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Appendix No. 4.

VANCOUVER ISLAND.

facilities for landing troops, as at Cadbury or Cormorant Bay, &c., and, unless a very strong land force were available, Victoria itself might be considered indefensible. It would, however, be very difficult for an enemy to cross the gorge, which is deep, with a strong tideway, and commanded throughout from its southern bank. Therefore Esquimalt might be considered secure, provided Signal Hill and Rodd Point had heavy guns on them, and the neck of land at Portage Inlet strongly defended by intrenchments, the guns being manned, as I have before reported, by trained artillerymen and enough regular soldiers to keep the volunteers up to the mark and act as an efficient reserve.

The question of the general utility of Esquimalt as a naval station and a coal depot will naturally depend upon, in the former case, the advantage it can offer as a secure and convenient harbour, a suitable base for supplies of all sorts, and its facilities for executing such repairs as may be needed for a squadron in time of war or peace.

The first two of these requisites would seem to be as well, if not better, fulfilled than would be possible at any of the South Sea Islands, while the completion of the graving-dock, and the slight necessary additions to the present very complete workshops and storehouses, would seem to fulfil the last-mentioned requisite.

As a coal depôt, however, the safety of Nanaimo, where the mines are situated, must always be a most important consideration. Lieutenant-Colonel Strange alludes pointedly to this, and from my own knowledge, I make no doubt, as I have before reported, but that the place presents facilities for casy defence against a naval attack. It would, however, in any case, seem possible and prudent to keep a sufficiently large supply of coal in safe reserve at Esquimalt.

All the above considerations seem, however, to be of secondary importance in view of the proposed railway terminus at Burrard Inlet. To any one who has seen the shipping at San Francisco, and noticed the business done by the Central and Union Pacific Railway, it must seem to be a matter of the very highest political and military importance to possess a naval station at what will eventually be the terminus of one of the greatest highways of commerce.

The position of Esquimalt with reference to the Straits of Fuca, the Channels of Haro and Rosario, the Straits of San Juan, the entrance of the Puget Sound, and the general configuration of the locality, seem to be most admirably adapted for protection and command.

Once the railway is in working order, the question of supplies, reliefs, &c., will receive the most satisfactory solution, and the contiguity of the American frontier with their depôt for coal at Puget Sound, and the otherwise unprotected terminus at Burrard Inlet, seem to furnish the strongest argu- ments in favour of retaining Esquimalt Harbour, and rendering it thoroughly secure as a naval station and marine depôt.

I may, perhaps, briefly refer to the coal mines at Nanaimo more in detail, for I almost doubt whether their value is as yet thoroughly understood and appreciated either on this or the other side of the Atlantic.

In 1875, for instance, I understand the output was over 110,000 tons, there were three Companies at work with plant, including eighteen engines, six steam-pumps, and communicating by tramway with the coaling wharves, which are 500 feet long, with a depth of water sufficient to permit the largest ocean steamer in the Pacific to come alongside.

The Director of the Canadian Geological Survey pronounced the Canadian Pacific coal-fields to be of vast extent; its enormous coal deposits must always render it a strong point for Imperial defence.

There is no reason why Vancouver Island should not be the great coal emporium, not only for the North Pacific but for the whole of Western America. The Pacific steam traffic is even now dependent upon the supply of coal from Vancouver, and I think, in view of these immense advantages, it would appear approaching the suicidal to abstain from strengthening our position in that direction.

The construction, again, of the Canadian Pacific Railway will eventually render it easy to convey any reinforcements required by land in time of war; the route decided upon has been already located, and a considerable portion of it from Thunder Bay on Lake Superior has been constructed towards the the west; tenders are out for further extension and for the building the line from Yale to Kamloops on the Fraser River; the portion from Yale or Hope to Burrard Inlet will probably soon be undertaken. From Burrard Inlet the distance is only a few miles across the Gulf of Georgia to Nanaimo and from thence to Esquimalt; the completion of the Pacific end of the railway will be a matter of no engineering difficulty nor requiring much time.

As I have stated, the present force of one battery of artillery and two companies of infantry at Victoria would be quite insufficient, but the railway will, by-and-by, transport reinforcements, and we must always rely as well upon the Royal Navy, for Great Britain cannot possibly neglect the advantages Esquimalt affords as a strategic naval base in the North Pacific.

We must not lose sight of the material progress in naval strength and resource which the Russians are rapidly developing at Petropaulowski and the mouth of the Amoor River, the former only 4,500 miles distant from Vancouver, and the latter but about 500 miles further. In the event of war, Russia would be in a position to harass, not only Hong Kong and our China and Japan trade, but to send a squadron across the ocean in thirty days to attack the western seaboard of the Dominion. This, in the possible absence of the British squadron, would, unless properly fortified beforehand, be in a great measure at the enemy's mercy.

What the result would be of such a hostile descent upon these shores, where so many monuments of British industry and energy exist, must awaken grave thought. Great Britain cannot, therefore, withdraw her naval protection from her North Pacific possessions, which the Dominion has conjointly already spent a large sum in partially fortifying.

If naval history proves anything, it proves that the Commander of a sea-going squadron must have full discretion, and that his success will be proportionate to his self-reliant genius; to restrict that quality may not be advantageous; telegraphic communication, on the other hand, is a very important

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