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15. One thing seems clear however:
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as it is not now
possible to envisage a meaningful discussion with China of the problem in its entirety, there is nothing to be said for discussing particular aspects of it with the present Chinese Government. Any attempt to do so, or to seek to involve them in solving any of the Colony's internal problems will almost certainly meet with a refusal to discuss a matter which they at present propose to regard as exclusively for us. Even in the unlikely event of their agreeing to doso, any agreement reached could not bind any successor Government to the present one. And finally discussion could result in our giving unnecessary hostages to fortune and limit our freedom of manoeuvre when the time comes to consider the problem as a whole.
16. It follows that the best course to adopt now is to accept the status quo so far as Hong Kong's external position is concerned; and to wait for the successor Government to that of Mao to emerge, establish itself throughout China, and define a general foreign policy against which to judge the nature and timing of any approach on Hong Kong. Meanwhile it should suffice to avoid actions which past experience leads us to believe would be inimical to China's interests; and to represent publicly that the existing understanding with China over Hong Kong illustrates the cooperative and friendly nature of our relations which is of mutual benefit, not least of all in trade. The policy is not without risks and will (on best assumptions of the continuing tranquillity of China) become increasingly difficult to defend publicly as the attention of the Hong Kong public turns to the consideration of the future. But it is the "least risk" policy and the one best suited to present
circumstances.
386 D073815 140M 5/74 Cr.P.C. Gp.839/3
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9
/Internal Policies
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