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Russia's transportation system, industry and reserve stocks. If, in addition, the Soviet oil supply were substantially reduced, a general breakdown of the Russian military, industrial and agricultural systems might ensue.

8. It is probable, nevertheless, that the local land and air forces in other theatres are sufficiently self-contained to be able to initiate simultaneous opera- tions of a limited nature.

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II. THE METHODS BY WHICH RUSSIA COULD STRIKE AT

ALLIED INTERESTS.

9. Against this background we now proceed to examine the nature and extent of the military operations Russia might undertake against Allied interests, in the following areas:

Northern Europe.

Near and Middle East. India and Afghanistan. Far East.

The extent to which such Russian operations could be successful, however, would, of course, be dependent upon the pressure we ourselves were able to bring to bear upon Russia, having regard to the weak points in her system discussed in paragraph 6 above.

It is possible that a greater danger might result from the dissemination of subversive propaganda and the stirring up of disorder and rebellion wherever opportunity offered. We have drawn attention to this in a previous paper,* and again invite attention to the need for the most active counter-measures.

NORTHERN EUROPE.

11. Russian hostility would mean a large increase in the total submarine strength of our enemies, although the Russian submarines are likely to be less efficient than the German. In consequence, we should have to expect an intensi- fication of the submarine menace in home waters, and heavier losses of shipping. The basis of enemy naval operations would be broadened, and the availability of the ice-free port of Murmansk would facilitate the activities of raiders, and, since Murmansk is a fully-equipped submarine base, the effect of our Northern mine barrage would be reduced. If Russia succeeds in defeating Finland, she may press on through Norway to the Atlantic seaboard in order to obtain a western base. In so doing, she would cut off our supplies of Swedish iron ore. The loss of these would be serious, and substitutes could only be obtained at the cost of delay and of increased shipping requirements and prices. The countering of the increased threat at sea, however, should be within the capacity of the Allied naval strength.

General.

NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST.

12. It would appear to be contrary to Russia's interests to take any action which might disturb Turkish or Iranian neutrality and thus expose her vulnerable areas in the Caucasus to Allied attack. It is therefore unlikely that Russia will start operations against Turkey or Iran, and she may well hesitate to pursue a more forward policy in the Balkans. If hostilities broke out between us and Russia, however, and if Turkey or Iran became involved, Russia might then undertake certain limited operations.

13. We could not exclude the possibility of Russian submarines penetrating into the Mediterranean, although their passage through the Bosporus and Dardanelles would be hazardous, particularly if Turkey were on our side and adequate anti-submarine defences were established in the Straits. The equipment for these defences, however, will not be ready before the middle of 1940.

* Paper No. C.O.S. (39) 69.

If

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