CO_968_451_DEFENCE_OF_HONG_KONG_1955_1956 — Page 65

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Conclusions

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4. We conclude that:-

(a)

(b)

(c)

(a)

The most probable course of action by Chinese Communist Forcos is likely to be a frontal assault in strength across the Sino- British frontier combined with small diversionary sea-borne attacks and infiltration against Hong Kong Island and the New Territories or both with strong air support. Sufficient

quie

used The ground forces for such an attack would be likely to have a numorical superiority of at least four to one. Apart from infiltration through the seaward flanks of the Colony a sea-borne lift of up to 20,000 would be possible. In the air, the assault would be strongly supported though mainly by piston enginod aircraft, (protected by jet fighters), but by 1958 the air support might woll be all jets.

Whilst CCA forces might have some training in defensive measures to bo adopted against the nuclear weapon, during the period under review, nuclear missiles are unlikely to be made available to them. Furthermore, their use of such a weapon against the Colony is unlikely to be considered cither necessary or wise. For nuclear weapons to play an effective part in the defence of the Colony, they would have to be immediately available on the outbreak of hostilities.

While there should be indications that an attack against the Colony is contemplated, it is most unlikely that prior warning of its cxact timing would be obtained. Should a conventional amphibious operation be decided on, however, up to 48 hours warning may be obtained.

2.

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