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The following comments are concerned mainly with the plan of defence set out in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Operation Instruction referred to above, and for convenience of reference, we have attached a copy of these paragraphs as an Annex.

5.

The plan of defence, as set out in these two paragraphs, appears to us to be generally sound. Never- theless, we are not entirely satisfied that sufficient emphasis has been laid upon the paramount necessity of resisting the enemy, by all means in our power, during that vital first phase in the operations where he will be most vulerable, i.e. during the process of disembark- ation on the beaches.

6.

It is during the period of the final approach and of the disembarkation that our air forces will hope to deliver a heavy scale of attack without fear of endanger- ing the lives of our own forces or of the civil population.

77. Although our interpretation of the explanation by the Commander-in-Chief, and of the operation orders, may not be entirely correct, we have formed the impression that the term "crust" or "outpost", when applied to the defence of our shores, is liable to misconception and danger. A defence, which is termed a "crust", implies that it is expected to be broken, while an outpost is indicative of thinly held posts from which retirement is permissible under pressure.

8*

We fully appreciate that it will be impossible in the time available, and with the forces at the Commander- in-Chief's disposal, to make impregnable the whole coast- line on which a landing might be attempted, especially as air-borne landings on a considerable scale must also be guarded against. Nevertheless, we feel that the balance of our defence, as the plan has been explained to us, may lean too far on the side of a thinly held "crust" on the coast, with insufficient mobile reserves in the irmediate vicinity of the points at which penetration might occur.

9.

We are not clear as to the location of reserves. While the position of London and the need for space for

deployment in any required direction necessitates the retention some way inland of the main reserves, yet the need for immediate counter attack against any penetrations is paramount, and troops so situated as the main reserves may take an unduly long time in coming into action.

Consequently we are anxious for an assurance, that bearing in mind the total forces available, there is a sufficient proportion available as local reserves in close support of the troops on the coast to hold the invader until the main reserves can intervene.

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