CO_968_451_DEFENCE_OF_HONG_KONG_1955_1956 — Page 109

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although all existing 26 airfields could, within the period

under review, be brought up to full modern jet standard, it is

impossible to forecast what new construction the Chinese may

wish to undertake in the general area.

28.

Successful nuclear attacks on existing airfields would,

we estimate, do the following damage:

(a) aircraft and buildings 90 per cent would

(b)

sustain severe damage on 95 per cent of

occasions.

railways would be rondered unusable on

30 per cent of occasions.

Land battle tactical targets

29. There are no suitable targets along the lines of

communication in the area to the immediate north of Hong Kong

the loss of which would constitute a reduction in Chinese

logistic capability. The distances are short and cross

country movement is practicable; we think therefore that the

likely targets for nuclear attack would be concentrations of

troops within the area. These targets could only be located by

The effectiveness of those attacks would depend

largely upon whether the Chinese moved only by night and the

extent to which they dispersed their forces. Korean experience

shows that the Chinese are extrememly adept at these tactics.

in view of the narrow front and the lack of room for

momcuvring the Chinese forces must be forced to concentrate

at some points before launching their attack.

reconnaissance.

However,

30. We therefore consider that the use of nuclear weapons

within the immediate battle erea against "targets of opportunity"

would reduce considerably the Chinese scale of attack. The

amount of reduction will depend upon the availability and

development of specialised nuclear weapons for use by Allied

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