CAB80-13 — Page 75

Page 75

Page 75

Page 75

60

TERRITORIES WHOSE EA COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE UNDER ENEMY CONTROL

North Africa

In

7.

Without the French Fleet it will .ot be possible to control sea communications in the Western Mediterranean, these circumstances, we shall not be able for long to make any use of French North African bases ourselves, and it will not be possible to prevent the enemy from using them, We must assume that Germany and Italy will be able in time to make any use they like of French North Africa, including its economic resources.

8.

The most we can hope to do will be to interrupt internal communications in North Africa by sabotage and subversive activities among the tribes, exploiting to the full Moslim religious fanaticism. In doing this we are unlikely to be assisted by the higher French authorities, who will probably be cowed by the enemy at their gates; but it might be possible to obtain some assistance from individual French officers, especially in the more remote districts.

TERRITORIES WHOSE SEA COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE UNDER OUR OWN CONTROL

9.

Before reviewing the various French possessions whose sea communications will be under our own control, we would refer generally to the basic question of whether we should attempt to occupy any of these territories with our own forces. As we see the problem, the main factors are as follows:

(a) those bases which would be of most value either to

ourselves or to the enemy are already defended.

If local French authorities can be induced to deny these bases to the enemy, they will probably be able to do so without assistance from us, except for supplies:

(b) if the local French forces resisted an attempt by our

own forces to occupy these bases, we should be faced with opposed combined operations for which it is unlikely we should have the resources:

(c) if, as is more likely, local French authorities

adopted an apathetic attitude and decided not to resist an occupation either by ourselves or by the enemy, we should have the alternative of (i) occupation by our own forces, or (ii) preventing an enemy occupation by the action of our naval forces:

(d) in any case, the economic products of these territories

would be largely denied to the enemy by our control of sea communications,

On balance, we feel that, with our very limited resources, we should not attempt to occupy these territories.

Morocco

10. Gibraltar may become untenable as a naval as an alternative it would be desirable to use Casablanca.

ase, and The French should, therefore, be pressed to concentrate the remnants of their A. A. defences and fighter aircraft in this area. The circumstances which render Gibraltar untenable, however, would very quickly apply to Casablanca, and we should not contemplate using it as a base except with French agree- ment.

There would be no question of landing a force to occupy the base.

-3-

Page 75

Page 75Page 76