CAB80-32 — Page 107

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6

The Opening of the Offensive.

23. Before the main offensive, certain preliminary operations were carried out in the vicinity of the coast behind the enemy's lines. The results of these operations are not yet known.

24. The offensive which opened at dawn on the 18th November coincided with very bad weather which prevented the bombing of enemy aerodromes on the extensive scale which had been planned. Heavy rain had fallen in Cyrenaica and turned usually motorable areas into mud. The Western Desert railway to Mersa Matruh was breached in several places, although the damage was not serious.

The rainfall had, however, been much heavier on the coast than inland, and enemy communications, landing grounds and laagers were more adversely affected than the desert areas in which our troops had concentrated.

25. The armoured portion of the force refuelled some 20 miles east of the frontier at 0900 hours on the 18th November and proceeded to advance according to plan. By the late afternoon the leading brigade was 20 miles south-east of El Gobi, with the remainder of the force echeloned in rear.

By midday advanced patrols of the formations detailed for the attack on the enemy in the frontier area had made contact on the general line Halfaya- Scheferzen, and, at dusk, a detachment was located between the Halfaya ridge and the coast, the bulk of the force being in the Scheferzen area and to the south- east of it.

Meanwhile the advance from Jarabub had begun.

Strict wireless silence was preserved during this stage of the operations. Hitherto serious battle had not been joined, but all available evidence pointed to the fact that the enemy had not yet appreciated either the scope or weight of the offensive.

On the morning of the 18th November an enemy force of tanks and M.T. were reported by air reconnaissance to be stuck in the mud at Bir el Gobi and were later very successfully attacked by Blenheims and Marylands.

26.

Operations on the 19th and 20th November.

Reports of operations subsequent to the approach march have naturally been fragmentary, and it is not yet possible to give a connected story of the battle. The first clashes between armoured forces appear to have occurred on the afternoon of the 19th November, when 18 Italian tanks were destroyed near Bir el Gobi and one of our leading formations met some 60 German tanks, believed to be of the 21st Panzer Division, 20 miles to the north-west of Sidi Omar. In the latter action 26 enemy tanks were destroyed and 20 of our own were lost.

Meanwhile the formation in the centre had pushed on unopposed in the direction of Sidi Rezegh, south-east of Tobruk.

27. On the 20th November the armoured battle was joined in earnest. The formation on the right took up the pursuit of the enemy forces with which it had been engaged in the Bir el Meliha area on the previous afternoon and drove them off in a north-easterly direction, inflicting a loss of 34 tanks and 9 tank transporters. Meanwhile the centre formation had encountered 200 tanks of the 15th Panzer Division, which seem to have been trying to cut their way out to the west. In the action which developed to the south-east of Sidi Rezegh the enemy lost 70 tanks, 33 armoured cars and several hundred prisoners before with- drawing. In addition, 19 enemy aircraft, previously damaged by our fighters, were captured on Sidi Rezegh landing ground with their crews.

In the centre, between Sidi Rezegh and Bir el Meliha, another British armoured formation came into action against German tanks moving south-west from the Bardia-Gambut area. The results of this action are still not known.

28. Enemy tank casualties on the 19th and 20th November amounted in all to 130 tanks, 33 armoured cars and 9 transporters-approximately half of the German armoured strength in Cyrenaica.

29. On the evening of the 20th November, reserves of tanks were sent up to make good the losses sustained by our armoured forces during the opening engagements.

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