CO_968_451_DEFENCE_OF_HONG_KONG_1955_1956 — Page 91

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neutralize it as a base for intelligence. It seems likely, therefore, that Hong Kong would be attacked immediately on the outbreak of war and simultaneously we could expect out- breaks of terrorism and sabotage in Hong Kong itself. Other campaigns would probably be undertaken at the same time but we do not think that they would significantly affect the scale of the threat to Hong Kong. Although the Russians might assist indirectly by relieving the Chinese of some of their responsibilitics in the north they are unlikely to assist directly in an attack on Hong Kong.

THE SCALE AND NATURE OF AN ATTACK

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5. We believe that, should global war occur between now and 1960, the greatest advantage to the Communist leaders would be to take the initiative and exploit surprise to the utmost. They would therefore aim at achieving surprise for their main strategic nuclear attack on the U.S. and U.S. bases overseas and would subordinate all other preparations to achieve this end. Hong Kong could only therefore expect immediate attack by those forces already in position to launch an assault at the time this strategic attack was delivered.

6. If, however, global war broke out after a period of mounting tension permitting preparations to be made the communists would be able to build up their forces sufficiently, in their view, to ensure rapid success. Wo summarise bolow the threat to Hong Kong, the details of which are given in Apendix.

THR AT TO HONG KONG

7. We have examined the threat in two separate cases

(a) Surprise attack by forces in situ at the time.

(10) Attack with full preparation.

8. Attack by forces in situ. In the event of global war starting by surprise we consider that the immediate threat to Hong Kong would be one of indiscriminate air attacks against military and civilian targets combined with small scale naval operations by MTBS, saboteurs and mining against ships using the port. We do not think that any attack by forces in excess of ono army of 50,000 men including one artillery division place by land of which we would not have at least 48 hours warning. We could expect similar warning of any amphibious assault which would not in any event exceed 10-15,000 men.

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would take

In the case of en attack Attack after full properation. after full preparation we believe that the air throat be no greater in scale than that shown in paragraph 8 above but that attacks would be better co-ordinated: the naval threat would be similar but on an increased scale and would include escorts and amphibious forces; possibly supported by a small force of cruisers and destroyers, the land force throat would be increased to a maximum of two armies, totalling 100,000 men, Positioning of the extra naval and military forces would give up to 7 days warning of the impending assault.

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(82) DEF 127/01

* JIC(56)4(Final)

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