CO_968_580_DEFENCE_OF_HONG_KONG_1957_1959 — Page 60

ANNEX TO C.0.S.(59)165

THE DEFENCE OF HONG KONG

Page 60

DEF 75/012

Background

1.

We have studied the practicability of the defence of Hong Kong and have taken into account the preliminary report of the results of an Exercise (White Dragon), which was held in Hong Kong late in 1958. Its aim was to study, in a nuclear context, the defence of Hong Kong against a Chinese attack in 1963.

Discussion

2.

We consider that it might be possible to defend the Colony successfully provided that:-

а

3.

(a)

the defending forces, but not the Chinese, have nuclear support;

(b)

the Chinese air potential could be reduced in the initial stages of an attack;

certain extremely expensive measures were put in hand now to meet the threat.

(c)

Nuclear Support. If both sides have tactical nuclear weapons at their disposal, there would be no chance of defend- ing the Colony. At some time between 1964 and 1969, the Chinese could, if they wished, be producing their own nuclear weapons and with Soviet assistance this period could be reduced. Furthermore, though the danger is held to be slight there is the risk that China may be given nuclear weapons by the U.S.S.R. at any time. Thus, there is a strong possibility that the first condition necessary for a possible successful defence may exist for only a short period.

4. U.S. Intervention. Reduction of the Chinese air potential, in time to prevent the Chinese Air Forces taking a decisive part in the overrunning of the Colony, can only be achieved at present by immediate U.S. nuclear strikes on South China airfields. Even if it can be assumed that this support will be forthcoming, there must be some doubt whether it would be brought to bear in time not more than 48 hours to subdue the Chinese Air Force.

5. Defence Measures. Apart from the construction of major defence works, preparatory defence measures, which would have to be put in hand now, envisage the addition of anti-aircraft and nuclear artillery units to the Garrison and the installa- tion of comprehensive radar equipments and the personnel to man them. Additionally an increase in the ground forces. would probably be required, to deal with the IS situation that would undoubtedly be deliberately fomented before and during an attack.

6.

Preparation of defence measures required could not be concealed from the Chinese and might precipitate the very crisis we wish to avoid.

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