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15 We are firmly of the opinion that executive planning for the
xecutive
defence of Hong Kong, is best done by the Commanders and staffs
on the spot. To meet the new directive, the original B.D.C.C.(F.E.)
plans require to be brought up to date and should be expanded to
include military measures necessary to meet the subversive threat
and extended to cover the period to 1962.
16. In view of the fact that discussion at political level
has already taken place we consider that II.ly/G. should agree the,
assumptions in paragraph 5 with the United States Government as
soon as possible. It is essential that Governments agree the
assumptions for planning purposes even should they be unprepared
to accept commitments regarding policy.
17. If there is to be full co-operation between the United
Kingdom and the United States over the defence of Hong Kong, we
believe it to be essential for our planners to have authority to
disclose to the appropriate American authorities a frank statement
of United Kingdom force capabilities and limitations in the Far
East in so far as they can be foreseen for the new period covered
e. up to the end of 1962.
18.
coun mea we
1 meet treat
? There
We accordingly propose the following sequence for planning:-
(a) HMG should be invited to endorse, and to obtain the
agreement
greement of the United States Government to, the
political assumptions which have been agreed by the
Chiefs of Staff.
It is appreciated that these
assumptions may only be endorsed for planning purposes
and not as policy.
(b) The Anglo-American Working Group in Washington' should
Pages (17)36)
172
prepare an agreed assessment of this threat, both military and subversive, based on JIC/CIA papers.
x cos (57) 134
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Rage 126 of 172
(c)
tgmi
(a)
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Page 126 The agreed political assumptions, together with the
assessment of the threats, should be forwarded by assessment of the
the Anglo-American Working Group to the appropriate
authorities in the Far East, as a basis for the pre-
military
paration of the draft/plan.
1. Pitary
The draft/plan, prepared by Commander British Forces
Hong Kong and CINCPAC, should be forwarded to the
The
Anglo-American Working Group in Washington. B.D.C.C.(F..) and Chiefs of Staff should be given the
opportunity of commenting upon
(e)
The plan, agreed in its final form in ashington, should
be submitted for Governmental approval.
19. We consider it unwise to attempt to short-circuit the pro-
718
cédure recommended in paragraph 19/above although there is no
reason why staff talks in Hong Kong should not be resumed on
points of detail in anticipation of agreed Anglo-U3 policy
guidance.
Recommendations
20. We recommend that, if the Chiefs of Staff pprove our note,
they should:-
this is wr Service Samp
(a)
(b)
(c)
Forward it to the Ministers as an expression of
the in views.
Forward it to the B.D.C.C.(.) as an expression
of their views together with their authority to resume
staff talks with CICPAC in accordance with paragraph
19 above.
give on it may m Authorize
arize the United ingdom representatives on the
Anglo-American Working Group and the B.D.\).0.( E.)
to disclose the United Kingdom Order of Battle up
to 1962 to the appropriate United States authorities.
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