GA.
Page 20
14
5. Our ability to apply economic pressure to a degree which would ultimately be fatal to Germany would also be entirely dependent upon Pan-American economic co-operation. If this is forthcoming, deficiency commodities would be cut off at source and we shall be able to maintain control over the Allied overseas Empires and naval control of the wider oceans and focal points leading to the blockaded areas, and we will be in a strong position to control the deficiency commodities at source.
In effect our ability to defeat Germany would ultimately depend on a complete blockade of Europe and any relief to populations in territory occupied by the enemy would merely serve. to prolong the struggle.
6.
Without the full economic and financial co-operation of the whole of the American Continent the task might in the event prove too great for us single- handed. Nevertheless, even if the hope of victory in these circumstances appeared remote, we should continue to fight as long as it was humanly possible to do so.
7.
It has been suggested that, in the event of the United Kingdom being overrun by the enemy, the struggle could be continued by the British Fleet from the American Continent. In resisting invasion, however, the whole of our naval resources in home waters would be thrown into the defence and a successful invasion would automatically imply the loss of a large proportion or our fleet. The remaining forces, operating from America, would be faced with consider le problems of maintenance, supply and manning, and the combined German and Italian fleets, possibly strengthened by captured units of the French navy, might extend their activities well beyond the confines of Europe. Without our air weapon and with our ability to exert economic pressure through sea- power considerably reduced, our chances of victory would be virtually at an end, even with the full military and economic assistance of the American Continent.
Assistance we would required from the Americas.
8.
Our full requirements from the American Continent
in are clearly a matter for detailed examination but, broad terms, they would be as follows:-
(a)
(b)
The immediate and vital requirement would be the provision at once of first line aircraft, destroyers, light naval craft, military equipment and supplies necessary to maintain our defence forces in being, whilst our own production is being disorganised by the enemy offensive and our reserves expended. Personnel, possibly on a voluntary basis, to assist in manning ships and aircraft, are also needed.
For the further prosecution of the war we should require arrangements to ensure:-
(i) the stoppage at source of all
supplies to enemy countries and territory in enemy occupation, and full co-operation in our contraband control against the remaining European neutrals;
Page 20
Page 20
Page 20
Page 20Page 21
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.