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(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROFERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT )

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOOK AND KEY-

It is requested that special care may be taken to

SECRET.

ensure the secrecy of this document.

C. O. S. (41) 18.

7TH JANUARY, 1941.

COPY NO.

29

I document was considered at Co. (41) 16

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.

Meeting.

93

DEFENCE OF HONG KONG.

Copy of Telegram dated 6th January, 1941, from Commander-in-Chief, Far East to the

Air Ministry.

IMMEDIATE.

GQGFE 135/6/1.

Following for Chiefs of Staff from C. in C. Far East as a result of 6 days examination of situation

(1) Policy for defence at Hong Kong I submit the following. of Hong Kong in event of war must remain unchanged viz. defence of island for longest possible period in hope that situation may so

(2) Preparations for develop that relief may be effected. implementing this policy have been and are being prosecuted vigorously with every resource available and garrison will undoubtedly

The most difficult factor in defence put up good show if attacked. would be dealing with very big Chinese population and military assistance to police may well be necessary at a time when it can least be spared. With present infantry strength this may stultify the military defence. (3) Up to date it has been essential to be prepared to defend Hong Kong with forces appreciably below strength

In our improving previously recognised as necessary minimum. situation continued acceptance of the risks entailed should no longer be inevitable. (4) Main arguments against reinforcement

That the stronger are that need for battalions in Malaya is greater. the garrison of Hong Kong the greater our loss if fortress falls, and that we have no good reason for basing plans on probability of relief. (5) On other hand repercussions from early fall of

Demonstration Hong Kong would be very serious throughout Far East. at present juncture of our determination to defend Hong Kong would encourage Chinese in their resistance to Japan and would be important feature in our policy of firmness towards Japan which is

(6) On these calculated to reduce likelihood of agression by her. grounds I judge all feasible measures to ensure that garrison could

I adequately fulfil its present role to be of first importance. propose to increase garrison from four regular infantry battalions to first 5 and then 6 battalions as soon as I judge one or two

Availability may depend battalions can be released from Malaya. on reinforcing Malaya by additional battalions from India though these might be of lower standard of training. I shall also ensure that General Dennys in consultation with authorities in Burma and Hong Kong examines (a) all possible measures to facilitate provision of British Air Support to Chiang Kai Shek should such a policy be decided upon in event of war. It is probable that such air forces will also be able to operate against Japanese attacking Hong Kong.

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