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16. It can be argued that concentrated attacks on the main centres of population in Germany, making the maximum use of damage by fire, combined with harassing action in the interval between the main attacks, might compara- tively quickly produce internal disruption in Germany. An incidental effect of this attack would be its repercussions on the morale of the German armed forces and on industrial production, and the stimulation of the morale of our own population.

17. While there is no doubt that concentration on this aim would produce appreciable results, there are equally strong reasons for believing that it would not be nearly so successful as might be expected. The first objection is that the Nazi Régime have already taken the most drastic measures in anticipation of attacks on morale. A rigid censorship is imposed which lessens, if it does not prevent, the spread of reports. Secondly, there is the very great area to be covered, the large number of targets to be attacked and the depth of penetration required. Moreover, our own experience indicates the local and transient effects of concen- trated attacks on centres of population.

With a bomber force of the strength of that at present available to Germany this might be a practical objective. With our existing strength it is unlikely that we could achieve results on a sufficiently large scale to justify concentrating on this particular type of target.

18. Morale as a main target is one which it may prove profitable to turn to as a long-term objective for our expanded bomber force, and when the state of German morale is less robust than it is at the moment. We think that there is not sufficient justification to concentrate upon it with our present strength, although we believe that the undermining of enemy morale must be an aim which we must always keep in mind. We should, therefore, allot as alternative targets centres of industrial population which could be attacked by aircraft failing to find their primary objective.

Naval Objectives.

These may be considered under two heads

19. Enemy Surface Forces.-Our naval forces are, at the present time, opera- ting under conditions of maximum strain. A very serious threat to our control of sea communications may arise if the Germans employ their fast Capital Ship units on the trade routes. If our bomber offensive were to put the enemy Capital ships out of action the effect would be felt immediately in our naval dispositions all over the world. Not only would more powerful hunting forces become available, but we should be able to concentrate greater light forces in the vital North- Western Approaches for the defence of trade.

20. The disadvantage of concentrating our bomber effort on this type of target arises primarily from the tactical difficulties of attacking it with success. Enemy forces at sea afford only a fleeting target, and when in harbour they are well defended by guns and searchlights. Situations may, nevertheless, arise when bombing effort to achieve damage or destruction may be justifiable. To damage the Capital Ship large bombs are necessary, and only a small number of such bombs can be carried in each attack. Moreover, the targets are situated in the most strongly defended areas in Germany and we have already experienced heavy casualties in endeavouring to destroy them. In addition, the large searchlight concentrations at the naval bases makes accurate bombing impossible. The pro- bability of hitting is therefore very low.

21. Submarine Objectives.-The best objectives for attack are the construc- tion yards. The Germans have, however, carefully dispersed these targets over a wide area including the Baltic and French ports. They are small and uneconomical targets and, although a concentration of attack upon them would certainly lead to a slowing up of submarine output, the effect would not be con- siderable. We do not think that this would be the most profitable primary aim for the bomber force, but should any large concentrations of U-boats be reported, they would be well worth attacking.

22. We do not recommend that naval objectives should be a primary target, but favourable opportunities should not be lost for destroying or damaging naval units or concentrations of submarines.

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