CAB80-20 — Page 124

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ANNEX.

Copy of a telegram from Commander-in-Chief,

Middle East, to the War Office,

dated 1st October. 1940.

108

IMPORTANT.

0/21186 Cipher 1/10.

Your 83344 (M.0.5.) 27/9.

One. Agree situation in Iraq unsatisfactory due to pro-Italian attitude of Prime Minister intrigues of Mufti and Italian minister and pro-axis feeling of large part of army. On other hand Regent is still loyal, present cabinet is unpopular and large proportion of tribes still pro-British.

Two.

connection.

Iraq fully realises economic dependence on British If she cuts off oil she can sell it to no one else, if she stops Empire air route she loses revenue if she closes Shatt EL Arab she loses still more. Few Iraq politicians have any.

I do not courage or principles except being on winning side. believe Iraq will take any drastic steps such as denying overland route unless either Syria or Iran is occupied by enemy or we suffer some defeat which makes Iraqis convinced we cannot win war.

Three. Our military position in Iraq is weak and we cannot at present afford troops or air force. Time is past when a comparatively small force might have restored prestige and influence. Unfortunately our diplomacy and propaganda have also been timid and

weak.

Four. Only remedy for present situation is a much stronger diplomacy and propaganda. Iraq should be made to understand

It that we are going to win this war and that we mean business. will probably be necessary as first step to replace present Govt. with one nominated by Regent under our guidance with promise from Indications are us of full moral backing and financial support. this action would be welcomed by certain influential Iraqis.

Five. In any case strongest diplomatic pressure backed by threat of economic measures but not (repeat not) of military force should be exerted on Iraq Govt. to (A) stop present anti-British activities including press and radio propaganda, (B) re-affirm publicly their loyalty to treaty, (C) break off diplomatic relations with Italy or at least enforce withdrawal of Italian Mission and internment of all Italians.

Six. If above steps were taken and taken firmly it would probably be unnecessary to demand arrest and deportation of Mufti and Jemal Husseini though we should not hesitate to do so

So long as we made it clear if opportunity appears favourable. that Mufti's arrest was due to intrigues with Italy reaction in Palestine and Syria should not be unduly serious.

Seven. A.0.C.-in-C. agrees.

Please pass to Air Ministry.

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