CO_968_451_DEFENCE_OF_HONG_KONG_1955_1956 — Page 90

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The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of Garstan

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39

Copy No....

DRAFT

TO BE RETURNED TO THE SECRETARY JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

J.I.C.(56)50 (Draft)

? 2

1956

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMIT TEE

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

THE MILITARY THREAT TO HONG KONG UP TO 1960

Draft Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee

In this paper we examine the circumstances under which an attack might be made on Hong Kong, its probable scale and nature and the extent to which the attock might be reduced by nuclear counter-action.

2. We believe that, in view of the isolated position of Hong Kong and the large preponderance of Chinese conventional forces available in the area, nuclear weapons must be used by the Allies the very moment the attack begins.

3. We have assumed that, during the period under review, the Chinese will not have devoloped a nuclear capability of their own nor will the Russians give them one.

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF AN ATTACK

#

4. We have appreciated elsewhere that the Communist Chinese and unlikely to embark on a deliberate war so long as it contains the risk of allied nuclear counter action. They will however continue to increase their influence in Hong Kong by subversion and infiltration and will become increasingly capable of causing internal troubles. They might be tempted to thin: that our professed determination to defend Hong Kong was only a bluff and that in the final instance we would not regard it as worth a war with them. It is therefore possible that after a campaign of subversion and infiltration, they might attempt to overun the Colony in the hope of a quick victory before reinforcements could arrive. On balance, however, we believe that even if they do decide to embark on a non-hostile policy, they will probably not have recourse to military action. In global war, however, the Chinese would probably regard Hong Kong as an objective to be attacked in order to gain an carly victory and thus improve morale. They would also wish to

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DEF 75792/05

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* JIC(55)63(Final Revise)

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Gp. 999 D 1091 W. 44290 60M 1/56 L(D)Ltd. 1157Page 91 of 154

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