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position of the Admiralty was loyally to do their best to help on any reasonable policy adopted by any of the Dominions, but at the same time they felt bound to explain clearly why, from the point of view of naval strategy, one policy was better than another. The overwhelming opinion of all naval authorities was that the greatest output of strength for a given expenditure of effort was to be obtained rather by a unified Flect disposed as required by strategical and tactical considerations than by detached Fleets, locally controlled and assigned, for other than purely naval reasons, to particular seas.

He undertook to arrange with Colonel Allen for preliminary Conferences during the ensuing week.

HI.-AERIAL NAVIGATION (AIRSHIPS).

Report of the Technical Sub-Committee (C.I.D. paper 159 B).

(Discussion adjourned from the 121st meeting.)

MR. CHURCHILL recalled that at the 120th meeting Sir Arthur Wilson had made a statement criticising the report of the Technical Sub-Committee which had impressed the Committee considerably. When the last meeting was held Sir John Jellicoe, who had been put in charge of these matters, had only just joined the Board. Since then he had gone into the question thoroughly, and had discussed the matter further with Sir Arthur Wilson, who had been good enough to furnish the Admiralty with a Memorandum, which they had examined with great care.

COLONEL SEELY said that he would like first to correct a slight misappre- hension which seemed to exist. His connection with this report was not as Secretary of State for War, but as Chairman of the Technical Sub-Committee, which in its turn was an offshoot from another Sub-Committee over which Lord Haldane had presided, and of which Mr. Churchill had been a member.

When this report had first been presented the Sub-Committee had submitted for consideration—

"that the standard to the attainment of which our efforts should be directed should be the

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provision of an Airship Fleet adequate to cope with that of any other Power with whom we are likely to come into conflict.”

To this recommendation exception had been taken, and it was perhaps looking rather too far ahead.

On reconsideration, therefore, the Sub-Committee had amended the recommendation (paragraph 27) to read :--

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"that the standard of attainment to which our immediate efforts should be directed should bẹ "the evolution, with the least possible delay, of a type of airship in no wise inferior to the best airships available in foreign countries for naval purposes and the training of personnel to handle airships of this type. The numerical standard of the Airship Fleet to be maintained will

· require consideration as soon as a satisfactory type of vessel has been produced.”

The present position was that the Army did not intend to build any airships this year. That branch of flying was being left to the Navy, while the Army was concen- trating its attention on aeroplanes. The report had been before the Committee for a long time, and he hoped very much that it might now be approved and be disposed of. SIR JOHN JELLICOE said that he had not had the advantage of hearing Sir Arthur Wilson's statement at the 120th meeting, but he understood that generally he had held that aeroplanes were more useful than airships, and that hostile airships could most easily be dealt with by aeroplanes. These views, he gathered, were based on Sir Arthur Wilson's belief in the very superior power of an aeroplane to rise as compared with an airship. As to this power in an airship, he thought Sir Arthur Wilson was under a misapprehension. The lifting power of a modern airship was 7 tons.

Of this the crew absorbed ₫ ton, fuel and oil sufficient for a journey from England to Cuxhaven and back 2 tons, spare 1 ton-leaving 3 tons available for carrying gear and explosives. A German airship of the Parseval type had flown over Sheerness and back to Germany. The newest Zeppelin" could carry 31 tons, and could remain in the air for 110 hours. There could be no question of the reality of the menace to our magazines, oil-fuel tanks, and dockyards, &c., if war should break Attack would probably be made by night, and the recent journeys were probably made with a view to pick up leading marks for future guidance.

out.

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