CO_968_580_DEFENCE_OF_HONG_KONG_1957_1959 — Page 61

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7. Expense. The defence measures, although they have not been examined in detail, would undoubtedly require the expend- iture of millions of pounds and the addition to the Garrison of a very considerable number of personnel, mostly highly specialised. In the present, and likely future, climate of financial economies and manpower restrictions in Defence Planning and taking into consideration that the lease of the New Territories has only 40 years to run, we find it impossible to justify such expensive measures.

Conclusions

38year

precise

8.

We conclude that: -

4tund

(a) the possibility of a successful defence of Hong

Kong against a Chinese attack depends mainly on:-

(i) the exclusive possession by the defence

of tactical nuclear weapons, a condition which may only exist for a very short period;

(ii)

intervention by the U.S., and the ability of the U.S. air power effectively to interdict South China airfields in the very limited time available, conditions which contain a considerable element of uncertainty when delays inherent in giving political decisions are taken into account;

(iii) the provision, installation and manning of extremely expensive defence measures in the colony;

(b) in view of:-

(i)

the uncertainties inherent in the conditions for a possible successful defence;

(ii) the short life which the lease of the new

Territories has to run;

(iii) the stringent economies which now govern

Defence Planning,

our plans for the defence of Hong Kong should continue to rely, as at present, on the general strategic deterrent to prevent China embarking on overseas adventures. At the same time, we should maintain a garrison to identify aggression should it take place and to assist an expanded police force to maintain law and order.

-3-

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