of especially vulnerable civilians, in the hope that
transport by the Navy may in the event be available, I would agree. No
other planning for such categories seems feasible. When the time came to
get them away, and if a naval vessel were there, they could be given
their instructions verbally by whatever means seemed best at the time.
3.
-
As to further planning, I still hold the view that there can be no
other plans - outline or detailed for the evacuation of any larger part
of the population, either before or after the start of hostilities.
already know my reasons. They are briefly :
You
(a) There would be no means of transporting
all who wished to go. Selective evacuation on grounds of race is,
politically, most undesirable and morally indefensible. It could invite
the collapse of civil defence services, including the Police, and of law
and order generally.
W.I.J.Wallace, Esq., C.M.G., 0.B.E., Assistant Under-Secretary of State,
Colonial Office,
LONDON.
TOP SECRET
/ (b) Any
BIGOTI
I
4.
TOP SECK!
CV
BIGOT
(b) Any evacuation before hostilities
(c)
(a)
started would be interpreted as an admission of defeat, would destroy
morale in Hong Kong and damage our reputation throughout the Far East.
Selective evacuation after hostilities started would require employment
of British troops or the predominantly Chinese Police Force to protect
and assist the evacuation, deflecting them from their proper tasks of
fighting the enemy and maintaining law and order.
Europeans would not necessarily be in greater danger from hostile attack
than others. On the contrary, the main danger to them would arise from
the breakdown of law and order and the development of mob violence and
looting.
(e) In any case, people on unprotected
evacuation ships would probably be in greater danger at sea than in Hong
Kong.
This assessment stands even if, after the start of hostilities,
the military situation developed more favourably than we expected.
Preparation of outline plans for the evacuation of wider categories than
the very limited numbers agreed in paragraph 2 above brings us face to
face with all the objections which constrain us to oppose a wholesale
evacuation plan. We cannot determine priorities without discrimination,
and the more you try to prune the list the more pronounced becomes the
discrimination. I therefore hold to my view that we should not plan for
an evacuation of women and children, even in a more favourable military
situation than the worst. The furthest I believe we can go in such
circumstances, assuming shipping space were available at the time and
the risks at sea deemed acceptable, would be to organise ad hoc the
evacuation of service families on the grounds that they could be got
together quickly
TOP SECRE
and virtually
BIGOT
TOP SECRET BIGOT
- 3-
For the
and virtually without planning or warning. rest, if the shipping
companies had space available I consider the most we should do is to
encourage them to make the best use of it, women and children first, on
a first-come, first-served basis without discrimina- tion.
Yours Care
(R.B.BLACK)
Romi Maca
TOP SECRET
BIGOT
TOP SECRET
D/CBF
Dear You
GOVERNMENT HOUSE
HONG THÀN
Th. Higham
یا
PERSONAL
24 July, 1964.
6/8
7
وهرة
Ано
(32) Pre
FED 520/1488/09
I wonder if you have yet any news for us on the subjects covered
in your letter (DEF 75/51/02) of 30 December 1963 to Robin Black,
Purpose of the Garrison,
We have dropped this one, I think we are in fact sufficiently agreed and
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.