CO_968_580_DEFENCE_OF_HONG_KONG_1957_1959 — Page 125

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Page 125

15 We are firmly of the opinion that executive planning for the

xecutive

defence of Hong Kong, is best done by the Commanders and staffs

on the spot. To meet the new directive, the original B.D.C.C.(F.E.)

plans require to be brought up to date and should be expanded to

include military measures necessary to meet the subversive threat

and extended to cover the period to 1962.

16. In view of the fact that discussion at political level

has already taken place we consider that II.ly/G. should agree the,

assumptions in paragraph 5 with the United States Government as

soon as possible. It is essential that Governments agree the

assumptions for planning purposes even should they be unprepared

to accept commitments regarding policy.

17. If there is to be full co-operation between the United

Kingdom and the United States over the defence of Hong Kong, we

believe it to be essential for our planners to have authority to

disclose to the appropriate American authorities a frank statement

of United Kingdom force capabilities and limitations in the Far

East in so far as they can be foreseen for the new period covered

e. up to the end of 1962.

18.

coun mea we

1 meet treat

? There

We accordingly propose the following sequence for planning:-

(a) HMG should be invited to endorse, and to obtain the

agreement

greement of the United States Government to, the

political assumptions which have been agreed by the

Chiefs of Staff.

It is appreciated that these

assumptions may only be endorsed for planning purposes

and not as policy.

(b) The Anglo-American Working Group in Washington' should

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172

prepare an agreed assessment of this threat, both military and subversive, based on JIC/CIA papers.

x cos (57) 134

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Rage 126 of 172

(c)

tgmi

(a)

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Page 126 The agreed political assumptions, together with the

assessment of the threats, should be forwarded by assessment of the

the Anglo-American Working Group to the appropriate

authorities in the Far East, as a basis for the pre-

military

paration of the draft/plan.

1. Pitary

The draft/plan, prepared by Commander British Forces

Hong Kong and CINCPAC, should be forwarded to the

The

Anglo-American Working Group in Washington. B.D.C.C.(F..) and Chiefs of Staff should be given the

opportunity of commenting upon

(e)

The plan, agreed in its final form in ashington, should

be submitted for Governmental approval.

19. We consider it unwise to attempt to short-circuit the pro-

718

cédure recommended in paragraph 19/above although there is no

reason why staff talks in Hong Kong should not be resumed on

points of detail in anticipation of agreed Anglo-U3 policy

guidance.

Recommendations

20. We recommend that, if the Chiefs of Staff pprove our note,

they should:-

this is wr Service Samp

(a)

(b)

(c)

Forward it to the Ministers as an expression of

the in views.

Forward it to the B.D.C.C.(.) as an expression

of their views together with their authority to resume

staff talks with CICPAC in accordance with paragraph

19 above.

give on it may m Authorize

arize the United ingdom representatives on the

Anglo-American Working Group and the B.D.\).0.( E.)

to disclose the United Kingdom Order of Battle up

to 1962 to the appropriate United States authorities.

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