CAB80-13 — Page 100

Page 100

Page 100

Naval

One or two cruisers to cover the landing. Escort and cover for the convoys depending

on the naval situation.

One aircraft carrier to provide and maintain

air protection until adequate A.A. defences have been put ashore.

Air

One fighter squadron.

Shipping

At least four liners

ships as necessary.

and M.T. and store

85

A. L. C's for the assault battalion. M.L.C's for landing guns and M. T.

It is doubtful, however, whether ever the above forces would be sufficient to secure the bases against a heavy scale of air attack from the mainland,

10. The Canaries, though important, are not vital to us. In view of the considerable forces involved of which we cannot at present spare the most important elements, e.g., fighters and A.A. guns

we do not recommend that we should seize these islands.

CAPE VERDE ISLANDS.

11. It is of great importance that our enemies should not have air or naval bases in the Cape Verde Islands, since we cannot route the Cape of Good Hope trade (which now includes all trade and supplies for the Near, Middle and Far East) clear of them without making a long detour if Freetown is still used as a convoy assembly port, or involving an even greater distance if trade is routed via the West Indies.

12. We estimate the forces required to capture and occupy the Cape Verdes (see Annex) to be:-

Army

Naval

Air

One Infantry brigade, Field Company,

Field Ambulance.

At least one cruiser or destroyer to

support landing on each island. Escort and cover for the convoys dependent upon the naval situation.

Carrier-borne fighter protection is

essential unless we

can be sure that no enemy aircraft are based on Sal,

Reconnaissance aircraft (one flight of

obsolete type) to be added to the

garrison after capture for watching the islands,

Shipping Two liners and store and M. T. ships as

required.

And

Page 100

Page 100

Page 100Page 101