CAB9-1_PT2 — Page 49

Page 49

8

It is scarcely necessary to point out that much reliance should not be placed on these stores being received in time to be of use for the purposes for which they may be required.

Chapter IV.-Instructions to District Commandants and Officers Commanding.

19. Pages 35 to 54.-This chapter should contain concise instructions to the Fortress Commander, two Section Commanders, and Officer Commanding the Field Force at Sydney, to the Officers Commanding at Newcastle and Wollongong, and to the Officer Commanding the offensive-defensive force of the Colony. At present it consists of a somewhat elaborate analysis of the various forms of possible attack, which part of the subject would be more conveniently dealt with under "Strategic Conditions" in Chapter I of the Scheme, and of the various methods of meeting such attack which would find its proper place under heading D in Chapter II.

The strategic conditions as set forth in this chapter are somewhat obscured by that detailed and symmetrical arrangement referred to in the Colonial Defence Committee's Remarks of the 28th February, 1895, on the 1894 Scheme, and it would therefore appear advisable for the Committee again to explain briefly these conditions as far as it is necessary to supple- ment those set forth in Chapter I. It is there explained (paragraphs 1 and 2) that except on a large scale territorial aggression would be impossible with the military force now in existence in the Colony, and on such a scale could not be attempted by an enemy without bases close at hand, and in the face of British naval superiority (paragraphs 3 to 6). A raid to inflict damage and create a feeling of insecurity might be attempted. More than a few cruisers, and the torpedo-boats they might carry, could not be collected together, nor could a force greater than 2,000, or, at the most, 3,000 men be embarked and conveyed without such arrangements and preparation as would bring the operations under the category of those dealt with by the Royal Navy.

The defence of Sydney should therefore be arranged to meet this maximum raiding attack. So long as the British Navy can hold its own, and so long as there is known to exist a considerable mobile force in the Colony, any other would be hopeless, and to provide against it would be unnecessary.

The B.L. armament of Sydney is greater than that of any port in England, with the exception of the fortresses of Portsmouth, Plymouth, and the Thames, and as great as that of any defended British port abroad, except Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, and Bombay. Against such an armament a few cruisers could effect nothing, provided, of course, the defence guns were manned and could be brought into action without delay. Guns on shore have such enormous advantages over guns on board that ships will never engage batteries if they can possibly avoid it, and the attempt of a few cruisers to bombard the Sydney forts is so unlikely that it may be dismissed from further consideration.

For the same reason no bombardment of the town from outside the harbour need be anticipated (provided always the forts are manned), as this could not be effected except by ships coming within comparatively close range of the forts.

With regard to the attempt to run past forts and mine- fields at speed attention is called to paragraph 9 of the Colonial Defence Committee's Remarks on the 1894 Defence Scheme. At most a desperate Commander might, under exceptional conditions of surprise, &c., attempt to pass the batteries into the clear water up the harbour, but surprise should be impossible by day, while at night the difficulties of navigation would make the operation quite impracticable.

The attack of torpedo-boats need only be expected at night, or in weather thick enough to prevent them being scen from the shore, but not so thick as to prevent their objectives in the harbour being plainly discerned. Small parties of men might be landed in the vicinity of the batteries with a view to capturing them by surprise, but this would only be done on dark nights when ships could lie comparatively close to the shore, and the boats might hope to escape detection during their approach.

Page 49

Page 49