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5.
CONCLUSIONS.
The only definite conclusion I draw from the
above is that the problem is very complex, that its terms
cannot be properly assessed at present and that any
pronouncement on it now would be premature and unwise.
If foreign propaganda on the subject should become
vociferous, I think it could be countered sufficiently
through the proper channels by a statement that BRITAIN
expects to recover her Crown Colony of HONGKONG through
her own exertions and those of her Allies, and reserves
all her rights as the Sovereign Power. But sooner or
later a declaration of British intentions as regards
HONGKONG will be expected. When that time comes anything
we say should be the result of the most careful deliberation
and should represent the consensus of the considered
opinion of BRITAIN and the Dominions. Before such an
opinion could be formed it would appear to be necessary
for the competent authorities to have before them a
complete and realistic survey, assessment and appreciation
of all the British interests involved not as they appear
at present, but as they will appear when the shape of post-
war conditions become discernible. The value of HONGKONG
to the Sea, Air and Land Forces of the Empire must be
assessed in post-war light. A realistic forecast should
be made of the special interests of BRITAIN, our trade with
CHINA, its prospects, the value of our investments and the
cost of rehabilitation in varying circumstances, together
with an assessment of our financial undertakings and
commitments in CHINA and in HONGKONG.
It will be of the greatest importance to ascertain
further an assessment of the stakes of the Dominions in
CHINA and their views for the future. Canada was sufficiently
interested in HONG KONG in 1941 to despatch troops for its
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