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33.

In regard to 30(c) above, an advance towards Syria;

At present the same objections this is a long term policy. obtain as in the case of invasion of Greece from the north. In addition the attitude of Russia to a German occupation of the Straits is doubtful and the operation would involve the diversion of serious air forces from the main front against England. Under present conditions it is not advisable.

34 In regard to 30(a) above, the occupation of Unoccupied France. The objects would be the occupation of French harbours, the seizure and use of the French Fleet, free communication to Italy on the one hand and into Spain by the Barceloną route on the other, but there is a risk of the French Government and fleet moving to North Africa, if Germany pressos France too hard.

So long as this condition exists

the disadvantages to us of occupying the whole of France

Diplomatic pressure and all the outweigh any advantage. secret methods which have proved so successful an adjunct to our policy must be employed with the greatest energy to

It cannot be said that our improve our position in France. civilians have been conspicuously successful in exploiting the brilliant situation created by our Army..

35. In regard to 30(e) above, the occupation of Italy.. This problem will arise only in the event of immediate danger

That eventuality is not yet of Italy collapsing entirely. imminent. Should it occur we shall have to proceed to an occupation of the industrial north, on the Roumanian model.. Whether this occupation would be extended depends upon circumstances, such as the position and condition of the Italian fleet, which cannot at present be foreseen.

36.

III. COURSES OPEN TO THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

England has the initiative only in Africa and in minor

While her fleet is dispersed and until operations elsewhere. her rearmament is much further advanced she is unable to initiate major operations and must, in the main, stand on the

The Courses which are open to her are:- defensive at home,

(a) To continue her operations against Italy in Libya,

This is certain un to a point which depends upon the degree of resistance which Italy can put up. At a later stage seaborne attacks against Ṭtalian

For the moment troops territory are possible. are not available for anything more than raids.

(b)

For the Establish herself strongly in Greece. moment operations in Africa and the reluctance of the Greeks to invite a German attack may be relied upon to delay this, but we must be prepared for this eventuality.

(c) Occupy certain Portuguese and Spanish Islands,

The occupation of Portuguese and Spanish islands is improbable unless Spain joins the Axis or the

Germany can do Peninsula is invaded by Germany. nothing to prevent such occupation except endeavour to forestall it.

(a) Carry out minor seaborne raids against important

The maintenance of reasonable forces objectives, in the neighbourhood of any possible objectives of real importance will provide adequate protection.

(e)

England will, of course, continue air attack against Germany and certain points in occupied territory. The material effect of air bombardment has been less than might have been expected.

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