CAB9-1_PT2 — Page 229

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.] Page 229 of 290–

SECRET.

No. 192 R.

SEGRETARY,

Printed for the use of the Colonial Office. July 4, 1898. SEA DEFENCE SUMMITTE

India Office No. M. 3975.

BOMBAY.

Defence Scheme revised to 1895.

Remarks by the Colonial Defence Committee.

THE India Office have referred the last revision of the Bombay Defence Scheme received from India to the Colonial Defence Committee. The Military Secretary, India Office, and the Ordnance Consulting Officer for India, attended the meeting of the Committee at which it was considered.

11

2. The Committee suggest that it would be convenient if Chapter I, page 1, of the Scheme commenced with a short description of the strategic conditions of Bombay, somewhat in the following terms :-

Bombay is, strategically, the most important port in the Indian Peninsula, being the principal naval base for Her Majesty's ships. Its extensive dock accommodation, including a dock capable of taking the largest iron-clad afloat, and its magnificent harbour, give it special advantages, both as a refitting and coaling station for the navy and as a harbour of refuge for merchant shipping in time of war.

Commercially, moreover, it is of the greatest importance, its situation securing for it the greater part of the commerce between India and Europe.

An attack from the sea on the forts of Bombay by any force less than two or three iron-clads would be quite ineffectual. An attack by such a force of iron-clads is, under existing conditions, highly improbable. France and Russia, the most formidable of our possible adversaries, maintain no armoured vessel in the East Indies, while the nearest French bases, Saigon and Diego Suarez, are distant respectively about 2,500 and 2,200 miles. Russia's nearest base, Port Arthur, is at a distance of about 5,200 miles. Moreover, even assuming that hostile iron-clads were available, any serious attack by them on Bombay could not be delivered unless we had definitely lost command of the sea in those waters.

A landing on the coast to the north of Bombay with a view to an attack on the town from the land side is possible, but having in view the small number of men available for landing parties from cruisers, and, indeed, all vessels of war, it would appear improbable that by such a landing more would be attempted than the demolition of the railway bridges or the destruction of the water-mains.

Combined attack by land and sea necessitates the aid of transports and a convoying squadron. Such an attack could not be made until we had lost at any rate local naval supremacy.

A weak point, however, in the Bombay Harbour Defences is the eastern side of the harbour, which, owing to its great width, cannot be effectually defended by artillery from the batteries on the western shore.

For this reason a floating defence has been provided by the allotment to the port of two turret- ships, armed with 8-in. B.L. guns, two torpedo gun-boats, and three torpedo-boats. A mine-field has also been laid to aid in protecting this side of the harbour, and would be of value even in the temporary absence of the floating defences.

[678]

Page 229

B

Page 229

!

!

13