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element which cannot be overlooked. Although it might not be prudent to send a continuous stream Appendix No. 4. of instructions to the Commander of a squadron, yet the telegraph must play an important part in future naval warfare.

Therefore, in the case of British Columbia, where the wires can run across the Continent on British territory, it makes it all the more important that Vancouver should ever continue to be our naval base in the North Pacific.

The Russian peace system of cruizing is usually by squadrons, while our mode of protecting commerce is frequently by single ships. These would have to be rapidly collected on the outbreak of war by the earliest telegraphic notice from England to the naval base.

On the opposite side of the Continent, Halifax is the Imperial fortress designed, heavily fortified, and maintained as an important base of naval operations in the North Atlantic. Our North Pacific fleet struggling without a telegraphic base, without a secure and well-fortified coal depôt, dependent, perhaps, on an island in mid-ocean for its coaling and supply station, might, I submit, be sometimes in a precarious condition.

It must be foreseen that, in a long naval war, it might not be possible to keep an island depôt supplied by coal transports, nor might it be possible to protect it against attack, or it might be the total annihilation of the coal stock and naval arsenal by fire.

Supposing Vancouver Dockyard given up and an island in mid-ocean selected as a coaling station instead, in the event of war our Pacific squadron must then rely for coal upon New South Wales or England, but notably upon Vancouver, and perhaps all three. Wherever it comes from it must be carried by colliers to whatever island point might be selected, and how many of these colliers might fall into the enemy's hands en route, supplying them at sea with the very material of which they would so much stand in need.

Now, where a dockyard and arsenal already exist, where a graving-dock for repair of disabled ships is in course of construction, where unlimited deposits of coal abound, where land forces are at hand, and, on completion of the Pacific Railway, can in ten or twelve days be reinforced from Ontario, where land batteries already stand, and, if necessary, can be easily supplemented, where there is now a telegraphic terminus, and, perhaps not the least noteworthy feature, where a loyal and a brave people can be thoroughly relied on to rally round for powerful and willing support, appears, in my humble judgment, to stamp Esquimalt as the place before any other on the Pacific where our naval basis and coaling station should be maintained.

To abandon such a naval base would appear to me to run the risk of being, in the event of sudden hostilities, swept out of the Pacific by a naval Power that has had ample time to concert its measures, and we must remember that, supposing we are swept out of the Pacific, and an enemy has got posses- sion of all our stores and coals, and other means that are in Vancouver Island, our important base of operations, he has shut us out of it entirely, and if we were to send a powerful squadron round the Horn to try to recover our supremacy on the Pacific, on what should we depend? We should be without any base, and at the greatest disadvantage in trying to recover that which, I must say, I think we should never run the risk of losing. I am far from an advocate for dispersing our forces at a number of points which, perhaps, might not produce much effect in a general war, but I do consider that an important point such as that on which we really must depend for everything in the North Pacific, must never be left at the risk of falling into an enemy's hands as his coal station, nor be aban- doned by us in any way.

The importance of Vancouver as our naval base, and the consequences which must be evident to all thoughtful and experienced officers of losing it, renders the railway across the Dominion one vitally concerning the whole Empire, and for these various reasons it is paramountly important that Vancouver Island should never be abandoned by our ships of war.

The harbour of Esquimalt, as I have already stated, can be easily defended; its position is naturally one of strength, easily approached from the Strait of Fuca, and available for ships of any tonnage or draught of water to enter by day or night at any time of tide, with depth of water varying from 7 to 9 fathoms, low spring tides. They can anchor in a safe roadstead, protected from the effects of wind and sea.

In making these observations, I naturally keep in view that Russia might be the enemy against which we must take precautions, for with respect to our neighbour over the border I think we need not give ourselves the slightest anxiety. It is true the American frontier has been advanced, so that our channel entrance from the south to Nanaimo can be commanded by American guns from the Island of San Juan, which we have allowed to become American ground.

There is an American military post (formerly the barracks of our Royal Marines) on the island within sight of our city of Victoria, another at Port Townshend, about 40 miles up Puget Sound, and another at Fort Vancouver, on the Lower Columbia River, the mouth of which is defended by heavy batteries near Astoria.

The United States are keenly sensible that fleets without well-defended coaling stations and fortified bases, accessible to the telegraph, and held in military occupation, are inefficient, if not dangerous, to trust to in modern warfare, and that they should not be relied upon alone to protect fixed points.

But America is peopled to a large extent by descendants of our own people. She has the same language, the same traditions and aims as ourselves. She is developing amazingly side by side with our own family, she is proud of our history as reflecting upon herself, she imitates and rivals our insti- tutions, and she will, like ourselves, never encourage the art of war with a view of promoting that which she knows full well never can follow in the wake of a purely warlike policy, namely, wealth, progress, and material development for her people and her industries.

It was stated, I believe correctly, that during the late Russo-Turkish campaigns there were eleven ships of war flying the Russian flag in San Francisco Harbour, all in first-rate order. They had about

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