CAB80-13 — Page 74

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Importance of the French Empire in relation to our General Strategy

4。

After the collapse of France, our ability to defeat Germany will depend upon our being able to control at source Europe's essential external supplies, including supplies of tropical and colonial produce and non-ferrous metals, and upon the retention of key strategic positions from which we can exert what will virtually be a blockade of the whole of Europe.

5.

Our requirements in respect of French overseas possessions will be:-

(a) to control the economic products of the French Empire at source and prevent them reaching countries outside the British and American economic orbit. This would be of great importance for, if such trade continued, the whole scheme for contact at source might collapse;

(16) to make such use of French overseas bases as we may

require ourselves, e.g. Casablanca;

(c) to deny naval and air bases to Germany and Italy, e.g., Dakar, Syria, Madagascar, from which they could dispute our control of sea communications; (a) to prevent our enemies from making use of French

territory or military operations or subversive activities against our own possessions.

The political importance of avoiding any disturbance in the status quo in the Far East will be a governing factor in any measures which can be taken in regard to French Indo-China,

6. As we have already pointed out in paragraph 3 above, there are three possible situations with which we may be confronted, varying from full and willing co-operation on the part of local French authorities to complete non-co-operation and even active resistance, Much will probably depend upon the personality of the local Governor and his officials, and the pressure to which they might be exposed if they assisted us. We can make no assumption in advance as to the attitude we should encounter in the French overseas possessions generally; and we have, therefore, grouped the French possessions under three main headings in examining what our policy should be:-

(a) territories whose sea communications will be under

enemy control;

(b) territories whose sea communications will be under

our own control;

(c) other territories.

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