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سات

109

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT. )

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to

ensure the secrecy of this document.

SECRET.

C.0.S. (40)814.

9TH OCTOBER, 1940.

WAR CABINET.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE,

COPY NO.

DEFENCE OF MALTA,

Copy of a telegram dated 8th October, 1940 from

Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Malta.

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IMMEDIATE.

GM 15204 cipher 8/10.

First of two parts.

Personal for C.I.G. S. from General Dobbie. Your 84005 (G.S.(P)) of 4/10. I cannot visualise a full dress attack on Malta unless enemy are confident of being able to prevent Mediterranean fleet from intervening for a sufficient period to enable them to gain control of the island. After consulting the V. A.M. I imagine that seven days is the maximum period the enemy could hope to have free from interference. In all probability it will be less but my remarks which follow are based on this assumption of seven days. This limit would probably rule out a deliberate step by step attack and would necessitate a maximum effort at all possible places simultaneously, carried through with utmost determination, German stiffening might give the necessary vigour. The local naval forces likely to be available within the next few months are only a few odd submarines, and even these are uncertain. M.T.B's would be extremely useful against sea-borne attack but cannot materialise for a long time, so I am not counting on them. It follows that the navy here will not be able to do much to interfere with sea-borne attack. The Air Force available at present could not count on preventing enemy from gaining air superiority if he made determined efforts to do so. The four fighter squadrons asked for, and which might have prevented such a result, cannot I understand come for some time. We must therefore face the fact that the enemy would have local air superiority, except in so far as our A. A. guns might interfere this of course is a serious handicap. But the R.A.F. reconnaissance aircraft should be able to give us warning of concentrations of shipping ir Sicily, thus reducing chance of complete surprise. I assume enemy will have ample resources of men and material and thật in order to gain a quick decision he will attack on very widę front. Further that he will use self-propelled armoured landing craft and will do the journey from Sicily at night attacking at or before dawn I assume also that these

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