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Note This paper was in final forms

arciel abed- as D.O(41) 28 16

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT).

SECRET.

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

is requested that special care may be taken to

ensure the secrecy of this document.

C.0.5.(41) 685 (Draft).

C.L

16TH NOVEMBER, 1941.

COPY NO.

13

A

Meeting

Part 7.

is document was considered at 70

C

WAR

CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.

CONTROL OF LAND FORCES IN IRAQ AND PERSIA.

DRAFT REPORT.

.#

The Control of Land Forces in Iraq was considered by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, with the Prime Minister in the Chair, on 3rd September when it was agreed that:

*E

*E

(b) That it should be accepted as a principle that

an immediate threat of an enemy advance into Northern Iraq and Syria would call for

#

unified command of our land forces in those

areas under the control of the Commander-in- Chief, Middle East.

器

班

No clearer definition of the time to implement the unification of control was then considered necessary. To day the threat is appreciably nearer, if not imminent. The Germans might reach South Caucasia in February and active operations in Northern Iraq and Persia are possibly in the Spring. The question now arises as to how long we can wait before unifying command in the Middle East and Iraq.

2.

At present Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East and India are planning separately, Commander-in-Chief, Middle East for operations in Anatolia and Syria, and Commander-in-** Chief, India for operations in Northern Iraq and Persia, although a measure of co-ordination is achieved by occasional visits of Commanders and Staff Officers. recent telegrams show that each Commander-in-Chief is tending more and more to consider his own problem and not the situation as a whole.

3.

Moreover

The War Office cannot carry out the close co-ordination which is necessary during the present planning stage and which will be vital when battle is joined and formations have to be moved from one part to another of this extensive front. Communications do not permit the War Office to retain sufficiently close touch with the administrative situation: nor is the War Office designed to undertake functions which are properly those of a Commander-in-Chief in the field. On purely military grounds there is an overwhelming case for placing the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East in control of land operations throughout the whole Middle East theatre, in the same way that the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Middle East is in control of all air operations.

*

C. O. S. (41)310th Meeting, Item 5.

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