CAB80-8 — Page 17

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6

Column 1.

French Views (as expounded at the Meeting on January 31, 1940).

11. Should the Finns fail to secure an unopposed landing for the Allied forces at Petsamo, the latter would have to land in a neighbouring Norwegian fjord, e.g., Kirkenes.

12. In order to enable the Finns to put in this attack to the northward, their forces in Central Finland would have to be reinforced by some three to four divisions of volunteers infiltrated through Norway and Sweden.

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13. It is thought that Norway and Sweden would raise objection to the passage of these volunteers, but the difficulty would be to find them.

14. On the question of air, it is hoped that the Finns would be able to provide sufficient Fighter aircraft to cover the original landing and subsequent opera- tions in the Petsamo area.

15. The projected operations would give us the use of certain Finnish aerodromes from which British bombers could bomb

Column 2.

on

British Comments French Views in Column 1.

via Narvik. This port has better harbour facilities than Petsamo and, more important still, would enable us both to occupy Gallivare and to render effective and sustained assistance to the Finns.

11. This would be an infringe- ment of Norwegian Neutrality, and we would prefer to Narvik (see 10 above).

use

12. We agree. Marshal Man- nerheim's request for personnel amounts to some 30,000 men. They must be trained Their organization and equip. ment in Finland would be difficult.

men.

13. We do not see where suitable volunteers are coming from; and even if Norway and Sweden raised no objection to their passage, there are two dangers to be apprehended:-

(a) The Germans may at any time bring such pressure to bear on the Swedes as to compel them to stop the passage of personnel and material. All that had passed through might thus be isolated.

(b) At any time after early May when the Gulf of Bothnia is open, and after early June when the White Sea is open, the Germans and the Russians could land superior forces in Finland and turn the Finnish defence.

14. The Russian air threat to Finland may intensify and we do not think the Finns will be able to spare any fighters for this area. We are apprehensive of the consequences of leaving our force

without any allied air support in the face of the con- siderable Russian striking force which can threaten it after the thaw. We do not consider that the situation at this time could permit the withdrawal of any Fighter Squadrons or Anti- Aircraft guns from Great Britain or France.

15. The operation of British long-range bombers in Finland from the United Kingdom would mean the establishment in

Column 3.

French observations on British Comments in Column 2 (as

at expounded Meeting February 1, 1940).

on

11. It is perhaps a less serious offence to land at a lonely fjord than at Narvik. The British and French Governments will have to give a decision on this point.

12. We think that the whole question is whether the efforts of all countries wishing to help Finland can be made effective.

reason

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13. We agree, and for that think that action should be taken as soon as possible.

14. This question requires discussion with Marshal Manner- heim. We think we should be able to give some help by sending material and personnel (especially Poles). There is no doubt that the air operations at Petsamo, especially the bomber and Fighter operations, will need careful planning.

15. We agree, it is important to secure bases in Finland as

soon as

under

possible and conditions of secrecy.

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