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Similar remarks to the above with regard to bombardment of forts and towns, to attack by torpedo-boats, and to the possibility of an attempt to capture the works by men landed in their vicinity apply also generally to Newcastle, but in this case the absence of any considerable area of manoeuvring water inside the harbour make it still less likely that an attempt would be made to run past Fort Scratchley. At Wollongong, which is defended mainly to prevent an enemy coaling there, the conditions are somewhat different. Coaling could not be carried on in the presence of a small defending force on shore until that force had been driven away. For this purpose the troops that could be landed from a few cruisers should be quite inadequate. Even if troops were landed from a transport coaling should have hardly commenced by the time reinforcements had arrived from Sydney.

The Scheme as it stands proposes that arrangements should be made to secure the country and property in the vicinity of the sea-coast-620 miles long-as far as possible from the foraging or raiding parties which may be landed from an enemy's ship or ships. Generally, these arrangements are to give a sense of security to the inhabitants, and, in the case of the northern rivers, to prevent an enemy making use of them for a rendezvous. The arrangements are left to the Officer Commanding the "Sydney and Coast District of the Defence," and are not detailed. The Colonial Defence Com- mittee consider that they should not involve any dispersion of the troops away from the three defended places and their vicinities. The telegraph system of the Colony appears to be so good that for a hostile ship to call at any port on the coast would be to make her whereabouts at once known at the naval head-quarters at Sydney, and to bring one of Her Majesty's ships on her track.

There remains to be considered the probable action of the maximum landing force which it has been stated above might reasonably be provided against. Territorial aggression being out of the question, the object of such a force must be of the nature of a raid to inflict the greatest amount of damage in the shortest possible time. For this purpose Sydney must be the objective. A desperate Commander, 3,000 men, and three clear days are the most favourable conditions that an enemy could hope for. The destruction of the Hawkesbury Bridge, on the north, and of the Como and Illawarra Bridges, on the south, might be undertaken with a smaller force in a shorter time. An advance on Sydney might be made by troops landed to the north of the entrance to Botany Bay, or in that bay and the rivers running into it, or it might be made by troops landed on the shores of the waters flowing into Broken Bay. The landing party would endeavour to regain their ships as soon as they had effected their object, or found that it would be impossible

to do so within the short time available.

20. The modes of meeting the various attacks above mentioned may now be briefly reviewed. Against the attempt to engage or run past the guns of the defence these should be fully manned and kept in a constant state of readiness from the outset of a war. The mine-fields should be laid at Sydney and Newcastle and Traffic Regulations put into force under the conditions laid down in Report No. XIX of the Joint Naval and Military Com- mittee on Defence. A mine-field should be provided for closing the entrance to Botany Bay, as recommended in the Colonial Defence Committee's Remarks of the 15th February, 1895, and in paragraph 5 of their Remarks (No. 142 R.) of the 31st May, 1896. Against hostile torpedo-boats in Sydney Harbour the two existing harbour torpedo-boats could be utilized inside the harbour. Against the landing of small parties in the vicinity of the batteries, the Scheme should embody the arrangements for closing the gorges of works referred to in paragraph 10 of the Military Commandant's Minute, printed as Appendix (A) to these Remarks, small forces of infantry will be required at central positions, and a complete system of patrols on shore should be organized. The duty of the Sydney field force will be to reinforce either section of the Sydney defences as may be necessary and to repel attacks on that fortress within the limits laid down for it.

The offensive-defensive force, so long as it remains in the Colony, will be available to repel attacks outside these limits, and for dispatch by rail to

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