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although all existing 26 airfields could, within the period
under review, be brought up to full modern jet standard, it is
impossible to forecast what new construction the Chinese may
wish to undertake in the general area.
28.
Successful nuclear attacks on existing airfields would,
we estimate, do the following damage:
(a) aircraft and buildings 90 per cent would
(b)
sustain severe damage on 95 per cent of
occasions.
railways would be rondered unusable on
30 per cent of occasions.
Land battle tactical targets
29. There are no suitable targets along the lines of
communication in the area to the immediate north of Hong Kong
the loss of which would constitute a reduction in Chinese
logistic capability. The distances are short and cross
country movement is practicable; we think therefore that the
likely targets for nuclear attack would be concentrations of
troops within the area. These targets could only be located by
The effectiveness of those attacks would depend
largely upon whether the Chinese moved only by night and the
extent to which they dispersed their forces. Korean experience
shows that the Chinese are extrememly adept at these tactics.
in view of the narrow front and the lack of room for
momcuvring the Chinese forces must be forced to concentrate
at some points before launching their attack.
reconnaissance.
However,
30. We therefore consider that the use of nuclear weapons
within the immediate battle erea against "targets of opportunity"
would reduce considerably the Chinese scale of attack. The
amount of reduction will depend upon the availability and
development of specialised nuclear weapons for use by Allied
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