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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNment

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

CL

74

MOST SECRET

C.0.S. (40) 465 (Also

W.P.(40)207).

15TH JUNE, 1940.

WAR CABINET

COPY NO.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

FRENCH

PLANS TO MEET A CERTAIN EVENTUALITY:

COLONIAL EMPIRE AND MANDATED TERRITORIES

Report.

The assumption on which this Paper is written is that the French Government has ceased hostilities against Germany and Italy, and has been compelled to accept terms which will apply to the whole of her armed forces and her Colonial Empire and mandated territories. The object of our report, which is based on the general strategy which we have already recommended,

is to consider what our policy should be in regard to the French colonial Empire and mandated territories in these

circumstances.

2.

滤

Whatever the German terms may be, we must assume that they will include the immediate cessation of hostilities by all French forces and the use of any French bases or territory by German or Italian forces for operations against ourselves. In addition, the German terms may demand that the economic resources of France and her overseas possessions shall be placed at the disposal of Germany and Italy.

3.

In these circumstances there are three possible situations with which we may be confronted in dealing with French overseas possessions:

(a) at the best, we may be able to induce local French

authorities to continue the war independently; i.e., to deny their territory and resources to the enemy, and to permit us to make any use of these ourselves; (b) at the worst, local French authorities may adopt an

attitude of complete acquiescence in the German terms; i.e., full co-operation with any German demands and non-co-operation with ourselves. this case, any measures which we might take might be resisted by force;

In

(c) alternatively, local French authorities may adopt a

middle course, i.e., they will actively resist neither side.

# W.P.(40) 168

-1-

465

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