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5.

CONCLUSIONS.

The only definite conclusion I draw from the

above is that the problem is very complex, that its terms

cannot be properly assessed at present and that any

pronouncement on it now would be premature and unwise.

If foreign propaganda on the subject should become

vociferous, I think it could be countered sufficiently

through the proper channels by a statement that BRITAIN

expects to recover her Crown Colony of HONGKONG through

her own exertions and those of her Allies, and reserves

all her rights as the Sovereign Power. But sooner or

later a declaration of British intentions as regards

HONGKONG will be expected. When that time comes anything

we say should be the result of the most careful deliberation

and should represent the consensus of the considered

opinion of BRITAIN and the Dominions. Before such an

opinion could be formed it would appear to be necessary

for the competent authorities to have before them a

complete and realistic survey, assessment and appreciation

of all the British interests involved not as they appear

at present, but as they will appear when the shape of post-

war conditions become discernible. The value of HONGKONG

to the Sea, Air and Land Forces of the Empire must be

assessed in post-war light. A realistic forecast should

be made of the special interests of BRITAIN, our trade with

CHINA, its prospects, the value of our investments and the

cost of rehabilitation in varying circumstances, together

with an assessment of our financial undertakings and

commitments in CHINA and in HONGKONG.

It will be of the greatest importance to ascertain

further an assessment of the stakes of the Dominions in

CHINA and their views for the future. Canada was sufficiently

interested in HONG KONG in 1941 to despatch troops for its

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