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a stop to all movements of shipping with valuable freights or gold from any of their ports. I imagine that mail steamers, knowing that their published time-tables could furnish an enemy with full information as to their exact positions almost hourly, and that they would be quite as easily intercepted coming out of Melbourne, or Glenelg, as King George's Sound, would confine themselves exclusively to the carrying of mails and passengers, and trust to their speed and their empty holds for exemption from capture. It may, I think, be taken for granted that, so long as there was any risk of its being captured, merchants would send valuable freights only under convoy, and gold in men-of-war.

22. In considering the defence of Western Australia, my attention has been directed to the measures proposed with the same object for the other Australian Colonies, and I trust I shall be pardoned if 1 venture to offer some observations respecting them which occur to me, though they are not in accord with the views expressed by the high authorities from whom these measures emanate.

23. It appears, from the Committee's Report, that a system of permanent defences has been undertaken for the protection of their principal towns and harbours, supported by a body of troops, not only sufficient to secure the works from attack by land, but also to take the field, and cope with any force likely to be brought against it. Granted the probability of these ports being attacked either for the purpose of levying contributions or for the destruction of the shipping they shelter, some defence is clearly required for their protection; but the question suggests itself, whether this could not be much better pro- vided by a naval force than by any system of land defences, to be manned and garrisoned by volunteers or Colonial troops? It is, of course, a great point to secure the immunity from attack of those towns and ports, but it is clear that this arrangement affords no security whatever to the trade of these Colonies, and that whilst they might easily and cheaply be protected from the attack of any small naval force that might reach these shores unobserved by our cruizers, no amount of defences or land forces will protect their shipping, for which they must, after all, be dependent on our men-of-war. It seems to me, therefore, open to question whether, after making such provision as might be necessary to guard against surprise, these Colonies would not have done better to have appropriated, in a different manner, the very large sums of money which the construction of the defences in question must have entailed, to say nothing of the outlay for their up-keep, and the maintenance of an armed force fit to take the field.

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24. There are no doubt political reasons why the Australian Colonies should have been urged to adopt the present course; it has imparted a feeling of security, which will probably last until we are actually at war; it has gratified a natural and laudable spirit of independence, by allowing them to feel that they possess their own defences and military forces, the control of which cannot fail to be very acceptable to a Colonial Ministry. the Imperial Government it is, of course, very satisfactory to be relieved from all claim or responsibility for the security of such wealthy and important Colonies in time of peace. But I submit, with due respect to the high authority by which this arrangement has been sanctioned, that if ever we are at war with the United States, or an European Power possessed of any naval force, the mother-country will find her responsibility for the protection of her Colonies is in as full force as ever, and that she will be called upon to provide means for it when she is perhaps the least prepared to do so.

25. I am aware that what is now being attempted in these Colonies is analogous to what has been successfully carried out in Canada, but I would point out that the circum- stances of the two countries differ materially. Canada's vulnerable point is on land, and her only enemy is not superior to her in military capacity; she lacks numbers, but this can be readily supplied from Imperial sources; it was therefore clearly right to encourage her to take measures for her internal defence. Such protection as her trade requires would be easily afforded by our Navy whilst engaged in harassing the enemy. But with Australia the case is different; it is most unlikely that one of the Great Powers would dispatch a land force for the attack of its fortifications, or that its land forces would be afforded the opportunity of showing their fitness to cope with it. Their real danger lies in the injury which would be inflicted by the presence on these coasts of an enemy's ships of war, an injury which, I submit, would be inflicted as much by their being shut up in their harbours as by their being exposed to capture at sea.

26. The question of the defence of Colonies is one which it has been my duty to consider during the greater part of my official career, and the conclusion at which I have arrived is, that, as it is a duty which must in the large majority of cases devolve upon the Imperial Government, it would be far better that such Colonies should contribute their proportion of the cost of the security they enjoy in the form of a money contribution, which would be, in fact, in the nature of an insurance, entitling them, in the event of war, to complete protection from aggression by sea and land at Imperial cost. Such an

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