CAB80-32 — Page 20

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4.

The main difficulty in making the transfer lies

It

in the political opposition which is likely to be raised in India, and the effect of this upon India's war effort. may be possible to lessen this opposition by allotting India an increased say in Middle East Councils and, if transfer takes place we recommend that this should be done.

One thing is sure the longer we postpone transfer, the more difficult politically will it be to effect.

5.

Date of Transfer.

If the political disadvantage can be overcome or accepted, transfer should take place as soon as possible so that the defence of the whole Northern Front can be planned and organised as one.

Although Commander-in-Chief, Middle East has his attention now focussed on his Western flank and when in London recently he stated that he was not at present willing to accept the additional responsibility for Iraq and Persia, the danger of divided control is so great that transfer should take place as soon as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East's immediate pre-occupation with CRUSADER permits.

6.

To minimise for India the difficulty of accepting the surrender of control to Middle East, and tỏ ensure that Commander-in-Chief, India, has an adequate opportunity of stating his views to the Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East, we suggest that:-

(a)

(b)

Government of India should have a political

representative with the Minister of state in Cairo; this representative should be a member of the Middle East Defence Council.

Commander-in-Chief, India should be represented

at General Headquarters, Cairo by an officer of general rank.

(c) Commander-in-Chief, India should be further

represented by a member on the Joint Planning Staff in Cairo.

We suggest that the question of control of Land Forces in Burma be examined concurrently with this problem. If there are now found to be good reasons for giving India military control in Burma, the transfer at this juncture might make the change of command in Persia and Iraq easier to accept

8.

Owing to the existence of the NOKKUNDI-MESHED route in Eastern Persia, which must be operated by India and which is quite separate from the main communications leading from the Persian Gulf, we consider that Eastern Persia, including this route, should remain within the boundary of the Command of Commander-in-Chief, India.

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