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TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to

ensure the secrecy of this document.

This document was considered at

216

28

Meeting.

Co. (41 CO.S. (xg) 33+.

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT).

SECRET.

C.0.S, (41) 52.

23RD JANUARY, 1941.

WAR CABINET.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.

COPY NO.

33

1.

STRATEGY IN THE BALKANS AND DASTERN

MEDITERRANEAN.

Memorandum by the Chief of the Air Staff.

To allow Germany to overrun Bulgaria and establish

a strong air force there without taking any action

ourselves beyond the building up of a strategic reserve in Egypt will, in my opinion, have disastrous consequences upon our strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean.

2.

Once the German Air Force is firmly established in Bulgaria, Germany could :-

3.

(a) Overawe the Turks by the threat of a

devastating scale of air attack on Istanbul, which is weakly defended and within very close range;

(b) limit, or even eliminate, our power to send

help to Turkey by damaging or destroying the port facilities at Smyrna which is within medium range and practically undefended;

(c) obliterate the Turkish lavy, thus throwing

open the Thracian and Asiatic coasts of the Black Sea to German landings;

(a) destroy the Macedonian ports which are within extremely close range and practically undefended, thus preventing the landing of British assistance in Macedonia;

(e) attack the Piraeus and thus seriously

interfere with our power to reinforce Central and Southern Greece.

By using to the full the mere threat of action on these lines Germany might, without firing a shot or dropping a bomb, be able to open the Straits, drive

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